文献一覧: 永綱憲悟 (著者)

6 0 0 0 IR プーチンとイラク戦争 : 限定的バンドワゴニング外交の成果と限界 (高殿良博先生退職記念号)

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: 亜細亜大学
雑誌: 亜細亜大学国際関係紀要 (ISSN:09173935)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.18, no.1, pp.5-36, 2009-03

2018-05-14 08:44:47
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https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110007055355

3 0 0 0 OA 研究ノート : プーチンのウクライナ戦争 : 暫定的資料整理の試み.

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: 亜細亜大学国際関係研究所
雑誌: 亜細亜大学国際関係紀要 = JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ASIA UNIVERSITY (ISSN:09173935)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.32, no.2, pp.235-265, 2023

江川美紀夫先生・永綱憲悟先生の退職記念号

2023-05-25 05:42:46
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http://id.nii.ac.jp/1385/00026465/

2 0 0 0 OA プーチンと歴史政治 ―単一歴史教科書問題を中心に―

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2016, no.45, pp.89-102, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)
参考文献数: 21

On February 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed that it would be worth considering “unified Russian history textbooks” that show “respect to all pages of our past.” This announcement has been interpreted as patriotic propaganda or an attempt at re-writing the past to justify authoritarianism in the present. To be sure, we cannot overlook the clear intensification of patriotism under the Putin regime. Also, we cannot deny that Russian citizens’ protests against election fraud during 2011–12 led to Putin’s countermeasures, such as the creation of quasi-social historical organizations, advocacy for unified textbooks, and so on. These measures are clear examples of Putin’s historical politics, by which he means to use history arbitrarily for political purposes.However, it is quite misleading to say that Putin has successfully ordered the history textbooks rewritten to strengthen his own rule. In fact, we see three types of undercurrent concerning the policy on unified history textbooks. First, a group of young politicians with patriotic views advocated the unification of textbooks in response to neighboring countries’ historical politics. Cultural Minister Vladimir Medinsky is a typical example of this group. Second, academic historians such as Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the Institute of World History, sought to build a basic consensus on historical outlook among historians and people within Russia. Third, there were some liberal groups who opposed any kind of forced textbook unification by the government.Putin monitored these undercurrents, adapting his historical politics as necessary, and avoided dire conflicts between the government and any of these groups. In the end, the “historical-cultural standard” was created, which every textbook must follow. The standard, however, is very general and loose. Therefore, two history textbooks with somewhat different viewpoints were authorized by the education ministry.One characteristic of Putin’s method of governance is the adoption of halfway solutions to disputed issues. They often fail to solve conflicts between groups, and sometimes even preserve them. In this sense, conflicts over historical politics, including those regarding history textbooks, will continue in the future.

2 0 0 0 マーティン・メイリア著白須英子訳『ソヴィエトの悲劇-ロシアにおける社会主義の歴史1917~1991』

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌: 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日: no.118, pp.192-196, 1998

2019-04-01 18:01:10
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1 0 0 0 OA ウクライナ危機とプーチン : ユーロマイダンとの対抗

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: 亜細亜大学国際関係研究所
雑誌: 亜細亜大学国際関係紀要
巻号頁・発行日: vol.24, no.1/2, pp.1-53, 2015

2022-11-23 22:29:18
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http://id.nii.ac.jp/1385/00015732/

1 0 0 0 OA ポチョムキン・デモクラシー―プーチンの限界か―

著者: 永綱憲悟
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2004, no.33, pp.26-35, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

This paper argues that Russian democracy has become a charade, like Potemkin villages, caused by Putin's personality and his method of leadership.We can discern four types of viewpoints about the Russian political system under Putin. The first is the “affirmation/optimism” type, as represented by Anatol Lieven's view. He asserts that Putin is a “convinced reformer, dedicated to modernizing Russia” Scleifer and Treisman make a similar argument, advocating that Russia has become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy and noting that the common flaws of such a democracy are not incompatible with future economic and political progress. Russian analyst Vyacheslav Kostikov takes the same view and points out that Putin promotes “a pragmatic democracy”, which differs from the western style of democracy.The second is the “affirmation/pessimism” type, as represented by Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov. He has a pessimistic outlook for the future, while, to some extent, supporting the current Putin system. The third is the “negation/pessimism” type. American scholar Richard Pipes has a very negative opinion about the present, as well as the future, of the Russian political situation. He asserts that “Russia's democratic institutions have been muzzled” and “its cooperation with the international community far from assured.” Russian sociologist Olga Kyshtanovskaya, known for her elite studies, takes a similar pessimistic position.The fourth type, to which this paper adheres, is “negation/optimism”. Most Rus-sian liberal intellectuals maintain this point of view. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the Lower House, believes that the Putin government is going to take “a modernization model of authoritarianism”: However, he adds that this model cannot overcome such problems as poverty and corruption in Russia. Therefore, in his view, opinions demanding big changes will increase around the time of the government elections, from 2007 to 2008. Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova takes a similar position and expects a growth of grass-roots democracy in Russia.We can verify concretely the deficiencies in Russian democracy by looking at the process of the national election campaign in 2003 and 2004. The OSCE election monitor group concluded that the election process for Parliament, as well as the President, did not reach the international standards of a democracy.Russian political journalist Elena Treguvova confirms that Putin's political outlook and behavior are not suited to politicians in a democratic country. She asserts, first, that Putin has no charisma as a public politician. Second, Putin is an expert who “mimics” the manner of the person to whom he is talking. Third, Putin often takes a strong attitude when someone points out problems in his work. Fourth, Putin used to be extremely faithful to an order from a superior official. Fifth, Putin is bluntly strengthening control over the media.Under such a president, we cannot expect Russian democracy to make progress. Putin's limits are not, however, the Russian nation's limits. It is, therefore, groundless to assume that Russia will never become a democratic country in the future.