著者
鈴木 秀憲
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.1, pp.27-42, 2012-09-30

In 1980s, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues conducted a series of experiments on voluntary acts. Its result is that certain brain potential (RP) precedes conscious will, which has excited much discussion about the existence and nature of free will. This paper shows that this result admits various interpretations about RP, conscious will, and their relation, depending on philosophical assumptions concerning free will and the relation between mind and brain. I also argue that the process of deliberation, rather than the momentary decision, should be the focus of investigation in order to elucidate the role of conscious will and the nature of free will.
著者
鈴木 秀憲
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.1, pp.27-42, 2012-09-30 (Released:2017-08-01)
参考文献数
41

In 1980s, Benjamin Libet and his colleagues conducted a series of experiments on voluntary acts. Its result is that certain brain potential (RP) precedes conscious will, which has excited much discussion about the existence and nature of free will. This paper shows that this result admits various interpretations about RP, conscious will, and their relation, depending on philosophical assumptions concerning free will and the relation between mind and brain. I also argue that the process of deliberation, rather than the momentary decision, should be the focus of investigation in order to elucidate the role of conscious will and the nature of free will.

1 0 0 0 OA 非決定と自由

著者
鈴木 秀憲
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_47-2_63, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)
参考文献数
20

Robert Kane developed naturalized version of Libertarianism in his The Significance of Free Will. In this paper, his free will theory is critically examined.    My criticism consists of two parts. In the first part, I argue that Kane’s theory is troubled by the problem of choice’s being matters of chance, and his account of ultimate control does not provide any solutions. It is also pointed out that though his position satisfies UR (the condition of Ultimate Responsibility), since it is only vacuously satisfied, the source of an agent’s purposes cannot be said to lie in the agent.    In the second part, I compare Kane’s theory with a compatibilist theory, showing that his position gives no more freedom-elevating features than compatibilism. Thus it is concluded that Kane’s attempt fails as a libertarian theory.