著者

齋藤 厚

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.113-137, 2001

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During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994, Muslims there decided to give a new name to the language which they spoke. This decision was taken together with the change of their ethnic name. "Bosnian" (Bosanski) replaced Serbo-Croatian as the official name of their language, while "Bosniacs" (Bošnjaci) was adopted as their new national name. Bosniacs continued to use the linguistic elements of Serbo-Croatian even after its nominal change. At that time, it was uncertain whether they would seek to create purely Bosnian linguistic elements. The first orthographical textbook of Bosnian was published in the autumn of 1996. Some minor changes were added to the linguistic elements of Serbo-Croatian in this textbook. Despite its publication, some questions about Bosnian remain unclear. One is whether Bosnian is to be considered a distinct language or it is no more than a new name of Serbo-Croatian. Another is why the new language name does not correspond to the new national name. In this paper I have tried to answer these questions by examining the linguistic, historical, and political background of Bosnian. The paper also reconsiders the role of language in ethnic identity because the case of Bosnian is a rare one: a nation based on religion has tried to create its own language later. The first chapter indicates the linguistic features of Serbo-Croatian in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the base of Bosnian. Serbo-Croatian was established as the common language of the region's Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Montenegrins in the late 19th century. It is a single, standard language with two major variants (the western or Croatian and eastern or Serbian variants) and two varieties (that spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that in Montenegro). Standard Serbo-Croatian is based on the dialect spoken extensively in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina and western Serbia. The variants contain many words exclusive to themselves, while the varieties blend elements of both variants. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims speak the same Bosnian language variety. It is almost impossible to distinguish a Serb from a Croat from a Muslim by their speech alone, because the ethnic distribution was very mixed and their dialects vary geographically, not ethnically. In the Bosnian language variety it is acceptable/common to use and mix elements of both variants. The second chapter reviews the recent history of arguments and policies about Bosnian language. Despite the above language situation, certain Muslim linguists argued that Bosnian should be recognized as a distinct language in the 1970's. The authorities in the late 19th century, too, once attempted to create a Bosnian language. Bosnian was chosen for the name of the official language in Bosnia-Herzegovina soon after the start of the Habsburgs' rule there. Benjamin Kallay, who served as governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, believed the necessity of a separate Bosnian national identity among the population and therefore decided to create a Bosniac people and a Bosnian language. At that time, Serbs called their mother tongue Serbian and used a Cyrillic-phonetic alphabet, Croats called it Croatian and used a Latin-etymological alphabet, and Muslims called it Bosnian or Serbian or Croatian and used an Arabic or a Cyrillic-phonetic alphabet. In order to standardize their common spoken language as Bosnian, Kallay and his government decided to adopt a Latin-phonetic alphabet and established the Committee for the Bosnian Language. The work of this committee resulted in the publication of a Grammar of Bosnian Language for High Schools in 1890. Though this textbook was widely used, many problems related to the name of the language arose. Serbs and Croats were strongly against the name Bosnian, and they refused to call their language as such not only in high schools but also in public life. Some Muslim intellectuals positively accepted this name, but most of the Muslim population were not like them. Thus, Kallay's attempt proved unsuccessful in its early stage, and no more important measures were taken after that. In 1907, 4 years since Kallay's death, the official language in Bosnia-Herzegovina was renamed from Bosnian to Serbo-Croatian. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia founded in 1918 did not recognize neither nationality nor particularity of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of such situation, they never relied on the former unsuccessful names of "Bosniacs" and "Bosnian". They continued to keep a distance from these names after World War II in Socialist Yugoslavia for decades. The name "Bosnian language" was revived in the early 1970's, this being catalyzed by the proclamation of a Muslim nationality and by various national movements in other federal units. At this time, Bosnian was perceived particulary as the language of Muslims. Though some Muslim linguists insisted that it needed to put back the voiced h wherever it was suspected one might have existed, they could not present any good examples. Others even admitted that it would be difficult for Bosnian to have its own elements. They did not insist on the use of the name Bosniac nation along with Bosnian, because they regarded it as a negation of the Muslim national conciousness. The third chapter surveys the change of national and linguistic identity of Muslims in the process of disintegration in ex-Yugoslavia, and examines how Bosnian has been created and used. Influenced by the increasingly fluid politics in the late 1980's, the national and linguistic identitiey of Muslims started to be shaken. Many questions related to their nationality and language were raised, especially after the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1990. Muslims themseives once decided to keep the existing names of "Muslim nation" and "Serbo-Croatian language" after several controversies. But the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought about another situation. During the war in 1993, two events occured which later made Muslims change their national and language names. One was the start of the conflict with Croats, their former ally against Serbs. This new coflict made Muslims seek a language name other than Serbo-Croatian. The other was the publication of a paper named "The Clash of Civilizations?" by Huntington. It strengthened the anti-Islam tendency among Westerners, and their strong bias forced Muslims to seek another national name. In the next year, Muslims dared to adopt the new names of Bosniacs and Bosnian, which they had long avoided using. These names were adopted without any strong opposition despite their negative past and implications. Some pretexts were formed for the use of these names by Muslim intellectuals. They explained that the Bosniac national name, which implied a supranational concept, could be used by Muslims exclusively because Serbs and Croats would not identify themselves as such any more. They also insisted that the language had to be Bosnian, not Bosniac, because it would be regarded as a mother tongue not only by Bosniacs but also by members of other nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Until the publication of its first orthographical textbook in 1996, Bosnian was de facto a new name added to Serbo-Croatian. But it became clear that Muslims, now Bosniacs, wanted Bosnian to be exclusively their language in this textbook. New elements were invented in it, through changing some orthographic rules, or putting back the voiced h wherever it was suspected one might have existed in the distant past. Though Bosnian was created in such way, its new elements are not always used. Interventions in the language were too late and subtle. In addition, the authorities have not formed a concrete language policy, and the Bosniac population is not eager to use them. Considering these conditions, it is impossible to regard Bosnian as a distinct language. It is also hard to foresee that Bosnian will become more distinct in the near future, because there are no signs of change in these conditions for the time being. It was not easy for Bosnian to be created from the beginning. Since standard Serbo-Croatian is based on the dialect in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian could not pick up enough peculiar elements from this dialect. Furthermore, Bosnian had great difficulty in finding elements exclusive to Muslims/Bosniacs in this dialect which is shared by the three nations.

著者

齋藤 厚

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.39-61, 2005

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In Slovenia, the first parliamentary election was held in 1990. The coalition DEMOS, which was formed by the newly-founded Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDS) and other new parties, won the election. The DEMOS government played a decisive role in the process of the independence of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. The second election was held in 1992. The center-left SDS achieved limited success in this election. Though the SDS was included in the coalition government formed by the Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS, the former League of Socialist Youth), the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD, the former League of Communists) and the Christian Democrats of Slovenia (SKD, the center-right new party), it considered a merger with the Socialist Party of Slovenia (SSS) for its survival. However, after the party leader Janez Janša was removed from the position of defence minister because of a military scandal in March 1994, the SDS stepped out from the ruling coalition and abandoned much of its social-democratic platform. The party turned into a rightist party, which strongly emphasized nationalism and anti-communism. The SDS was very successful in this turn, and it has been the strongest opposition party since the 1996 elections. In this paper, the author analyzes the factors that are related to the success of this right turn by the SDS. The first factor was an intra-party factor, the political leadership of the party leader Janša. As a dissident from the communist time and a hero in the country's bid for independence, he has been regarded as a charismatic leader in Slovene politics. He excels in perceiving public opinion and exploiting it for his political purpose, rather than initiating policies by himself. Thus, he perceived and started to exploit nationalism and anti-communism among people who stood up for him when he was ousted from his cabinet position. The SDS followed him firmly since the party executive backed him, and the greater part of the party were members who newly joined in support of him. The second factor was an inter-party factor, the close linkage between political parties and interest groups, and the absence of a strong nationalist party. By 1994, the main parties built close relations with their interest groups, for example, the LDS with the capitalist class, the ZLSD with the working class, the SKD with the Catholic Church and the Slovene People's Party (SLS, the center-right party which emerged in 1989 as the former Slovene Farmers' Alliance) with farmers. On the other hand, the far-right in the Slovene political spectrum was vacant at that time due to the split of the SNS (Slovene National Party) into several groups. The SDS, which had failed in getting the support of the working class, used this vacancy and succeeded in approaching the voters of the right. The third factor was a sociopolitical factor, the control of administrative structure by the government coalition. In Slovenia, various laws and administrative organs were established intensively after independence. Eventually, when the administrative structure was established or reformed, officials were largely recruited from party members of the then government coalition. The LDS, ZLSD and SKD appointed their members as leaders of the ministries. Thus, the government coalition in 1993 gained control of the administrative structure. The SDS, which was ousted from the coalition, started to criticize this control as the restoration of communist power (LDS, ZLSD) with the help of the collaborationists (SKD). This criticism by the SDS drew the support of the people who didn't enjoy the benefits of the transition. The fourth factor was an institutional factor, the introduction of corporatism, and the ZLSD's domination over it. In Slovenia, corporatism, which consists of the National Council, the chamber system and social partnership, has been introduced since 1992. By 1994, the ZLSD succeeded in dominating the social partnership, the main institution of Slovene corporatism, through its connections with the government, the trade union and the employers' association. This seemed to be the revitalization of the former system to its critics. The SDS started to demand change in the existing trade unions and employers' association, to draw the support of these critics. The fifth factor was a historical factor, the split in the Slovene nation over their modern history. During World War II and the Nazi occupation, Slovenes were divided into two sides, the communist-led partisans and the collaborationists. After the end of communist rule, the Catholic Church, on behalf of the collaborationists, started to revise historical events during WWII to justify their past collaboration. Since then Slovenes have once again become divided over their modern history, whether they take sides with the partisans or the collaborationists. The SDS, which was not previously a supporter of the collaborationists, started to advocate them and succeeded in attracting support from them. The sixth factor was a geographical factor, namely the smallness of the state. With a territory of about 20,000 square kilometers and a population of 2 million, administrative and economic structures in Slovenia are small and simple. Under this circumstance, the SDS's criticism of the heritage of the former regime seemed concrete to its supporters, though it was actually distorted. In Slovenia, parties form a coalition government based on its proportional electoral system which often does not produce a majority party. The SDS had kept its political influence through criticizing the former communists in power and being in opposition. The SDS became the first party in the parliametary election in 2004, and formed a coalition government with other rightist parties. Now the question is whether or not the SDS will be able to keep the same political stance as when it was in opposition.

著者

齋藤 厚

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.52, pp.39-61, 2005

著者

國井 乙彦 齋藤 厚 熊澤 淨一 荒田 次郎 松田 静治 大石 正夫 馬場 駿吉

出版者

Japanese Society of Chemotherapy

雑誌

日本化学療法学会雑誌 (ISSN:13407007)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.6, pp.655-664, 1995

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新しく開発された経口ペネム系抗生物質TMA-230を各科領域の細菌感染症を対象として, 100mg1日3回投与を中心に, 有効性・安全性を検討した。呼吸器感染症では, 100mg1日2回から200mg1日3回投与を行った (1日投与量200~600mg)。急性気管支炎では全例有効で, 細菌性肺炎では90%に近い有効率が得られたが, 慢性気道感染症での有効率は56.7%であった。また, 細菌学的効果では主要起炎菌のうち<I>Staphylococoamus</I>や<I>Streptococcus pneumoniae</I>では80%以上の菌消失率であったが, <I>Haemopmus influenzae</I>に対しては9.1%(1/11) と低く, 不十分な成績であった。尿路感染症および皮膚科, 産婦人科, 眼科, 耳鼻咽喉科領域感染症では100mg1日3回投与で満足できる臨床効果および細菌学的効果が得られた。自他覚的副作用発現率は13.2%(28/212) で, 特に下痢・軟便, 悪心・嘔吐など消化器症状の発現頻度が9.9%(21/212) と高かった。臨床検査値異常の発現頻度は8.0%(17/212) で, GOT, GPT, Al-P上昇の肝機能異常が主なもので, すべて一過性の変動であった。

著者

齋藤 厚 砂川 慶介 炭山 嘉伸 中島 光好 池澤 善郎 比嘉 太 佐々木 緊 矢野 裕二

出版者

公益社団法人 日本化学療法学会

雑誌

日本化学療法学会雑誌 (ISSN:13407007)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.8, pp.497-506, 2003-08-25 (Released:2011-08-04)

被引用文献数

1