著者
河見 誠
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, pp.14-26, 2008 (Released:2021-03-31)

Thomas Aquinas is said to be not only the greatest medieval philosopher, but also the first modern figure. He put autonomic reason and the human being at the starting point of understanding being and belief. However, his attempt was persistently a compilation of ancient and medieval thoughts, therefore his concepts of autonomy of reason and humanity, which seemed quite modern and yet were quite different from those of the modern era onwards. I will focus on these differences and search into what the modern era cuts off from the medieval concept of reason and the image of human beings compiled by Thomas. Through this inquiry, we will uncover the points which we should reconsider modern legal thought. According to Thomas, autonomy of reason means that reason can grasp being and essence by its own power. However, reason presupposes them both when it works. Truth in speculative reason is conformity of intellect and thing. Moreover, truth in practical reason is conformity of intellect and right appetite, that is, will. Being and reason are not in a one-way, linear relation, but in a two-way, circular relation. From being to reason, reason to will, will to being. From the perspective of such a circular development, the character or position of the human being would be as follows : “incompleteness,” “just a part of being order,” “having a role in realization of being” (from possibility to reality), “trial and error in the process of human activity.” The modern era requires law and legal thought as normative support for breaking the connec tive ring of being, reason, and will. If such modern efforts bring about the opposite human character or position, that is, “human unrestrainedness,” “lack of holistic perspective in under standing being,” “loss of objective purpose,” “arbitrary action and perception,” and such character or position causes a huge distortion to humanity, society and nature, law and legal thought should enter the process of connecting the circular ring. This is what Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy would suggest.
著者
堅田 研一
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1996, pp.120-128, 1997-10-30 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
5
著者
池田 弘乃
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, pp.140-147, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

In this essay, I shall explore the relationship between feminist legal theory and contemporary studies on the concept of law. I shall then .seek the possibility of more productive dialogue rather than mere accusation among themselves. Feminist legal theorists have fiercely criticized law's claim to neutrality or autonomy. Yet their attitudes toward law are diversified into the broad spectrum from the optimistic reformism within law to the detached pessimism over such legal reforms. I shall argue that feminist legal theory needs to tackle the studies of the concept of law to escape from the predicament caused by rigid dichotomy between legal optimism and pessimism. The main focus of my argument is the thoughts of normative legal positivism. Legal positivism is often caricatured and criticized as a formalistic approach which disguises gender biases behind purportedly value-neutrality. Its worth, however, must not be overlooked. There are the affinities for several themes such as anti-essentialism between legal positivism and feminism (at least concerning its post-modern strands). The appreciations of the affinities and differences deserve to a close research. In the course of argument, we can use the sketch of the problematics figured by feminist legal theorist Nicola Lacey, who has been committed to the tradition of English analytical jurisprudence and at the same time influenced by the deconstructive thought of Drucilla Cornell. To connect Cornell's utopian imagination to the actual institutional reform of the legal system. Lacey scrutinizes the argument of normative positivism, especially ethical legal positivism (EP) set out by Tom Campbell. EP encourages to engage in more radical social reform through democratic process rather than judicial process, although EP's antagonism toward judicial review of democratic legislation has a substantial danger for minority protection against the tyranny of majority. I try to show both EP’s advantages and dangers for feminist legal theory and construct a standpoint for further research.
著者
松尾 陽
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, pp.241-250, 2008 (Released:2021-03-31)

In recent years, the state which heavily depends on the governmental regulations has been criticized and demands for “deregulation” are increasing. One of the central questions is “What is regulation?” In order to answer this question in ‘Post-Regulatory State’ debate we make clear how regulation by architecture (which was suggested by Lawrence Lessig) functions and show its significance. We analyze “New Chicago School” approach, into which the concept of architecture was introduced by Lessig, in order to understand necessity for thinking about regulation by architec ture in jurisprudence and recognize its importance for carrying out legal regulation effectively. This approach augues that there are multiple regulators (law, market, social norm, and architecture) , that each regulator interacts, and that law can efficiently control human behavior through its regulating other regulators (“indirect regulation”, for example, gatekeepers regulation). Because of these features, regulation by architecture is not only necessary but also important for thinking about legal regulation. Here we define the architecture as “controllable physical environment”. Regulation by architecture functions in the way that its constraint cannot be ignored, that it regulate the regulated whether he recognizes the architecture as a regulation or not, and that we don’t need any agent to enforce it. Unlike legal regulation, regulation by architecture functions without monitoring and enforcement because of these features. Because of this nature of regulatory functions in architecture, regulation by architecture can be very efficient, but reduce opportunities to rethink of validity of regulation at the stage of monitoring and enforcement.
著者
下川 潔
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, pp.40-52, 2008 (Released:2021-03-31)

This paper begins by identifying two prominent features of the modern tradition of natural jurisprudence. First, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke adopted narrow concepts of justice. And second, they were deeply concerned with the origin of property. Given this seventeenth century background, the paper explores and clarifies the ways in which Hume transformed the tradition of natural jurisprudence and paved the way for Bentham’s utilitarianism. First, Hume adopted even a narrower concept of justice. He took over Grotius’s concept of justice as alieni abstinentia, and narrowed it further by excluding a human body and its attributes from the realm of justice. Hume reduced alienum to another’s ‘external possessions’ by considering ‘three different species of goods’ (THN 3.2.2.7) and arguing that external possessions alone were the proper object of justice. This argument actually involves a fallacy, but it did function to destroy the natural lawyers’ idea that justice serves to protect human dignity. Second, Hume transformed the earlier conventionalist theories of the origin of property. He developed a new naturalistic concept of convention by radically transforming a set of agreement related concepts; pactum (Grotius), covenant (Hobbes), and pactum or conventio (Pufendorf). Unlike the old concepts, Hume’s is entirely free from the notion of willing. He sees convention as a convergence or concurrence of more than two person’s senses of interest. Besides having this naturalistic concept, Hume resorts to an Epicurean principle. He explains the virtue of justice in terms of the feeling of pleasure which is produced, in a spectator’s mind, by the public utility of the system of justice. In spite of some existing differences between Hume and Bentham, these naturalistic and Epicurean strands in Hume did make a significant contribution to the rise of Bentham’s utilitarianism.