2 0 0 0 OA 自然法の論理

著者
稲垣 良典
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1960, pp.77-109, 1961-08-30 (Released:2009-02-12)
参考文献数
70
著者
愛敬 浩二
出版者
THE JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, pp.76-87,203, 2005

Libertarianism is not so popular among the constitutional lawyers in Japan. There are some reasons for that situation, but one of the most important reasons is that Japanese Constitution is, both in content and in its historical background, not suitable for the ideology of libertarianism. So under the constitution like that, libertarianism could hardly prevail, and there is no need for constitutional lawyers to take it seriously.<br> But this story is too simple. If libertarianism is not the vindication of "laissez-faire" capitalism, but the diehard claim for liberty of private life of individuals, then constitutional lawyers should not make light of the critical stance of libertarians to the paternalistic regulation of the government. Especially in Japan, constitutional theory of "double standard dependent on the aim of regulation" allows the government very wide range of paternalistic regulation on economic freedom. Japanese constitutional lawyers could learn much from the libertarian criticism of that theory.<br> But the problem of libertarian criticism is that they don't pay due attention to democracy. So taking libertarianism more seriously, we, Japanese constitutional lawyers, should come to think much about democracy, and I think it's good for us.
著者
瀧川 裕英
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, pp.181-189, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

This paper aims to demonstrate the thesis that the duty to obey the law is not particular. To show this. I begin by examining the difference between the duty to obey the law and political obligation, though they are usually used interchangeably. I argue that aliens staying in a host state do have the former but not the latter. Thus the duty to obey the law does, pace John A. Simmons, not meet the particularity requirement, while political obligation does. The duty to obey the law is rather regarded as the duty to reach a global juridical state (status iuridicus), which is discussed by Immanuel Kant. I conclude that we owe political obligation only insofar as it is a useful way to discharge such a universal duty.
著者
那須 耕介
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, pp.190-197, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

For the theory of the duty to obey the law. its introductory discussion is as important as its main discussion. In order to bring out the importance and role of theory of the duty to obey the law. we cannot avoid examining its practical significance as well as its theoretical specificity. Here I propose to focus not only on the traditional problem of 'evil law' but also on the problem of 'doubtful law'. Each provides the means to overcome the skepticism about the importance (or, theoretical specificity) of the theory of the duty to obey the law. The former, 'evil law' approach have pointed out that the concept of law's content-independent morality - legality, or L. L. Fuller's 'inner morality of law' - is the key to establish the general duty to obey the law. Besides, the latter, 'doubtful law' approach opens up the perspectives to a new domain of inquiry on the conditions of subjects who are expected to obey and respect their law that is, the conditions of citizenship or law-abiding morality.
著者
横濱 竜也
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, pp.198-204, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

Must we adhere to ask and solve the problem of obligation to obey the law? An affirmative answer to this question is not self-evident. On one hand, legal positivists (like Matthew Kramer) who attempt to build a comprehensive descriptive theory of law which covers all the phenomena of law around the world, deny any necessary relations between the concept of law and morality. So they wholeheartedly accept that an evil law is also a law. but they reject the idea that law in general has a value which deserves the basis of obligation to obey the law. On the other hand, for natural law theories (like Michael Moore's) that argue we should recognize the normativity of law only when the law is morally just, an evil law is basically not a law (except when the evil law is useful as a heuristic to find what is morally just), so the problem whether and why we should obey evil laws just because they are law, is not a problem from the very beginning. Legal theories mentioned above treat useless the arguments to solve the basis of obligation to obey the law. But if we recognize that when we fulfill our obligation to obey the law. we should not only comply with laws, but also occasionally we should disobey them in order to improve the law to conform to common values of our society, it becomes clear that it is not sufficient to ask whether laws are useful for us to follow good or right reasons. Rather we must ask whether law's have the intrinsic value of law sufficient to ground obligation to obey the law.
著者
ムスラキス ジョージ
出版者
The Japan Association of Legal Philosophy
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, pp.205-215, 2009 (Released:2021-12-29)

J. S. Mill thinks of individuality as the most essential of human interests. Individuality is equivalent to freedom as meaning self-determination - the principal condition of and main ingredient in self-development. Accordingly, non-interference is, for him, a vital prerequisite of the good life: it is a fundamental presupposition of his liberalism that individuals should not be interfered with unless their activities can be shown to injure the interests of others. But in addition to the individualist-functionalist strain in Mill's thought there is also a strong strain of skepticism and this is a fundamental component of his liberalism. As well as presupposing a particular view of the nature of man. Mill’s liberali.sm also rests on an empiricist view of the nature and possibilities of human knowledge. From this point of view, fallibilism is seen to be one basis of his belief in toleration, k corollary of Mill's fallibilism is his conception of human nature as essentially open and incomplete. His doctrine of individuality and self-development, on the other hand, appears to imply that the individual is definable by certain necessary and permanent characteristics. Following a discussion of the empiricist and fallibilist strain in Mill's liberalism, this paper offers an interpretation of Mill's view that reconciles these two seemingly discordant elements in his understanding of man.