著者
宮川 真一
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2002, no.31, pp.181-198, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)
参考文献数
60

In Russia, “fundamentalism” in the Russian Orthodox Church has been on the rise since the early 1990's. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” stand for restoration of autocracy, restriction against the Jews and the confessions other than the Orthodox one, the imperial principle of state structure, the Russian Orthodox Church status as the state church, for complete rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as concerns the freedom of conscience), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the country and struggle against it beyond its borders, and compulsory imposition of “Orthodox values” in every-day life, culture and even economy. Their worldview is based on extremely mythologized notions about the pre-revolutionary Orthodox monarchy.Inside the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga Ioann, a person of a greatest authority among the conservatives, prodused the most convincing arguments in favor of a “fundamentalist” position. Many Orthodox “fundamentalist” leaders including an activist Konstantin Dushenov, Editor-in-Chief of “Orthodox Rus” newspaper, have followed Ioann. Some church bishops and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and of the True Orthodox Church have represented “fundamentalist” circles in these churches. A number of Orthodox brotherhoods, such as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union, the Union of Orthodox Citizens, ideologically hold extremely nationalist positions. Same as the similar extra-Church groups, such brotherhoods are not supported by the bishops, but it is impossible to expel anybody from the Church for political views and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working actively. Moreover, right-wing extremist organizations, such as “Pamyat”, “Black Hundred”, “Russian National Unity” actively cooperate in many regions with Russian Orthodox Church clerics. These persons and organizations can be classified into “fundamentalism” and “quasi-fundamentalism” for the moment. The clerics in the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox church Abroad, the True Orthodox Church are the former. The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union are included in it. The Union of Orthodox Citizens and the right-wing extremist organizations are the latter.“Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” fight back to defend their national and religious identity and worldview, fight with fundamentals of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality”, and fight against their enemy. such as Western Europe, globalization under the name of God. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism” is similar to Russian Right-wing Extremism, and both of them are violent and aren't tolerant. “Russian Orthodox Fndamentalists” base their core identity on religion and they try to construct structual violence. Russian Right-wing Extremists emphasise race, nationality, state in their identity and they resort to physical violence. In addition, Russian New Right-wing Extremism borrow various ideologies othar than Russian Orthodox Christianity.In 2002, conflict between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church has come to the surface. It seems that since the early 1990's the unstable balance between “fundamentalists” and the Patriarchate has been gradually shifting in favor of “fundamentalists”. It is impossible to ignore the influence of “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” at the aspects of politics, society, and public opinion in Russia today.
著者
宮川 真一
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.131-143, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
40

In 1949, international peace campaign was formed systematically. The Russian Orthodox Church participated in the international peace movement and played a leading role. In the same year, a column “In Defense of Peace” was newly established in the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”. In the “Peace” column, information on the peace campaign and the Russian Orthodox Church's participation in that movement and the most important documents of the World Peace Council began to be published. However, no specialized research on the peace activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th century exists in Russia, and this theme has not been reviewed and evaluated academically.In this paper “war and peace” image presented by the Russian Orthodox Church in early postwar years is considered, analyzing the articles published in the “Peace” column in the “Journal”. The followings are observed as features of the “Peace” column. It closely reflects the trend of the peace organizations both inside and outside the Soviet Union, a wide variety of articles are published primarily as editorials, and authors consist mainly of the Orthodox high priests, such as Metropolitan Nikolai. In addition, as character of the “Peace” column, the most articles relate on the Christian Church and the world peace organizations, about half of the articles include direct criticisms directed toward the Western countries and direct praises to Stalin and the Soviet Union.Nikolai was a leader of peace activities in the Russian Orthodox Church. He talked about Christian church. He insisted that the Russian Orthodox Church contributed to peace, and that the Christian world had to cooperate each other. In addition, Nicolai wrote about world peace organizations. He reported favorably the condition of the various peace movements including the World Peace Council and praised Stalin and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Nikolai preached about international relations. While striving for peace activities such as the award of the International Stalin Peace Prize, he condemned fighting acts of the Western countries including the United States of America in the Korean war.In this way, the “Peace” column is filled with the voice of peace as a Christian. However, the Orthodox Churches are praised in the field of Christian church, the Eastern countries are praised in the field of world peace organizations, and the Western countries are criticized in the field of international relations. The "war and peace" image presented by the Russian Orthodox Church in the early postwar period consists of an image of the Orthodox Church which serves peace, an image of the peace-loving Eastern countries, and a militant image of the Western countries. “Journal” actively discussed peace, but it reflected the intention of the Soviet state under the Cold War of those days.
著者
宮川 真一
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.146-156, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after passage of the 1990 law on freedom of conscience, Russian people showed increased interest in religion, moral values, and national cultural traditions. Such a phenomenon is quite understandable because the ideology of socialism had failed. Every other state also has come to bear various aspects of a multicultural society nowadays. Elements, which constitute society, such as ethnicity, culture, and religion, have become far more diversified than expected. As a result, every state is compelled to restructure its educational system, so that it may better accommodate to this growing diversity. While the specific contents of value education differ from country to country, it can generally be stated that those in advanced countries involve citizenship education, multicultural education, or education aimed at developing autonomous value judgment. On the other hand, those in developing countries involve moral education, religious education, or education aimed at developing national identity.From the early 1990s on, we have observed the decentralization of the system of education in Russia. School curricula are being revised, new elective and local initiatives in education are being encouraged, and private schools are appearing. Thus the system of education has become more flexible and there is a favorable situation to introduce religious education as an elective. In the early 1990s, the Russian Ministry of Education made the decision to introduce religious studies in Russian schools by means of curricula stressing Christian ethics and morality. High officials from the Russian Ministry of Education also approached Western Christian educators for help. The response was a collaborative effort of over 80 Western mission groups called the CoMission, which instructed Russian public school educators in the teaching of Christian ethics and morality. The CoMission was to teach those Christian beliefs that were common to all Christian denominations, but its curriculum represented a Protestant approach to Christian ethics and Scripture. In 1995 the Ministry of Education suspended the Protocol of Intention with the CoMission.By virtue of its title Alla Borodina's textbook “Basics of Orthodox Culture” became the symbol of the proponents of introduction of BOC. The textbook has the stamp “Recommended by the Coordinating Council on Cooperation of the Ministry of Education of Russia and the Moscow patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.” The discussion about the teaching of the “Basics of Orthodox Culture” in public schools began as a reaction to a circular letter by Russian Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov to regional offices of administration of education in October 2002. To the letter was appended sample contents of education in the academic subject of “Orthodox Culture.” Two camps arose; on one hand were those who approve the introduction of basics of Orthodox culture into the curriculum of secondary education; on the other hand are those who categorically oppose it. Two members of a human right organization made an attempt to initiate criminal investigation against Borodina. They accused her of anti-Semitism. More than ten court sessions took place in Moscow concerning this matter. Nevertheless the “Orthodox Culture” has already become a regular school subject in several cities and provinces of Russia: Voronezh, Kursk, Smolensk and others.It will be a great loss for Russia's children if either the path of indoctrination or an irreligious school education is pursued. In the former case, while trying to preserve national identity and the consolidation of Russian society, they potentially lose democratic principles and freedoms. In the latter case, while trying to preserve freedoms, they lose all connection with their national spiritual tradition and,