出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.54-83, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

著者

竹原 有吾

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.3-25, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

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Jewish entrepreneurs made a great contribution to the development of the Prussian silk industry in the 18th century, and their contribution led to the possibility of building a secular “state community” in Prussia. The silk industry, which originated in Asia, was not seen in Prussia until the late 17th century. After the Thirty Years’ War, the government of Brandenburg-Prussia tried to promote various industries. The government, at first, used Huguenot immigrants from France to promote the silk industry, as they had been producing silk in France. Most of them, however, soon gave up silk manufacturing, because they lacked both money and knowledge of the Prussian market. On the other hand, David Hirsch, a Schutzjude (protected Jew), is the first merchant to have success in silk manufacturing in Prussia. Because Hirsch did not have any Christian business rivals in Prussia, he could begin producing silk there in 1730, using international markets and foreign artisans for his business.The number of Christian and Jewish merchants working in silk manufacturing increased during the reign of Frederick the Great. Jews were not excluded from the Prussian silk industry because they worked for both Jewish and Christian profits. In 1752 Jewish merchants were forced by the Prussian government to sell a fixed amount of silk produced in Christian factories. Furthermore, according to data found in the journal of Jewish silk manufacturer and eminent philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, he bought raw silk from abroad and sold it to both Christian and Jewish manufacturers.Because Jews generally could not join Zünften (associations of artisans) in medieval cities in Europe, it was very hard for Jews to work as artisans or manufacturers in late medieval times. By the 18th century, however, both Jews and Christians worked for the development of manufacturing, which led to the beginnings of a secular community in Prussia.

著者

『経営史学』編集委員会

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.26, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.27-38, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.39-75, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.81-94, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

千本 暁子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.3-23, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

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Under the Edo period's hokonin system, the goal of a merchant house hokonin, a business employee having completed the minimum apprentice-type training period, was becoming an independent merchant — running a business under the master's name with some capital and goodwill — and being raised to bekke (non-kin branch family). During the Meiji period, this system transformed into an employment system based on employer–employee relations.Recently, there have been several studies concerning the hokonin system of individual merchant families and its transformation process, but they do not offer generalized discussions. Despite numerous published research outcomes about the House of Mitsui, a largescale merchant family, no research has generalized it as a hokonin system.Shigeaki Yasuoka compared the bekke-system of the Houses of Konoike and Mitsui, discussing their foresight into the modern era, especially the uniqueness of the House of Mitsui because of their innovative and modernized management. Today, Yasuoka's theory is an important, commonly accepted theory, making it challenging to discuss the commonalities between the hokonin systems of large-scale merchant families.This study attempts to verify Yasuoka's hypothesis using historical records of Konoike's hokonin published after Yasuoka's hypothesis was presented. We produced data on 256 individuals who joined the House of Konoike as hokonin between the end of the 17th century and latter half of the 19th century and clarified the trend of the ages at which they joined the family, began living outside the main family's premises, started their own business, and passed away. Moreover, we verified three of Yasuoka's hypotheses: (1) the House of Konoike had no family-run business aside from inheriting the existing bekke; (2) bekke was non-autonomous from the House of Konoike; and (3) management of hokonin at Konoike was “drifting management.” As a result, we revealed that the House of Konoike also implemented pragmatic management much like the House of Mitsui.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.46-81, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

著者

平松 茂実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.28-50, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

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Dr. Kikunae Ikeda discovered the “Umami” taste associated with glutamate. He thenwent on to apply for a patent for a method of manufacturing a seasoning based on the“Umami” taste associated with foods high in glutamate. Fortunately this patent has turnedout to have an uncommon high availability, making it possible for Ajinomoto Company toestablish and maintain a large new global enterprise.Up to this present day, many technically outstanding patents have failed to succeed inbecoming the base of new businesses, even though these inventions and their patentshave been recognized and appreciated as representing useful technical novelties.The purpose of this paper is to clarify the reasons that Dr. Ikeda’s patent achieved thisrare high availability over a long period. First, I examined the details and the nature of thediscovery of “Umami”, took a close look at the novelty, the technical uniqueness and thedeficits of his patent, and then, in the light of these considerations, investigated the reasonsfor this success, by applying the NASA’s 3 step model developed to analyze barriersto industry development. In 2003, NASA in U.S.A. released a plan development model.This model identifies three barriers that need to be overcome during the course of successfuldevelopment. These are 1st: “the Devil River” R & D barrier, 2nd: “the Valley ofDeath” barrier to getting a business started, and 3rd: “the Darwinian Sea” barrier to successfulcompetition in the market.It is found that even though Dr. Ikeda’s patent had some deficits related to “the DevilRiver” barrier step, which allowed developers in the U.S.A. to get a foothold in the monosodiumglutamate industry in U.S.A., it also contained strong elements to combat “the Valleyof Death” barrier, and so it was able to hold back the emergence of most competitors inthis industry for a long time.Even though it may be difficult to place such a strong defense against “The Valley ofDeath” barrier in many patents, this finding does surely provide some new suggestionsabout how to launch highly available inventions and patents in the future.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.51-80, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

五十嵐 千尋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.25-50, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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This paper aims to provide a brief account of the growth of the Western confectionery industry in Japan, focusing on Morinaga's vertical integration during the interwar period.Western confectionary was introduced into Japan around the beginning of the Meiji period. When Morinaga was founded, in 1899, there was neither a market for the ingredients nor a distribution channel for Western confectionary in Japan. In that case, how did Morinaga procure ingredients and create a market for its new products?The dairy industry was immature in those days but had excellent business opportunities, both inside and outside the country. Morinaga thus developed these and moved into the dairy industry. Consolidating some dairy businesses into a single company after WWI, it was thereby able to steadily secure ingredients. Later, when Morinaga's performance fell, it founded a corporate spin-off as the running costs were too high for Morinaga to maintain it.In the 1920s, in order to strengthen sales when a competitor, Meiji Seika, was established, Morinaga and various wholesale stores established sales companies. There was only a low-level capital relationship between Morinaga and these sales companies, however, so their elimination or consolidation did not damage Morinaga. The sales companies to which Morinaga sold its products had to take the risk of sluggish Morinaga sales, which supported Morinaga, especially through asset liquidation and a capital reduction from 15 to 7.5 million yen. In spite of Morinaga's development of a Beltline store system, however, it was unable to control the small retail-store units.Summarizing, Morinaga took measures towards vertical integration in order to secure ingredients and control its distribution network. The immaturity of the ingredients market meant that the main factor in this aspect of the vertical integration was the stabilization of ingredients provision, while Morinaga was able to maintain its group through corporate spin-off and risk hedging.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.51-95, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

定藤 博子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.3-26, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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This paper aims to provide a fresh and revised view on Société Générale d'Immigration (SGI), a joint-stock company that organized foreign workers for French employers after WWI. As a specialist agent for migrant workers, it played a major role in shaping France's national system of immigration. While France was lacking a workforce, it organized the mass immigration of Polish workers, especially for agriculture and the mining industry.In France, SGI was criticized at that time for acting like a ‘slave trader’. Hence, this paper focuses on the business of SGI as an agent for Polish workers during the 1920s using primary sources. The key sources are in the French National Archives, the official journals of the labour unions, a conservative magazine, the official review of SGI, and the papers of the president of Comité Central des Houillères de France.First, as a joint-stock company, SGI had to ensure profitability, and fees to operate the immigration system were one of the only sources of revenue to provide stable management and stable growth.Second, SGI organized immigration for Polish workers who wanted to come to France and live as agricultural workers. The company prepared farmland and an agricultural centre for workers and their families. However, the agricultural labour market differed from the industrial labour market, so SGI did not have enough internal resources to meet all of French farmers' needs.Third, the company did not complete the selective examinations of migrant workers. Mismatches with the labour market resulted both from the lack of careful research from SGI and from incomplete information related to the market. Workers did not know which jobs were suitable for them, if they were not assigned a position.Consequently, this paper shows the major role of private companies and market mechanisms in immigration during the 1920s. Private companies contributed to the establishment of the national system of immigration, but were highly criticized as they sought profit.

著者

齊藤 直

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.27-48, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the background factors behind “anomalistic” capital increases (hentai zoshi) by Japanese corporations during the interwar period. Hentai zoshi means capital increases by establishing another company and immediately merging it.In most of previous researches, Commercial Code, which prohibited corporations from issuing new stocks before the shareholders pays full face value, has been considered as the background factor of hentai zoshi. However, the authenticity for the idea remains uncertain.In this paper, we analyze the case of the merger between Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company and Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company in 1927, and attempt to demonstrate that not only Commercial Code but also business decision played an important role to choose rather hentai zoshi than other options of raising fund. The main findings of this paper are as follows.1) Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company was established by Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company for the purpose of acquiring the production equipment of Toyo Sugar Manufacturing Company, which had affiliated with Suzuki & Co.2) Stocks of Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company were allocated to the shareholders of Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company.3) When Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company was merged, the stocks of it were discounted 40 %. Moreover, the information of this discount was announced before the offering of the stocks.4) One of the background factors of this hentai zoshi could be ascribed to Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company's motives to discount overvalued assets.5) The excellent condition of the business performance and the stock price allowed Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company to implement this hentai zoshi.

著者

小野寺 香月

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.49-65, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.66-88, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.27-45, 2016 (Released:2018-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.46-83, 2016 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

三科 仁伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.3-28, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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In the field of modern Japanese electric industry, there are many publications on activity of top management of company, such as Yasuzaemon MATUNAGA. On the other hand, research of middle management who supported management activity of top management is not published.So this paper examines the activity of Koukichi MATUOKA, middle manager of the Toho Electric Power Co. and Hayakawa Electric Power Co., mainly using his report head office and his diary. Firstly he managed the Yamashiro Electric Power Co. in South Yamashiro Kyoto Prefecture. After the Yamashiro Electric Power Co. was consolidated by the Kansai Electric Power Co., precursor of the Toho Electric Power Co., he assumed the chief of office in Toyohashi Aichi Prefecture.The basic activity of the office was to invite and customer and collect fee, to gather and report information about distribution area, to manage office's staff. Therefore, as the chief of the office, his duty was to manage those activities.At Toyohashi, when he arrived, there was the problem on electric charge, so his main mission was to solve it. He negotiated many people, such as police chief, local politician and journalist. In consequence, the agreement satisfied each other was concluded. When the Toho Electric Power Co. corrupted the Hayakawa Electric Power Co., he explained this acquisition to provincial government.

著者

井岡 佳代子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.29-52, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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This paper discusses the mechanisms used by Tonen (currently TonenGeneral Sekiyu K.K.) to realize higher profits in Japan's oil industry, which is generally considered to have low profitability, as Tonen has achieved exceptionally high profits over the long term. The paper questions the common notion that the absence of vertically integrated companies causes low profitability in Japan's oil industry, and examines how Tonen, a vertically separated company and dedicated oil refiner, managed to achieve exceptionally high profits.For the analysis, the authors rely on Daniel C. Hamilton's criteria for dedicated oil refiners to have competitive advantage, which also take into account the Gulf of Mexico situation: 1) the existence of conditions enabling new market entry, 2) relationship between stable costs and prices, 3) high operating rate, and 4) advancement of distinctive technology through concentrated resource investment.Tonen was established in 1939 and was already a powerful oil company by 1949, when the post-war business structure was decided through an overseas alliance. Thus, the conditions for 1) were already met. Regarding 2), the refining cost in overseas refineries was the benchmark for a unique product sales price pact that provided an incentive to reduce costs. For 3), under Nobuhei Nakahara, Tonen achieved a high operating rate in production between the late 1950s and the 1960s by quashing intentions to convert product into white oil (gasoline, kerosene, etc.) and shifting to heavy oil.This paper contributes to research by improving the standard of analyzing Tonen’s management. It also shows that, despite the notion emphasizing the superiority of integrated vertical management in the oil industry, a dedicated oil refiner with a vertically separated structure can also realize high profits by meeting certain criteria. Today, in the global oil industry, dedicated refiners such as the American company Valero Energy Corporation are noted for their strong performance. The analysis undertaken in this paper may be useful in the future analysis of dedicated oil refiners' management.