著者

橋野 知子 高槻 泰郎 山本 千映

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.53-71, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.72-94, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

韓 載香

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.3-27, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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This paper discusses the pachinko industry's tremendous market expansion and development in the 1980s through an examination of factors related to the transformation of pachinko parlor management during this period.The first factor in this development is related to increasing stability of the profit structure of parlors that occurred as sales fluctuations became smaller, a trend spurred by the sudden rise in sales brought about by greater enthusiasm for gambling. At the same time, management became increasingly independent as it no longer needed to readjust the individual pins on game boards, a process that required a great deal of technical skill.The second factor is related to the supply system of the ‘Fever’ machine, which occurred in response to the pachinko boom. Since there is high fluctuation in demand, machinery manufacturers generally do not have sufficient production facilities to fill orders in a short period of time when popular models appear. However, in response to the sudden popularity of the ‘Fever’ machine, other makers, in addition to the original manufacturer, started to produce and supply imitations, making it possible to meet expanded demand throughout Japan.On the other hand, competition became more fierce as many new parlors entered the market, enticed by the industry's growth potential. Parlor management, which had previously relied on, among other things, technical expertise related to pachinko board pin adjustment, now found itself confronted with limitations. The industry thus sought new management approaches as it attempted to come to terms with the new situation.

著者

西尾 典子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.28-53, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the medium-sized munitions companies which grew rapidly in the interwar period, focusing on Watanabe Tekkojo (Watanabe Engineering Corporation).In 1886, Watanabe Tekkojo was established as the supporting section of a wholesale merchant of metal products in Fukuoka. It had expanded into munitions in 1902, when Fukuo Watanabe became one of the executives in the company. He had experience of working in the military section of Ishikawajima Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., Ltd. Watanabe Tekkojo made advances to the Imperial Japanese Navy in WW I, and received orders for parts of torpedoes and torpedo tubes from the navy. The orders increased after the Washington Naval Treaty. In the 1930s the navy built up military aircrafts because of the London Naval Treaty, so Watanabe Tekkojo began to manufacture parts of aircrafts.In the past studies about the Japanese munitions companies, the military sections of the Zaibatsu Konzerns had attracted attention as the center of the private military companies. Accordingly, it has been defined that the military influence in the Japanese economy was reduced in the disarmament period before WW II. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy also made advance to the medium-sized companies. As a result, the range of the munitions industry was expanded in Japan. The Imperial Japanese Navy gave technical guidance to the medium-sized munitions companies, dispatched able engineers to them, helped the procurement of their capital and materials and so on.The change in the interwar period led the Japanese military production system to the wartime economic controls in WW II. Aircrafts and the others munitions were made by not only arsenals and the Zaibatsu Konzerns but also many medium-sized munitions companies.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.54-83, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.52-77, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_52-4_63, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_64-4_89, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

真保 晶子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.3-26, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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The history of retailing in the early modern England has found new evidence of the advanced nature of retailing during the period, challenging the conventional view of James Jefferys (1954) that regards the mid-nineteenth century onwards as the starting point for modernisation of retailing systems and the development of stores. Instead of showing a development of shopping space and advertising, this article focuses on the role of showrooms as a space for discussing a long-term use of products and London furniture-makers' pursuit of quality and durability in the 1840s and 1850s, using showroom account books and advertisements.Recent studies of luxury shops in eighteenth-century London emphasise the separation of production space and retailing space to explain the existence of ‘modern’ spaces for retailing. However, as some furniture-makers' trade cards emphasised, having workshops and showrooms in the same premises or in close proximity was furniture-makers' strategy to support the originality and quality of their products and to attract visitors.Furniture-makers provided a wide range of services, partly because they were aware that the services formed lasting relationships with customers. This is proved by the existence of regular customers shown in the use of the customer number system introduced in Gillow's London showroom account books. Records of house-letting also suggest the role of the London showroom as an information centre.Heal and Son made the best use of advertisements, which offered convenience for customers and brought about more standardised taste. Nevertheless, the words ‘large workshops’ came together with ‘showrooms’ in their circulars, and ‘quality’ and ‘workmanship’ sometimes appeared in circulars and price lists to prove the genuineness of the products. Thus, behind sophisticated showrooms and growing advertisements of ready-made items for middle-class markets, both furniture-makers and consumers continued to care about the expected longevity of domestic goods and houses.

著者

竹原 有吾

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.27-49, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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Historical changes in the social relationship between Jews and Christians are an important factor behind the formation of large-scale businesses by religious minority entrepreneurs. Jews in Berlin were politically emancipated in 1869. But they were opposed by anti-Semitic campaigns after the end of the 1870s, and strived to assimilate culturally.Emil Rathenau, a Jewish entrepreneur in Berlin, was able to found the first telephone office in Berlin in 1881, and the forerunner of AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft), Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft für angewandte Elektricität in 1883, thanks to political emancipation. These businesses received most of their capital and executives from Jewish private banks. They were, therefore, managed by Jewish interests. The Jewish bankers on their own, however, could not afford to cover the expanding financial risks which were necessary to make Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft für angewandte Elektricität into a company large enough to accommodate the growing demand for electricity in the latter part of the 1880s. They had to find banks which could afford to share their company's financial risk.AEG was established in 1887 as a company managed by civil interests. The Jewish executives decided to get funds from the credit banks in Berlin, which required that they appoint executives of those banks as executives of AEG. The credit banks which invested in AEG were, in particular, found at the initiative of Ältesten der Kaufmannschaft von Berlin and were funded by both Jewish and Christian capital. These banks were, therefore, managed by civil interests.This paper shows that large-scale business-building was the primary factor behind Jewish acceptance of the representation of civil interests. This expanding of business was part of the process of Jewish assimilation.

著者

平沢 照雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.2_28-2_50, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

被引用文献数

1

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This study examines the philosophy upon which Tamagawa Seiki Co., Ltd. is based, and analyzes the management reforms implemented by the company since the 1990s.In 1938, Hiroichi Hagimoto established Tamagawa Seiki for the main purpose of stimulating regional revitalization in the south of Nagano Prefecture, which had suffered heavily in the 1930s because of the effects of the Great Depression. Since then, the basic philosophy of this company has been to focus on its regional community; this philosophy has contributed to regional industrial development.After World WarⅡ, Tamagawa Seiki focused extensively on the design of products and on research and development. Further, it actively promoted and organized cooperative factories to contribute to regional development. However, the company faced two management crises between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. During the management reforms that were implemented in the aftermath of these crises, the top management resolved not to move its factories overseas and, instead, to continue domestic development and production.The reforms comprised the following measures. (1) The company adopted an original strategy called Tanzakuka that involves identifying core competencies and concentrating on these competencies. (2) The production engineering department was instrumental in enabling the company to produce selected “Tanzaku” products in-house through a mass production system. (3) Upon further expansion of production in the 2000s, Tamagawa Seiki acquired some bankrupt cooperative factories as wholly owned subsidiaries, and established new factories in those areas from which leading companies had withdrawn. Because of these reforms, Tamagawa Seiki realized fresh corporate growth and contributed to the revitalization of the regional economy.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.2_51-2_94, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

稲葉 和也

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_28-3_49, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

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Many Japanese chemical companies have been re-evaluating the importance of research and development (R&D) since the low-growth era began during the first oil crisis. New businesses cannot succeed without the cooperation of their R&D departments. Their R&D sections were merged with their Business sections to connect research with product development more closely. As a result, the Central Research Institute became disorganized, and the volume of corporate research declined. This paper examines the history of R&D at Tokuyama Corp. I describe both the company's polysilicon production and the laboratory reform that occurred at the beginning of the 1980s.Tokuyama's polysilicon production was a planning initiative project. Such a project required a leader who can maximize the company's investment. Yuuji Fujii, director of Tokuyama's Planning Division, headed the company's polysilicon business. He was both an engineer and a manager, which proved an effective combination. This project grew into the company's core business; they are now the world's second-largest polysilicon producer for semiconductors, after the Hemlock Semiconductor Corporation.Laboratory reform is now considered necessary for Japan's chemical corporations. During reforms at Tokuyama Corp.'s new Fujisawa Laboratory, the old linear model was retired, and at least two of the lab's functions were changed to stimulate market creation. Takashi Yoshioka, the new R&D head, announced the “Five Management Ideas in the Laboratory” concept. Instead of a bottom-up management style, he imposed a top-down style, which is how the R&D and Business sections had worked together in the beginning.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_50-3_84, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

星野 高徳

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_29-4_53, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

参考文献数

80

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After 1910, urbanization and increased use of other fertilizers resulted in the loss of the value of human waste as compost. The night soil recycling networks of Osaka, formed in the early modern period, collapsed and the city was forced to provide human waste dis-posal as a municipal service.Previous studies on the transition to this municipal service have shown that improve-ments in hygiene conditions in Japan came later than in Western countries because Japa-nese cities depended on systems of human waste recycling networked with suburban farming villages.However, Takeshi Nagashima compared statistical data of Osaka with that of Tokyo and raised questions about the effect of Osaka’s modern sewage disposal system. According to this study, Osaka’s typhoid morbidity rate in the 1930s was higher than that of Tokyo, which placed an emphasis on the night soil recycling system. In short, the sewage disposal system built in Osaka did not provide a fundamental solution, and problems of infectious disease persisted for a long time. Regarding reasons for this, Nagashima pointed out the city’s financial limitations but did not examine the more concrete problems Osaka faced when creating its sewage disposal system.Thus, this paper focuses on Osaka’s night soil disposal plan and examines obstacles encountered when building a modern sewage disposal system as well as factors that pro-longed the city’s continued sanitation problems.After human waste disposal became stagnant in the city center, the government revised the Filth Cleaning Law on May 17, 1930. The revised law included human waste as part of cities’ waste disposal obligations. After this revision, Osaka considered the construction of a sewage disposal system to be a more important municipal measure than its human waste removal service. However, despite the city’s plan, Osaka’s residents were opposed to such a measure because they were reluctant to spend much money on flush toilet installation. Therefore, the measure was ineffective in solving the city’s waste disposal problems.In the end, Osaka was entrusted with the final disposal of human waste. Because the measure preserved the livelihoods of night soil peddlers and reduced the city’s waste dis-posal cost, the city cooperated with Osaka Prefecture and agricultural associations to build human waste storage tanks, thereby intervening in the process of human waste disposal. As a result, the city of Osaka supplied human waste to many surrounding farming villages in the prefecture, simultaneously relieving its human waste problems.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_54-4_92, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

著者

宇田 理

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_51-1_67, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_68-1_99, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

青木 洋

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_3-2_26, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

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Industry-government-university collaboration (IGUC) in Japan during the period from World War II to the postwar time has recently attracted the attention of some historians. However, there are only a few case studies focussing on the development of a specific technology. This paper presents a case history of high frequency (HF) heating and hardening technology from the pre-war to the post-war period in Japan, and examines the role of IGUC for the technological development.Many new technologies were developed during the War, but the most famous and important among them was electronics. It originally led to the development of radio, but thereafter, people tried to apply it in other industrial and technological fields also. The HF heating and hardening technology attracted attention as a promising manufacturing technology after the War. It is one of the reasons for which a lot of idle HF valve oscillators for military use were applicable to HF heating equipments.Consequently, this paper gives a clear picture that the network of IGUC expanded from the pre-war to the post-war period in the field of HF heating technology. In the pre-war period, there was a lack of IGUC because new technologies for Japanese firms were mainly procured from foreign firms. But, the situation changed during the War. Japanese firms needed to develop new technologies by themselves or in collaboration with other domestic institutes. Public research institutes and university professors played an important role in IGUC. As a result of this collaboration, some new enterprises got the opportunity to establish and grow as leaders in the industry.

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_27-2_52, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

63

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This paper aims to analyze the diffusion of tungsten filament lamps in Japan and the strategy of Tokyo Electric.In the United States, General Electric (GE) developed drawn-wire tungsten lamps in 1910. This electric lamp was three times more efficient (w/candlepower) and lasted twice as long as a carbon filament lamp. In Japan, Tokyo Electric, a GE subsidiary, introduced tungsten lamps in 1911.Initially, this lamp was adopted by small scale electric power companies/utilities in rural areas and new market entrants in major city. Some electric power utilities in major cities were cautious in the introduction of the tungsten lamp. The revenues of electric power utilities may have declined if there was no increase in the demand for electrical lighting service, corresponding to the improvement in the efficiency of electric lamps. Tokyo Electric promoted tungsten lamps, by introducing them in installations with more and brighter electric lights. This served the mutual interest they shared with the electric power utilities, which was building a large customer base for lamp manufacturers.During World War I, many electric power utilities decided to introduce tungsten lamps and the main channel of distribution of the tungsten lamp was through a cooperative relationship with Tokyo Electric. Electric power utilities succeeded in internalizing the effect of improved lamp efficiency by revising the advantageous rates for electric lighting service. The tungsten lamps that were launched in Japan were adjusted for lower efficiency and longer life spans, compared with their US counterparts. Electric power utilities tend to emphasize the longer life spans. Furthermore, Tokyo Electric marked down the lamp price while maintaining quality standards. Thus, Tokyo Electric, which pioneered the distribution of tungsten lamps in Japan, reaped significant profits.