出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.50-82, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

著者

二階堂 行宣

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_3-4_24, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

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This paper aims to grasp the Japanese government railways' freight operations during the interwar period as an integrated ‘transportation system’, and clarify how it was formed and developed. The ‘transportation system’ here means an integration of policies and measures adopted for freight operations. The analysis covers even the role of individual managers who contributed to freight business reforms, corresponding appropriately to different circumstances at each stage of business procedure.The government railways' freight organization was composed of traditionally separated‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors, and the former was divided into two: the ‘transportation’ division in charge of train operations, and the ‘wagon distribution’ division in charge of distributing empty wagons and collecting loaded ones. After the 1907 railway nationalization, the new government railways badly needed a nation-wide unified freight system. Moreover, rapid growth of demand due to the boom during the WWI urgently required efficient use of transport capacity. However, the ‘line’ sector hardly coped with the changing circumstances in the 1910s, despite some improvements in ‘staff’ sector. In particular, wagon distribution was controlled by old managers of former private railways, continuing decentralized operations.The 1919 transportation disruption revealed the defects of the old system, and establishing a truly centralized system became the most urgent challenge. Finally, the new Wagon Distribution Division was founded under the Transportation Department of the Ministry of Railways, and skilled experts were called to Tokyo to serve the new headquarters. Frequent adjustments and clear transportation planning were made possible by this reform. Ryukichi Nakayama, an eminent bureaucrat of the Railway Ministry, led the entire reform process and served as the first chief of the new division.Through this reform, a centralized wagon distribution system was established, leading to clear separation of ‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors, and from this time onward, the rail freight‘transportation system’ at each period was shaped through cooperation and occasional confrontation between the newly established ‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors.

著者

久保 文克

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_4-1_22, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

金 花

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_3-4_28, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

参考文献数

46

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High-tech industries have played a role in the rapid development of the Chinese economy. However, few companies that had operated under the planned economy until the liberalization and reforms in 1978 could generate and lead high-tech industries. In this situation, university-industry collaboration was promoted under government backing and has contributed to the development of high-tech industries in China.This study aims to first clarify the actual state and development of university-industry collaboration from the 1990s to the 2000s, and then, to describe the mechanism of university-industry-government collaboration through case studies.Two periods are shown through this study. The first is an era of a direct type of industrial creation in the 1990s, represented by university-run enterprises. This study finds that from the late 1980s to the 1990s, university-run enterprises in China increased rapidly as universities had to acquire research funds on their own because of the government’s fiscal predicament. Moreover, companies were not recipients of technology transfer, and thus, engineers in universities had to commercialize their technologies by themselves. As a result, academia outside the market complemented industry by creating and driving the development of new industries.The second is an era of an indirect type of industrial creation from the 2000s onward. This study shows that in the early 2000s, owing to economic reforms, the direct collaboration between universities and university-run enterprises was discarded and university-run enterprises took the form of university-owned enterprises. Furthermore, this ongoing period emphasizes new technology transfer, as well as incubation facilities such as university-founded science parks. Universities now transfer technologies to outside companies, rather than form companies themselves. Thus, the universities’ role has changed from commercialization of technologies through university-run enterprises to enhancement of competitiveness among companies through technology transfers.

著者

張 楓

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_48-4_73, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

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This paper clarifies the growth of the furniture industry during the postwar high-growth period in Bingo Fuchu, where is famous as a production center for high-class marriage furniture. With the increase in income during the postwar high-growth period, there was a growth in the bridal market as well, thereby it lead to an expansion of the high-class marriage furniture market. Against this background, it was evident that Bingo Fuchu had been also rapidly expanding as one of the most famous production centers for high-class marriage furniture in Japan. We consider the following two aspects as being of great significance in the popularizing Bingo Fuchu as a production center for high-class marriage furniture. First, the production system for Bingo Fuchu's original high-class marriage furniture and that for mass products were coexisted and led by backbone manufacturers. This aspect is different from that indicated previous studies which emphasize mechanization and mass production. Further, the creation of a new advanced system (specialized Planning Management Division, enhanced manufacturing facilities, etc.) and enhancing existing provincial cooperation among associated local enterprises made it possible for the production system to be constructed in Bingo Fuchu. Second, in order to construct a new distribution system for increasing sales, a burgeoning production center was necessary, since there were no local wholesalers in Bingo Fuchu. Thus, a new distribution system was constructed as a supplementary to establish wholesalers who played a central function in distribution, as indicated by previous studies; this system was characterized mainly by development of the trade fair business. Initially, certain backbone manufacturers enabled Bingo Fuchu to acquire the reputation of being a production centre of high-class marriage furniture from the end of the 1950's to the beginning of the 1960's. This was done by conducting nationwide exhibitions in reputed furniture stores and winning prizes for excellence on the basis of market evaluation. Further, local trade fairs in Bingo Fuchu led by the unions in the middle of the 60's also played a vital role in the establishment of Bingo Fuchu's reputation. At these trade fairs, a long-term dealing relationship was established between wholesalers and retailers through the disclosure of production information. In addition, almost simultaneously, manufacturer's sales offices were established in Bingo Fuchu as distribution points and sales bases in order to attempt strengthening ties with business partners and customers.

著者

時里 奉明

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_28-2_48, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristic of securing and the management of manpower by analyzing the housing policy of a government-owned Yahata ironworks.Yahata ironworks has constructed workman's house before operation begins. The reason was because an area cannot supply a workman with a house.After Yujirou Nakamura assumes the position of the third president, the house is explained as part of the welfare facilities. The purpose of Yahata ironworks's establishing the welfare facilities is to prevent the movement of the workman who had actually faced, and to press established. It was expected of the workman to be skilled because the uneasiness of life was canceled by the welfare facilities, and it worked for a long term. Moreover, it was planned for the workman to live according to Yahata ironworks, and to train the loyalty that even the descendant worked at Yahata ironworks. It does to the welfare policy after the model of the enterprise like an acknowledged Krupp ironworks in Germany.Yahata ironworks makes the residential area, encloses necessary manpower to the region that is, and is crowded. And, Yahata ironworks establishes other welfare facilities in the residential area, and straightens the mechanism that the workman's life is wholly managed. Yahata ironworks will do the welfare policy of the workman supporting entirely with a core of the housing policy.Thus, Yahata ironworks chose the road where the welfare policy of a German enterprise was wholly introduced. If so, it will be able to be said that Yahata ironworks had the historical significance of presenting the shape of new Japanese firm starting with the housing policy.

著者

磯村 昌彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_29-4_51, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The study analyzes a steel plate purchasing system for automobiles, which exists between steel and automobile industries, from the perspective of genetic theory, with a focus on a centralized purchasing system.The centralized purchasing system is a system in which an automaker attempts to procure steel plates not only for its in-house use but also for the use of parts and other manufacturers.The centralized purchasing system differs among automakers. The controlled self-supply method employed by Toyota is the most efficient; how has this method been developed and formulated?Toyota's centralized purchasing system for steel plate procurement began during the World War II. At that time, Toyota was using direct supply method. The company then eventually developed the current efficient controlled self-supply method after twists and turns, including the virtual abandonment of the centralized purchasing system at one point.During such process of development, Toyota's procurement policy that included long-term stability, co-existence and co-prosperity, and self-dependency had been important. The existence of the policy and that of parts manufacturers and Toyota Tsusho Corporation, which developed based on synergistic effects with the policy, has enabled the adoption of the controlled self-supply system.Also, the purpose of the centralized purchasing system has evolved from an initial response to the procurement difficulty of steel plates to the current system with the rationality of competition that excels in “Quality, Cost, and Delivery.”In other words, Toyota's centralized purchasing system has not been based on prior agreement; nor has its development been following a linear path.

著者

田中 智晃

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_52-4_76, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper discusses issues related to the marketing strategy carried out by Nippon Gakki. In spite of numerous restrictions on sales, such as cost, size, and the need for periodical tuning and long training periods for users, the Japanese piano and organ market developed rapidly during the high economic growth period (1955-1973). What was behind the market expansion during this period? Mainly, it is attributed to three different factors: music education, credit sales, and the dealership system.Modern music education using instruments only began in the postwar period. The Japanese government officially announced the new school curriculum guidelines in 1958, which clearly stated that ‘students have to play the organ in school music class.’ This new curriculum boosted the demand for keyboard instruments, especially organs (reed organs). Around the same time, Nippon Gakki tried to further expand the market by encouraging early childhood music education, through the Yamaha music school.The second factor was the use of Yoyaku-hanbai (savings-type installment sales) which a Japanese sewing machine company created in the prewar period. This method was used by Nippon Gakki and Kawai Co. to enlarge the market to a wider income group. The third reason for the expansion was the dealership system of Nippon Gakki, which changed its system into a force that could achieve an ideal musical education, using the management resources of the dealership.Nippon Gakki grasped the trend of the times to firmly gain a competitive advantage; furthermore it constructed a stable marketing channel which was reinforced by the synergy of the three factors mentioned above, in addition to the territory system, the dealer-support system and the evolving sales force organization. This resulted in Japan becoming the largest piano and organ producer and consumer in the world.

著者

恩田 睦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The aim of this paper is to present the entrepreneurial activities of local enterprises during the pre-war period by analyzing the fund raising approach of Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. between the early 1900s and mid 1920s. The funds raised were instrumental in the railway company's success in large-scale capital investments like the electrification and electric actuation of their train carriages in a short period of time. In conclusion, it was evident that the 2nd generation manager, Sadakichi Kakihara was not only able to expand business activities in the local areas, but also actively do so in Tokyo and raised funds with highly favorable standings.For the funds raised between 1900 and 1907, it was necessary to have collaterals for small sums of money borrowed at high interest rates for a short period from small-scale local banks situated along the railway lines that were concurrently run by the board of directors. The board of directors had to use their own securities or the company's stocks as collaterals. However, by relying solely on the local banks, it was unable to provide sufficient funds for the railway construction. It was during 1907, when Kakihara became the manager that he took the initiative to approach Tokyo's Eiichi Shibusawa for loan financing and the two entered into an agreement. The debt financing terms of Shibusawa, who had connections with banks in Tokyo, were such that there was sufficient funding with low-interest rate for the construction of the railways. In addition, the loan was for the long term.Subsequently, with regards to financing for the electrification works of the railway, Kakihara then raised funds from Bushu Bank which had been inaugurated as an external board. Although Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. was able to increase profits, retained earnings for the company were reduced because of the increase in corporate dividend ratio. Due to Kakihara's business activities making inroads into Tokyo, success in large-scale capital investment with the funds raised was made possible.

著者

木下 なつき

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_57-2_74, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper explores the early history of the life insurance company owned by African-Americans in California, focusing on their marketing strategy. The company, founded in 1925 as the Golden State Guarantee Fund, struggled to survive in the tough situation for Black Business, which was different from other black life insurance companies. California's small and lower-middle black communities made a life insurance business tough. According to the prior studies, successful black insurance business had to have a large and poor black population as in the Jim Crow South, or solidarity as in the ghetto North. They covered the organizational inefficiency that most of black business had.Because of the contrary condition in California, the Golden State Life had to develop their organizational capability in sales and marketing. George A. Beavers, Jr., one of the main founders, was in charge of both public relation and directing agency divisions as young community leader. While introducing some competitive ways to the agency management, Beavers took the advantage of community capitals on which most of their marketing activities were based in its early stages.Going between two opposite elements — competitiveness and community-consciousness, they finally made up their organization — “branch=team system.” While they developed team works inside each branch, all the branches competed the company-wide production contests. The concept came from baseball and other team sports. Organized sports gained high popularity and made an enthusiasm among African-Americans in the early 20th century. They helped the agents unite with each other and learn how to make organizational efforts in business.The Golden State Life's other marketing strategy was breaking into non-black market. Black people often shared residential and commercial spaces with other racial and ethnic groups in California. The company tried to meet the demands of the local communities, which were not limited to the blacks.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_44-3_59, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

著者

道重 一郎

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2008 (Released:2011-10-18)

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In this paper, based on investigation of clothing retailers in eighteenth century London, I try to clarify the role of retailers in the consumer revolution and discern the degree of modernity of eighteenth century London retail shops.In eighteenth century England, there were splendid urban growth and development of shopping area in many towns and retailers of these areas began to display novel goods at their shop windows and tried to sell fashionable things. Especially in London, shopkeepers were strongly sensitive to fashion trends. A key to their business success was in understanding fashion trends and keeping up with the latest fashions. Active business conduct going along with fashion was decisive for shopkeepers in London and they played an important role in diffusion of new fashion trends.I have investigated trade cards of some London clothing retailers and the business records of a London milliner. They sold diverse clothes and ornaments, but focused their business on preparing and arranging fashionable dresses and hats. The main concern of Mary Holl, whose records I have investigated was to provide sales of lace or other ornaments and the service of stitching these ornaments into clothes as well as washing and mending clothes. They tried to provide customer satisfaction by offering services which adopted the latest fashions and also suited the middle class customer's identity.It is also clear from records of Mary Holl, and other documents, that the outer and inner appearance of shops were important elements to attract potential customers. Show windows displayed diverse goods and a tasteful shop façade could lure customers into the shops. Inside of many shops there was a special space for the favoured customers to rest while shopping. Shopping became a leisure activity in the late eighteenth century; it was a very important business strategy for shopkeepers to enhance customer satisfaction by preparing comfortable space, especially for female customers.In the late eighteenth century, at the onset of the consumer society, shopkeepers in London, such as Mary Holl, whose customers were mainly the middling sorts of people played a very important role in increasing the consumption and spreading fashion trends.

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.3-29, 2007-09-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

110

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.27-57, 2007-06-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

132

被引用文献数

1

著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.3-25,98, 2005-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to study the process and features of the so-called 'military transition' of the Japanese automobile firms during the wartime. 'Small vehicle' manufacturing sector and automobile sales sector were then repressed by the military government, for they were thought to be unfitted to military use. Therefore, these sectors were compelled to change their product item, otherwise to be closed and to supply their labor forces to the military sector. In the meanwhile, the vast amount of capital for constructing and enlarging the factories was required by firms in order to transit the product item. The main focus of this article lies in the analysis of financing the capital for restructuring by the firms concerned.Nihonnainenki established in 1932, was the 3rd manufacture of small vehicles for civil use. In the initial phase, the management of this firm possessed to the Nihonjidosha. But, in 1936, it was transferred to Terada Zinkichi who was the top management of Terada Zaibatsu. Because he was the active manager for the military production, Nihonnainenki rapidly enlarged the production capacity. Since 1938, on which wartime economy began, up until 1942, production focused to small vehicle for military use. However, since 1943, it shifted to airplane parts under the financial support by the Nihon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan).Nihonjidosha established in 1909, was the largest automobile sales firm in the inter-war Japan. It was originated as a division of the Okura Zaibatsu, but Okura's influence to this firm became weaker and weaker. Initially, Nihonjidosha was reluctant for transiting the business and enlarging the capacity, although automobile sales sector was repressed. However since late 1943, the firm also started to produce tornado parts for navy, under the financial support by the Senji Kinyu Kinko (Wartime Finance Fund).In conclusion, the transition of Japanese automobile companies during the wartime from civil to military production could be performed only under the financial aegis of the public banking institutions. And, nothing explains better than the firm's managerial strategy that makes a distinction between Nihonnainenki and Nihojidosha.

著者

近藤 智子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.27-43,98, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1902, two girls were employed by Mitsukoshi department store. Since then, the number of salesgirls increased. The girls were called department store girl. Before the WW I, most of the salesgirls were true meaning girls, about 12-15 years old. They had started working right after graduating only primary school. They worked long long time every day. So they were considered very miserable.In the 1920's, department stores had changed their customer target. Since then, customers of middle classes increased. Many of them were families. At the same time, the salesgirls with decent images grew an important factor at department stores. They were thought to be well-educated and beautiful girls, so sometimes they were heroin of modern city. Many of salesgirls were from middle classes, and retired from their job by marriage. But they came back to department stores again with their family (her husband and children) as customers. It is so called reproduction of clients. The salesgirls were not only representative of modern culture, but also assisted with development of Japanese department stores. So department stores had become modern consumer's culture, and they also became women's workplace.

著者

青地 正史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.49-75, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the corporate governance structure of non-zaibatu companies in 1920s Japan. Takahashi Kamekichi, Kabushikigaisha Boukoku Ron (1930), Tohou Denryoku Shi (Tohou Electric Power History, 1962) and so on, are very instructive. They observed that Japanese companies in those days operated on short-range planning and showed unusually high pay-out ratios, up to nearly 70%, neglecting sufficient internal reserves, depreciation, and investment for plants and equipment.This paper takes the so-called institutional approach, focusing especially on the accounting system and laws at that time and places special emphasis on the following two issues.First, surprisingly old Japanese companies used the market price accounting system from 1893 to 1949, as do today's Japanese companies since 2001. But the new market price accounting system is confined to only financial instruments, and valuation profits cannot be paid out as dividends. On the contrary, the old market price accounting covered all assets and valuation profits were appropriated as dividends. According to Takahashi (1930), Japanese companies in the 1920s gained valuation profits from fixed assets and clearance assets as well as stocks, and they paid almost all of them out as dividends. Consequently, they lacked in long-term planning and suffered from ineffective management. It is difficult to say that they were mature going concerns.Second, between 1893 and 1938, an accordance of ownership and control was commonly found within Japanese companies under the Commercial Law system, which stipulated that a director and auditor must be a stockholder. Moreover, there were both a few large block large shareholders and many small shareholders. On the one hand, the block shareholders occupied executive posts of the within the companies. According to Tohou Denryoku Shi, they enjoyed controlling the company profits. On the other hand, many small shareholders were silent or weak, and shareholders' meetings were meaningless, as today's are. Consequently, both could not work as monitors for their companies. It is evident that this sort of image of Japanese companies was quite different from Berle & Means's separation of ownership and control.In conclusion, the 1920s Japanese companies were not mature going concerns, and their shareholders did not function as monitors at all. Thus they cannot be classified as the Anglo-Saxon corporate types.

著者

松下 元則

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.76-101, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to show the reason why Suntory was able to innovate on a distribution channel in the Shanghai Beer industry. Suntory has had strong marketing skills and high technology in beer production in Japan. From 1984, Suntory's Chinese Business began in earnest. China Jiangsu Suntory Foods became the number one beer maker of Jiangsu Province, and Suntory developed skills in the management of a Chinese beer company. These Chinese business skill work as the core competence of Suntory's business in China. In 1996, Suntory established Shanghai Suntory Brewing and started a beer business in Shanghai. Though the Chinese business skills worked well, they were not good enough to make Suntory Shanghai's top beer maker. The marketing skills and knowledge of the beer market's competence, which were obtained in Japan, were needed. From 1997, Chinese business skills combined with marketing skills helped the rapid increase in Suntory beer sales. Suntory has been the number one beer maker in Shanghai since 1999. Suntory's technology and management skills have been adjusted to the Chinese market and work well in China. The adjustment process distinguishes Suntory from others and contributed to Suntory's to success in distribution innovation.

著者

齊藤 毅憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.86-96, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

長廣 利崇

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.30-55, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In most previous studies of the Japanese coal industrial history, it is assumed that small-scale coal mines were undeveloped. Large-scale coal mines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were thought to have monopolized the market during the interwar period. However, there is almost no empirical study that analyzes small-scale coal mines. Therefore, this paper examines the case of Arate coal mine, under small-scale management in the coalfields of Chikuhou during the interwar period.The coal market share of Arate was greatly extended under the oligopoly of large-scale coal mines from 1930 to 1935. In this study, this factor is analyzed from three angles: a market, production, and finances.What should be emphasized is that Arate produced high-quality coal that was equal to that of large-scale coal mines. Arate operated under a labor-intensive system, using low wage earnings, and was became able to compete at the same production cost as large-scale coal mines.That is, Arate competed on an equal footing with large-scale coal mines, in both the market and production cost, and grew in management scale. This paper thus presents a critique of the historical image of small-scale coal mines as undeveloped.