著者

小林 正彬

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.1, pp.69-90, 1971-10-20 (Released:2009-10-14)

著者

石坂 昭雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.2, pp.61-91, 1969-10-25 (Released:2009-11-11)

参考文献数

37

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The huge Seraing iron and machine works, founded by the Cockerills in 1817, was in the first half of the 19th century one of the largest heavy industry establishments on the Continent, and not only a most formidable rival for the British machine industry, but also something like a model factory and training center for young engineers and skilled workers in Germany and other nations. In this article we attempt to throw some light on the role which the Cockerills played in the course of the industrial revolution on the Continent.The Cockerill family, English mechanics in origin, started their business in 1799, when William Cockerill with his sons at the request of Simonis, Biolly & Co., the biggest clothier in the Verviers woollen industry district, constructed a set of machines for the woollen industry. Afterwards the Cockerills transferred their workshop to Liège, the iron industry center of Belgium, to take advantage of the entrepreneurial opportunities for machine-makers which the prosperous woollen industries, under the Napoleonic Empire, guaranteed them.After 1815, when Belgium was cut off from France, the Cockerills were obliged to contend with the economic crisis caused by the fall of the Napoleonic system, and tried to seek compensation in German markets. They founded actually several branch-mills for machine construction and model woollen spinneries in Berlin and other eastern German towns under the auspices of the Prussian Government, besides some similar ones in Russian Poland.However, John Cockerill, the successor of this family enterprise, dissatisfied with this limitation of his business, ventured into the difficult undertaking of being a steam engine constructor. He converted the Seraing castle, disposed of by the King William I of the Netherlands at a favourable price, into a huge machine factory in 1817.Moreover, to secure materials suitable for machine-building, John Cockerill was obliged not only to expand his business to iron works and collieries under the auspice of the Netherlands government, but also to form a joint enterprise with the State.Through several years of hardships and experiments, his business was established in a complete vertical combination, and after 1830, Cockerill was able to take full advantages of the excellent capacities of his factories in the face of new railway age.It was duly these legacies of John Cockerill that allowed made the Seraing factory to survive to become the best in European heavy industries, after his bankruptcy in 1839 and his death in 1842 followed by a reorganization of the business into a joint stock company.

著者

上林 貞治郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.1-29,i, 1967-09-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

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Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks in Deutschland besteht aus zwei verschiedenen Abschnitte. Der erste Abschnitt von 1916 bis 1945 ist die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein grosses Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals, und der zweite von 1945 bis heute ist die Geschichte als ein volkseigener Betrieb der DDR. Dieses Referat spricht hauptsachlich uber den ersten Abschnitt.Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein kapitalistisches Werk des I G-Konzerns ist in zwei Bestandteile zu teilen, also, erstens die Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung des I G-Monopolkapitals, zweitens die der Grundung und Entwicklung des Leuna-Werks selbst. Die Entstehung des I G-Trusts in 1925 war ein Erfolg des langen Entwicklungsprozesses der acht groBen Chemiegesellschaften, die in 1904 zwei Interessengemeinschaften und dann in 1916 ein groBe Interessengemeinschaft bildeten. In 1925 wurden diese acht Gesellschaften in einem Trust, “I G Farbenindustrie AG”, fusioniert. Das Leuna-Werk selbst wurde in 1916 als ein Werk von “Die Badische Anilin-und Sodafabik” begrundet, dann in 1920 als ihre Tochtergesellschaft, “Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, ” reorganisiert, und nach 1925 als das grosste Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals entwickelt. Aber die Niederlage des deutschen Imperiolismus in dem zweiten Weltkrieg war zugleich die Ende des Leuna-Werks als Werk des Monopolkapitals. Heute ist es “VEB Leuna-Werke Walter Ulbricht” in der DDR.

著者

石井 里枝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.57-60, 2015-09

著者

矢野 久

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.69-71, 2014-09

著者

松原 日出人

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.3-27, 2020 (Released:2023-03-30)

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This study investigates the Misumi production area in the Kumamoto prefecture, an emerging citrus production area led by the Misumi Agricultural Cooperative Society (hereinafter referred to as the Misumi region). The primary objective of this study is to elucidate the development of the Misumi region in 1970–1990, focusing on the rise, fall, and resurgence of this region. In contrast to the existing studies that focus on traditional production areas, the secondary objective of the present study is to explain the development of the citrus industry centering on this emerging region. The historical analysis revealed the following: during the first period (up to 1975), the Misumi region was established in the citrus market as a new noteworthy producer and its success was symbolized by the production of mandarin oranges containing 13°C sugar;the Misumi region was highlighted as a new brand name producer for this product. However, the Misumi region stagnated in the second period (1976–1985) because of unstable shipments and delays in the introduction of better varieties. These problems weakened the competitiveness of the Misumi region in the market. In the third period (after 1986), the Misumi region was restructured to regain its competitiveness in the market. The focal point was the double renewal of production, namely, the introduction of superior varieties and new production techniques. These efforts raised the competitiveness of the Misumi region again as a production area.

著者

島西 智輝 梅崎 修 南雲 智映

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.3-27, 2020 (Released:2022-12-30)

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This study analyzes the growth of the largest industrial union in Japan, Zensen Domei(ZENSEN), from the postwar economic recovery era to Japan’s period of high economic growth, by using historical documents and union leaders’ oral histories. Although the number of employees in the textile industry shrank during the period of high economic growth, ZENSEN’s number of members clearly increased. This can be attributed to the collective organization of small and medium enterprise workers and workers in the downstream industry such as distribution. Three factors contributed to ZENSEN’s successful organization of workers. First, the organizational system was improved and centralized leadership was strengthened. Second, ZENSEN created an organizer department at its headquarters to centralize organizing activities. Third, a human resource development plan, an evaluation, and selection system were introduced to develop the organizers. In addition, ZENSEN used “enforcement and penalties” and “selective incentives” to maintain its expanded organization. In other words, ZENSEN severely penalized large company unions that dropped out of the united struggle and demonstrated the benefits of industrial policy, internationalization, information sharing, and human exchange to their company unions. As a result, in spite of the increase in the number of SME unions, large unions remained within ZENSEN. Although limited to the case of ZENSEN, currently known as UA ZENSEN, the findings confirm that industrial unions can mitigate the difficulty of union organization and weak labor-management bargaining power in small and medium enterprises.

著者

辻 智佐子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.3-26, 2020 (Released:2022-10-12)

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This study examined how local public experiment and research institutes before World War II impacted the modernization of regional industries. It also analyzed engineers who flourished through the career and activities of Toshiharu Sugawara, the leader of the Industrial Training School of Ehime Prefecture and the Dyeing and Weaving Institute of Ehime Prefecture. To this end, this study focused on the towel industry in Imabari. The findings revealed that the establishment of a school system to cultivate engineers in the Meiji and Taisho Eras, the activities of low- and middle-ranking officials who studied at those schools, and the establishment of local public experiment and research institutes played an important role in the technological and human resource development of local light industries. As shown in the case of Toshiharu Sugawara, who became an official after studying spinning technology at Tokyo Higher Technical School, engineers engaged in technological and human resource development greatly contributed to the activities of local public experiment and research institutes before World War II. Because of the development and improvement of towel weaving machines and the cultivation of towel manufacturers by Toshiharu Sugawara, the Imabari area, which had held a subordinate position in towel manufacturing before World War II, became Japan’s top towel-producing district.

著者

長井 景太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.27-50, 2020 (Released:2022-10-12)

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This study examines the adoption of minimum capacity standard of 300,000-tons per year (300,000-ton standard) by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for ethylene plants in Japan and resulting cooperative actions by members of the petrochemical industry. In order to strengthen international competitiveness and control investment, MITI enacted a 300,000-ton minimum capacity standard for new ethylene plants in June 1967. However, in 1972, one year before the first oil crisis, there was overcapacity. Many industrial historians have studied the 300,000-ton standard as a cause of this overcapacity from a macro-perspective. However, the capacity adjustment in plant building was made through consultations between MITI and individual companies, sometimes involving the local authority. Thus, this paper examines the effects of MITI’s authorization and the prefectures’ micro adjustments with individual companies from several perspectives. My analysis reveals that MITI’s authorization criteria included not only ensuring stable supplies of raw materials, like naphtha and its derivative products, but also investment profitability, and the prevention of environmental pollution. This result implies that Japan’s industrial policy in the late high-growth era was influenced by a broad range of social and economic problems, not limited to the petrochemical industry.

著者

宮﨑 忠恒

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.3-27, 2020 (Released:2022-10-12)

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This article reviews the establishment process of the Japan Electronic Computer Company (JECC). Japan’s industrial policy for its domestic computer industry has been regarded as a successful example that has achieved its aims. JECC rental, along with regulations on imports and capital and subsidies for research and development, was one of the main measures of Japan’s industrial policy. The JECC was established in August 1961 based on a joint investment by seven Japanese firms to secure rental funds. This article considers the entire period of JECC’s founding. Specifically, it focuses on the actions of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Councils, industry association, and computer makers. First, the MITI proposed a US-Japan joint venture with peripheral equipment technology alliance (Plan 1). Next, it proposed a public-private company with integrated research, production, and sales (Plan 2). Further, it proposed a public-private company with a rental agency (Plan 3). Finally, it proposed a privately funded company with a rental agency (Plan 4). The Industrial Rationalization Council recognized the necessity of a rental system and loan facilitation, which had an impact on MITI’s drafting of Plan 3. The Electronics Industry Council also recognized the necessity of a rental system to promote the use of computers. The Japan Electronic Industry Development Association conducted a survey to study the demand for computers. The survey results revealed that most potential users wanted a rental system as a way to introduce computers. These facts contributed to the decision to continue the movement toward Plan 3. Computer makers did not oppose MITI’s plans all at once. They expressed their support and full support, but they had been trying to gain freedom of sales during JECC’s establishment process. In the final phase of this establishment process, the MOF was dissatisfied with the MITI regarding the amount and interest rate of the Japan Development Bank loan to the JECC, and rejected MITI’s request.

著者

菊池 雄太

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.28-43, 2020 (Released:2022-10-12)

著者

橋口 勝利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.3-28, 2019 (Released:2022-03-30)

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the way to construct the production organization with Power room factory in the Bisai area. During the WWI, the demand for woolen fabric rapidly increased, so the weavers changed the main products from cotton fabrics or silk-cotton fabrics to woolen fabrics. At the same time, a lot of modern factories with power rooms were born. Since the 1920s, as western clothes spread in Japan, the demand for woolen fabrics has increased more and more. Therefore, Suzuki Kamajiro – an influential Textile manufacturer – executed the manufacturing a wide range of products by changing the products in accordance with the season.In addition, Suzuki Kamajiro gave the female workers a role to produce different types of woolen fabrics and paid the salary in proportion to their production and the number of working days. The female workers were motivated to work longer and harder for receiving bonus. The Suzukama-factory recruiters hired female workers from rural areas in Gifu and Mie prefectures, and adapted them to a working environment of the factory by controlling their dormitory life and factory work. As a result, the female workers were trained as factory workers and came to contribute to the factory management. In this way, the Bisai area had developed dramatically as the main production center of woolen textiles in Japan.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.29-53, 2019 (Released:2022-03-30)

著者

水野 敦洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.3-22, 2019 (Released:2021-06-30)

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The present study clarifies the actual condition of overseas expansion of products and production of the pre-war Japanese miscellaneous goods industry by highlighting the relationship between the trading companies and manufacturers as a case example of the match industry developed in the Hanshin area (Kobe and Osaka). Two leading match makers of different development types were selected for the purpose of this study. The study period spans from around the 1900s, when match export from Japan advanced, to the early 1920s, when it entered a stagnant phase.In 1900, majority of the match exports from Japan were carried out by Chinese merchants residing in the Hanshin area. Therefore, trade with Chinese merchants was inevitable for match makers at the time to send products to overseas markets. At the same time, however, Mitsui Bussan, a leading trading company in Japan, entered the match export business with the aim of restoring commercial rights from Chinese merchants. Therefore, various types of match makers emerged, such as those linked to Chinese merchants and those to Mitsui. Both match makers stimulated industry development through competition and cooperation.However, during the recession of the 1920s following the First World War, the growth of both the match makers diverged. Match manufacturers linked to Chinese merchants aggressively expanded overseas production to China, Korea, and India, which were previously product export destinations. However, similar attempts by match manufacturers linked to Mitsui were not very successful. These case examples show that the link with Chinese merchants established through the export of products until that time was strong even when match makers launched overseas production.

著者

陳 家豪 蔡 龍保

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.23-41, 2019 (Released:2021-06-30)

著者

大坪 稔

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.5-22, 2019 (Released:2021-09-30)

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The number of Japanese firms adopting a pure holding company system has increased since changes to the anti-trust law in 1997. This study investigates how adopting the pure holding company system changes the management of Japanese firms. Since the changes in anti-trust laws, many researchers have highlighted the merits of a pure holding company, such as efficient internal capital market, easy Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), and easy divestiture. This study expects that adopting the pure holding company form drastically changes the scales of business departments, which enhances their performance, that is, a pure holding company results in the corporate restructuring of business departments.The results of the empirical study reveal the following four facts. First, firms with lower performance tend to adopt the pure holding company system. Second, firms adopting thepure holding company tend to reduce the scale of major business segments, which lower firm performance. These results indicate that Japanese firms adopt the pure holding company system to reduce the scale of major business segments with lower performance. Third, M&As increase the scale of non-major business segments; in other words, they increase product diversification. Simultaneously, firms adopting the pure holding company system do not increase the number of M&As after adoption. Although M&As contribute to the growth of non-major business segments, firms adopting a pure holding company system do not increase the number of M&As after adoption. Finally, the decrease of major business segments improves the performance of firms with a pure holding company system.

著者

川本 真哉 河西 卓弥 齋藤 隆志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.23-39, 2019 (Released:2021-09-30)

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Mergers of regional banks through pure holding companies have been increasing since the latter 1990s. Such mergers were examined for this study, with emphasis on determinants of such mergers and banks’ post-merger business performance.A cause of the increase in mergers is that, in addition to the conventional methods of mergers, a ban on the method using a bank holding company was lifted in 1998. In advance of empirical analysis, we reviewed changes in bank mergers after lifting of the ban. We categorized merger methods into (1) business consolidation, (2) combination by establishing a holding company, and (3) purchase of a bank by an existing holding company, which revealed that many mergers in recent years used the second method.Subsequently, we examined determinants of becoming a merging bank and a merged bank. Our estimation revealed that a regional bank with low local market power and particularly intense competition with large banks was more likely to become a merging bank. The results for efficiency suggest that a bank that had raised profitability through a merger was less likely to become a merged bank. Another finding was that a bank with a high baddebt ratio was more likely to participate in a merger as a merged bank.Additionally, we divided and assessed the sample to ascertain whether the form of merger and other conditions created differences in the subsequent business performance. First, results suggest that, as forms of merger, business consolidation was more likely to promote corporate downsizing than establishing a holding company. Secondly, analysis of the holding company method performed by dividing sellers and buyers revealed an increase in buyers’ net interest spread and sellers’ rationalization effects. Differences between mergers within an area and between areas included net interest spread growth in the former and active restructuring in the latter.

著者

下谷 政弘 川本 真哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.40-48, 2019 (Released:2021-09-30)

著者

伊藤 輝美

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.3-27, 2018 (Released:2021-03-30)

被引用文献数

1

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The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to elucidate why the national power company, Electric Power Development Company (J-POWER) began promoting a business model centered on use of large-scale, overseas-coal-fired thermal power stations, turning back the clock on the energy revolution, wherein Japan, preceding the oil crisis, shifted away from coal to imported oil; (2) to explore why J-POWER succeeded in the commercial operation of the Matsushima Thermal Power Station (500 MW×2 Units) in 1981; and (3) to interrogate why J-POWER challenged the research and development of cutting-edge thermal power technologies like flue gas desulfurization, selective catalytic reduction of NOx, and ultra-supercritical steam generation using boiler-turbines. Nine electric power companies (NEPC) were established by the reorganization of the electric power industry in 1951. NEPC had four key characteristics: private management, vertical integration, nine regional divisions, and monopoly. In 1952, however, J-POWER was founded by a government initiative, The Electric Development Promotion Law, to overcome post-war power shortages and to increase the supply of electricity in Japan following World War II. J-POWER is the only large-scale wholesale power company in Japan that has power stations and a nationwide network of transmission lines that connect each domestic region. NEPC actively developed large-scale, oil-fired power stations during Japan’s energy revolution. Before the oil crisis, the autonomy of NEPC worked well, as an economic and stable electricity supply had been realized. Despite this, J-POWER made an effort to promote a business model employing the large-scale import of coal for coal-fired thermal power stations, to turn back the clock on the energy revolution. After the oil crisis, J-POWER demonstrated that the Matsushima Thermal Power Station could indeed generate more economical electricity than an oil-fired power station. As such, J-POWER aggressively developed power stations fueled by overseas coal on a large scale to supply to NEPC in tune with the needs of the time. Several studies about the Japanese power industry were published and mainly focused on NEPC. These studies recognized coal as a natural resource that had taken a beating by other natural energy sources, such as oil and liquefied natural gas. In doing so, however, these studies disregarded J-POWER’s above-mentioned activities and its role in the energy industry.

著者

イヴ・ドンゼ ピエール

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.28-40, 2018 (Released:2021-03-30)