著者

張 文良

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.95-106, 2013-03-31

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According to Lü Cheng, the Consciousness-Only or Yogācāra School of Indian Buddhism claims that the essence of all sentient beings is “tathatā,” which is lack of cognitive ability, and therefore is a theory of what he calls“Primal Purity.” On the other hand, he claims that Chinese Buddhist philosophers believe that the nature of all sentient beings is pure and intelligent, by their theory of “Original Bodhi.” With these contrasting, Lü Cheng claims that there is a radical rupture between Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism, and he regards Indian Buddhism as orthodox, Chinese Buddhism is therefore “pseudo-Buddhism.” Lü Cheng’s criticism of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism points out a difference between Chinese and Indian Buddhist theories, which may be valuable for understanding Chinese Buddhism. However, in contrast to Lü’s analysis, Buddha-nature and tathāgata-garbha theory are both found in Indian Buddhism originally, and in fact are both the source of the theory of “Original Bodhi” found in Chinese Buddhism. Furthermore, there is the tradition of “Original Bodhi” and “Primal Purity” in Chinese Buddhism as well, the latter is represented by the thought of Consciousness-only (weishi zong 唯識宗) school in Chinese Buddhism. Therefore, in contrast to Lü’s view, there is in fact both continuity and discontinuity between Chinese and Indian Buddhism, and Lü Cheng’s chracterization of Chinese Buddhism as “Original Bodhi” cannot be considered complete. Altogether, as for Lü Cheng’s Buddhist research methodology, he is unsatisfied with the current objective Buddhist research, and tries to put a value judgment on Buddhist thought from his standpoint of the Consciousness-Only or Yogācāra School of Indian Buddhism, criticizing what he considered “pseudo-buddhism.” With regard to his research method, further discussion is required.

著者

金 京南

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.61-75, 2003-03-20

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In this paper, I examine how the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra 入法界品, the last chapter of the Hua-yen ching 華厳経, was interpreted in the Chinese Hua-yen school, specifically clarifying the differences between the interpretations of Chih-yen 智儼(602-668) and his disciple Fa-tsang 法蔵(643-712). Paying attention especially to their theories regarding the "division" of the sutra into smaller sections, I examine both their interpretations from two angles: 1) interpreting the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra within the Hua-yen ching, and 2) interpreting the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra by itself. Chih-yen advances a theory of three divisions in his Sou-hsuan chi 捜玄記, and therein he suggests two views on the liu-t'ung-fen 流通分. 1) The Hua-yen ching originally consisted of one hundred thousand gathas, of which only thirty-six thousand gathas now remain, and the liu-t'ung-fen is missing. This means that the liu-t'ung-fen never existed. 2) In the sutra, the last two gathas are considered to correspond to the liu-t'ung-fen. The first view is based on the assumption that the sutra consists of one hundred thousand gathas, excluding the liu-t'ung-fen, and the second, that the sutra consists of thirty-six thousand gathas which include the liu-t'ung-fen. This means that, in Chih-yen's three divisions, the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra either belongs to the cheng-tsung-fen 正宗分, or includes both the cheng-tsung-fen and the liu-t'ung-fen. Chih-yen, influenced by Chih-cheng 智正(559-639), also divided the cheng-tsung-fen into four parts, the last of which is the i-yuan hsiu-hsing cheng-te fen 依縁修行成徳分. To this belong the "Li-shih-chien p'in" 離世間品 and the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra. The latter is also called the i-jen ju-cheng fen 依人入証文. For Chih-yen, the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra represented a Buddhist teaching of realization (cheng 証) which perfects ascetic training through shan-chih-shih 善知識. This was the very chapter from which began the enlightenment of sentient beings. Fa-tsang's three divisions developed from his Wen-i kang-mu 文義網目, which does not admit the liu-t'ung-fen, to the T'an-hsuan chi 探玄記. In the meantime, he bolstered his arguments with the concept of dharmadhātu (fa-chieh 法界) and, furthermore, emphasized the One Vehicle character of the Hua-yen ching, taking the Three Vehicle character as the liu-t'ung-fen. In addition, basing himself on Chih-yen's four divisions, he suggested a theory of five divisions. He views the structure of the Hua-yen ching as being fully provided with hsin 信 (faith), chieh 解 (understanding), hsing 行 (practice), and cheng 証 (realization). The Gaņdavyūha-sūtra comes under the Buddhist teaching of cheng-ju 証入. Chih-yen put emphasis on the importance of shan-chih-shih in dividing the inner structure of the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra. He categorizes all shan-chih-shih into five types. This method of categorizing was taken over by Fa-tsang. The main characteristic of Fa-tsang's method of dividing the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra lies in his distinguishing of the essential assembly (pen-hui 本会) from the secondary assembly (mo-hui 末会). To sum up, the main difference between the two theories can be reduced to the way in which emphasis is put either on the concept of shan-chih-shih or on that of dharmadhātu. Chih-yen emphasized the former, Fa-tsang the latter. This difference shows the development of understanding the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra, from Chih-yen's practical interpretation to Fa-tsang's rather theoretical one.

著者

Giglio Emanuele D.

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.107-121, 2013-03-31 (Released:2013-09-24)

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The True Characteristic of All Dharmas (Shohō Jissō-shō 諸法実相抄) is traditionally believed to be one of the twelve epistles sent by Nichiren (日蓮, 1222–1282) to the ex-Tendai monk Sairen-bō (最蓮房, 13th century) during their exile on Sado Island. Because the only surviving copy of this epistle is the one included in The Writings “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles (Rokuge-gappon 録外合本) from 1480 by Nicchō (日朝, 1422–1500), the eleventh abbot of Kuon-ji monastery (久遠寺), it is classified as one of Nichiren’s “nonautographical writings” (Shahon-ibun 写本遺文). The present study aims to introduce some relevant problems about the origin of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas, with due consideration given to the results of research realized by several scholars on the biography of Sairen-bō, and on the circumstances of the collection of Nichiren’s writings following his death. Clarifying the origin of this epistle can lead us to a deeper understanding of the relationship between Nichiren’s non-autographical writings and Medieval Tendai Thought (Chūko Tendai-gi 中古天台義). As I argue, upon his return from Sado Island, Sairen-bō brought the original text of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas, along with the other eleven epistles he received from Nichiren, to Kyoto, where he concluded his life. However, another collection of Nichiren’s writings, The Writings “Inside the Records” in Binded Fascicles (Rokunai-gappon 録内合本) compiled by Nicchō from 1479, includes four other epistles to Sairen-bō. This fact leads us to the hypothesis that the material that became the primary source of both The Writings “Inside” and “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles was delivered from Kyōto to Minobu respectively by the third abbot of Kuon-ji monastery, Nisshin (日進, 1271–1347), who copied epistles to Sairen-bō while in Kyoto, and by the twelfth abbot Nichi’i (日意, 1444–1519), disciple of Nicchō, during his mission in the capital between 1470 and 1479. I argue that considering that the primary sources for both The Writings “Inside” and “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles were still being transferred from Kyoto since the time of Nisshin, these two compilations by Nicchō were nothing more than a copy of what was already arranged earlier. Moreover, this fact makes plausible the hypothesis that the origin of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas arose before the second half of 15th century, and suggests the necessity of further verifying the movements not only of Sairen-bō but also of Nisshin and Nichi’i.

著者

酒井 真道

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.77-93, 2013-03-31

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For hundreds of years following the appearance of Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna i.e., the inference of momentariness from the existence of things, his successors were challenged to carefully analyze his argument. They did so by identifying its various parts and defending their formulation from a variety of opponents. Dharmottara is one such successor of Dharmakīrti. This paper focuses on Dharmottara’s contribution to the discussion of the inferential reason—existence (sattva)—and his attempts at resolving problems with it. In his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Dhamottara introduces and then argues against the view of his opponents that the inferential reason, ‘existence,’ is a pseudoreason. According to his opponents: 1) If this inferential reason were established by a source of knowledge (pramāṇa), it would be opposed (viruddha), since, according to them, existence has to be characterized by permanence (nityatva), which is opposed to the property to be proved i.e., momentariness. They argue that when a source of knowledge is used to ascertain that something is existent (sat), it also ascertains that that thing is permanent (nitya); 2) In contrast, if this inferential reason were not established by a source of knowledge, it would be unestablished (asiddha). Thus, in both cases, the inferential reason would be a pseudo-reason, since it would either be opposed or unestablished. Dharmottara responds to these objections by explaining the functioning of a source of knowledge (pramāṇavyāpāra). He argues that it is not possible for the same source of knowledge to be used to make two different judgments (adhyavasāya). This is because making a judgment can only consist in a single exclusion (ekavyāvr tti). Suppose that a source of knowledge e.g., perception is used to judge that something is existent. This source of knowledge leads to this judgment by excluding that thing from whatever is non-existent (asat)—that is, from things that do not fulfill a specific purpose (anarthakriyā) for the perceiver. The functioning of this source of knowledge is said to come to an end with this exclusion. Thus, it is impossible for this source of knowledge, which has already been used to judge, through exclusion, that something is existent, to itself generate the further judgment that this same thing is permanent. In his overall argument, Dharmottara explains the role that perception plays in ascertaining the existence of a thing, which then serves as the inferential reason from which a thing’s momentariness is inferred. In the intellectual history of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, Dharmottara’s explanation appears to be influential. For example, it seems to have influenced Jñānaśrīmitra when he discusses the issue of how to establish the “inferential reason in the site of the inference (pakṣadharmatā)” for the sattvānumāna. In concluding this paper, I explore Dharmottara’s influence on this aspect of Jñānaśrīmitra’s discussion.

著者

曺 潤鎬

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.54-66, 1996-12-20

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The Yuan-chueh ching (圓覺經 Perfect Enlightenment Sutra, hereafter YCC) is one of the most important texts in studies of East Asian Buddhism from the 8th century onwards. This paper examines the age, background, and intellectual characteristics of this Sutra by analyzing from a historical perspective some concepts and theories which make up its intellectual framework. The main findings are as follows: 1. The subject of the Sutra is "Yuan-chueh" (圓覺). This concept has already being seen in the Jen-wang pan-jo po-lo-mi ching (仁王般若波羅密經), Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men (大乘止觀法門), and Shou leng-yen ching (首楞嚴經 Heroic Valour Sutra, hereafter SLC). However, this concept is presented for the first time in the YCC as "the Root and Absolute Truth" and "Ultimate Stage" at which the training person should aim. Therefore, it is clear that the "Yuan-chueh" of this Sutra developed from the examples in those earlier texts, and especially from the thought of "Yuan" (圓) of the SLC. In addition, We can guess that ideas such as "Harmony and Non-Obstruction" (圓融無礙) and "Non-Obstruction of Totality in Complete Freedom" (圓通無礙) of Hua-yen and Tien-t'ai Buddhism lie behind this "Yuan". 2. The theory that "Sentient beings are originally Buddha" (衆生本來成佛) which is explained in this Sutra tries to eliminate the stage between the sentient beings and Buddha. This does not mean that enlightenment is possible and potential but rather that enlightenment has been achieved originally in the present reality of the sentient being. This concept that "Sentient beings are originally Buddha" does not appear before the YCC. We can therefore say that this original theory concerning the Attainment of Buddhahood developed from the thought of Buddhahood (佛性) and Tath?gatagarbha explained in a series of past Sutra and Abhidharma. Furthermore, this theory is promoted aggressively from the Attainment of Buddhahood of Hua-yen and Ch'an Buddhism, where it is expressed in the idea that "Evil passions are themselves enlightenment and birth and death is itself Nirvana" (煩惱即菩提, 生死即涅槃). 3. The Tath?gata-garbha and Last Dharma (末法) theories of this sutra are inherited from the ideas which flourished in China around the 7th and 8th centuries. There is thus an obvious and direct relationship to the Heroic Valour Sutra. 4. An original theory of training is explained in the YCC. This Sutra stands basically on the concept of sudden enlightenment (頓悟), but on the other hand the theory of training is also preached. This coexistence of the ideas, that sudden enlightenment is united with gradual practice (漸修), and that the method of the training such as ?amatha, sam?patti and dhy?na, show a clear relationship between the YCC and the SLC. 5. This Sutra has the SLC as its intellectual foundation. On top of this foundation it builds up an original theory, keeping thoughts such as the "Awakening of Faith, Hua-yen, Tien-t'ai, Ch'an, Tath?gata-garbha, and Last Dharma" in view. 6. As for the purpose of the YCC, it can be said that this Sutra is made directly for general monks, and is arranged from a basic standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. It aims to establish a doctrinal dependence place by arranging from an overall viewpoint the influential ideas in Chinese Buddhism at that time. 7. Concerning the age of the YCC, it is certain that it was composed after the SLC. Kiyotaka Kimura estimates that the latter was composed around 713 years at the very earliest. And he says that it does not go back to the age of writing of K'ai-yuan-shih-chiao-lu (開元釋教録). By extension, we can guess that the YCC was composed in the 720s, only a few years before it appeared in K'ai-yuan-shih-chiao-lu in 730.

著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.39-54, 2009-03-31

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In early buddhist sūtra texts “asaṃskṛta” is a term used as a synonym for nirvāṇa, the ultimate purpose of buddhists. Disciples in Sarvāstivāda, one of the most influential buddhist sects in india, regarded asaṃskṛta as dharma, and in their abhidharma texts they classified three kinds of dharma, that is to say pratisaṃkhyānirodha, apratisaṃkhyānirodha and ākāśa, into asaṃskṛtadharma. According to the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy these three asaṃskṛtadharmas are real-entities ( dravyasat ); on the other hand scholars of Sautrāntika / Dārṣṭāntika denied the real-entityness of them. This article deals with the controversy about real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas appeared in abhidharma texts, in particular *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』, MV ), *Tattvasiddhi (『成實論』, TS ), Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ( AKBh ) and *Nyāyānusāriṇī (『阿毘達磨順正理論』, NA ). The argument for acknowledging the real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas in TS, AKBh and NA is grounded on the possibility of cognizing intrinsic nature ( svabhāva ) of asaṃskṛtadharmas.And scholars who accepted this argument considered that the possibility can be reasoned from the possibility of cognizing results of activities of intrinsic nature. Saṅghabhadra, the author of NA, affirmed that ākāśa has an activity of receiving ākāṣadhātu and that apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has an activity of constant obstruction to the arising of those factors whose nature is to arise ( 可生法, *utpattidharmaka ). On the other hand in TS, AKBh and NA pratisaṃkhyānirodha is considered as the dharma whose intrinsic nature and an activity can not be cognized by anybody except āryas. Then Vaibhāṣikas who appear in AKBk and Saṅghabhadra reinforced the argument of real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas with finding out their characteristics which are inherent only in beings. According to NA non-beings are neither distinguishable, cognizable, nor describable, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is not accepted as such a thing, so it is a being. And furthermore, it is not a being as a provisional designation ( prajñaptisat ) by any possibility, therefore it must be a real-entity. From the viewpoint of those who denied the real-entityness of three asaṃskṛtadharmas each of them is a non-being. In TS ākāśa has an active influence on spatial beings with its non-beingness, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is a mere non-being. And according to AKBh a statement that pratisaṃkhyānirodha exists is only a negation ( pratiṣedhamātra ) and indicate non-beings. Saṅghabhadra considered this “existence” is not only existence as a real entity, but also existence as a provisional designation.

著者

吉次 通泰

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.18, pp.55-69, 2011-03

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The subject of ageing and lifespan was studied in ancient Indian medical texts, such as Carakasaṃhitā (CS), Suśrutasaṃhitā (SS), Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha (AS) and Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā (AHS). According to the 4 texts, age was defined as the state of body dependent on the length of time lived, and was broadly divided into three periods—childhood (–16 years), adulthood (16–60 or 70 years) and senescence (60 or 70 years and over). Further SS and AS subdivided the age into smaller stages as follows: childhood —kṣīrapa, kṣīrānnāda, and annāda; adulthood — vṛddhi, yauvana, sampūrṇatā, and parihāni. While taking up the management of the patient, the physician should examine the lifespan as a starting point in diagnosis. To determine the lifespan of the patient, his body was first measured as a whole and then each of the body parts were measured in terms of aṅgula (finger's breadth measurement) of his hand, and also his sāras were considered, depending upon the state (excellence, purity, and predominance) of each one of the dhātu and manas. The lifespan of the person depends on the interaction between the forces of daiva (deeds done in the previous life) and puruṣakāra (deeds done in the present life). There is considerable variation in the strength of both forces, with them possibly being mild, medium or intense. When both daiva and puruṣakāra are strong, the lifespan is long, happy and predetermined. while both are weak, the lifespan is short, unhappy and changeable. So the average human lifespan is clearly determined by both genetics and the environment in this view. A weak daiva can be subdued by a stronger puruṣakāra. Therefore a wholesome lifestyle is the basis of longevity and an unwholesome lifestyle will result in a short lifespan.We must understand that if we want to live longer, it is necessary to live properly.

著者

馬場 紀寿

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.17-31, 2003-03-20

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The Interpretation of the Paţiccasamuppādangas in the Mahāvihāra Theravāda tradition changed in the order of the "Vibhasigasutta", Vibhańga, VIsuddhimagga and the commentaries on the Vinaya and the four Nikāyas. In this paper, I examine the process of change in these different interpretations. (1) The "Vibhańgasutta" (Samyuttanikāyu Nidānavagga2) is the only sutta in the four Nikāyas that describes paţiccasamuppāda as having twelve ańgas and defines all twelve paţiccasamuppādańgas. (2) The "Suttantabhājaniya" section of the "Paccayākāravibhańga" chapter in the Vibhańga follows almost the same definitions of the paţiccasamuppādańgas as are found in the "Vibhańgasutta", but changes the definitions of sańkhārā, nāma, and bhava. "Vibhańgasutta" → Vibhańga (a) sańkhārā : kāya-, vacī-, mano-sańkhāra → puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-, kāya-, vacī-, mano-(abhi)sańkhāra (b) nāma : v edanā, sañña, cetanā, phassa, manasikāra → sañña-, sańkhāra-, viññāna-kkhandha (As a result of this change, viññāna and nāmarūpa came to mean pañcakkhandha) (c) bhava : kāma-, rūpa-, arūpa-bhava. → kamma-, uppatti-bhava These changes made both "sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna・nāmarūpa" and "bhava ⇒ jāti" common causation as follows. (a) sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna → nāmarūpa = puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra ⇒ khandhā kāya-, vaci-, mano-sańkhārā (b) bhava ⇒ jāti = kamma-bhava (including puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra) ⇒ khandhā uppatti-bhava ※jāti is defined as "khandhānam pātubhāvo" (the appearance of khandhā) in the Vibhanga. But in this text the standpoints of "kayia-, vaci-, mano-sańkhārā" and "uppatti-bhavia" are not yet clear. (3) The Visuddhimagga basically follows the same definition of the paţiccasamuppādańgas as found in the Vibhańga rather than those of the "Vibhańgasutta". Moreover, the Visuddhimagga interpretes the six sańkhāras as three sańkhāras, and restricts bhava as being the cause of jāti to only kammabhava. (a) sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna → nāmarūpa = puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra ⇒ khandhā (b) bhava ⇒ jāti = kamma-bhava (including puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra) ⇒ khandhā Therefore, it is clear those the Vrsuddhimagga interpretes both "sańkhārā" ⇒ viññāna→nāmarūpa" and "bhava ⇒ jāti" as "kamma (action) ⇒ rebirth". With these interpretations, Paţiccasamuppāda theory came to explain the causation of the past, present, and future. (4) The commentary on the Vinaya (Samantapāsādikā) and the commentaries on the four Nikāyas (Sumańgalavilāsinī, Papañcasūdanī, Sāratthappakāsinī, Manorathapūranī) do not explain paţiccasamuppāda in detail and advise readers to study it by reading the Visuddhimagga. Thus, the Visuddhimagga represents the final stage in the interpretation of paţiccasamuppāda theory.