- 著者
-
畠山 久志
林 康史
歌代 哲也
- 出版者
- 立正大学経済学会
- 雑誌
- 経済学季報 (ISSN:02883457)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.65, no.1, pp.1-32, 2015-08
1996 年に第二次橋本内閣が発足直後,抜本的な金融制度改革,いわゆる日本版金融ビッグバンを実施した.その金融制度改革の施策の一つに外国為替取引の完全自由化という規制撤廃があった.外国為替管理の自由化によって為銀主義が廃されたために,現在では一般にFX取引と呼ばれる外国為替証拠金取引が誕生した.外国為替証拠金取引に関しては,規制する業法もないため,監督官庁もなく,通常の民法や商法などの一般法によるルールがあるのみといった,ほとんど規制のない状態で取引が自由に行えるようになった.外国為替証拠金取引は,レバレッジを用いて取引が行われ,また,差金決済が可能であるため,取引によっては多額の利得を得ることもあるが,過大な損失を被ることもある金融商品である.法律の不存在の結果,外国為替証拠金取引の商品特性の説明が不十分であったり,顧客も特性を理解しないまま取引が行われたりし,不公正な取引が行われることもあり,社会問題化し,また,訴訟にも発展した.こうした事態を受けて政府は規制を行うこととし,外国為替証拠金取引は先物取引と整理され,改正金融先物取引法で規制が行われることとなった.外国為替証拠金取引業者は金融庁に登録が義務付けられ,参入規制や,商品説明義務や不招請勧誘などの行為規制などが課され,顧客保護に一定の効果があった.しかし,リーマン・ショックが起こり,外国為替証拠金取引業者が破綻し,顧客に損害が及んだケースもあった.そのため,取引証拠金の区分管理を徹底し,ロスカット・ルールを定め,証拠金のレバレッジ規制を導入した.取引証拠金の区分管理やロスカット・ルールは,外国為替証拠金取引に本来的に不可欠なものであり,適切な規則であるものの,商品性の本質にかかわるものではない.一方,レバレッジ規制は,商品の効率性,魅力に係る本質そのものを制限するものであり,単なる業者規制,行為規制に止まらない.こうした商品の本質そのものに係る制限は,日本版ビッグバンが目指した金融制度改革の規制緩和,自由化に逆行するものと評価される.本稿は,外国為替証拠金取引を外国為替制度の規制緩和の流れのなかで位置づけて史的展開を述べ,市場・取引と法が相互依存・経路依存であることを認めたうえで,その取引に係る諸規制,就中,レバレッジ規制について検討するものである.This paper describes the development of foreign exchange margin trading within the history of the Japanese foreign exchange system and discusses regulations concerning foreign exchange margin trading, especially leverage regulation, with the recognition that the market/trading and law have a mutually dependent relationship. Soon after the second Hashimoto Cabinet was formed in 1996, the government carried out a radical financial system reform called the Japanese Big Bang, which was similar to the British Big Bang financial reform 1986. One of the measures taken was the complete liberalization of foreign exchange transactions. Due to the liberalization of Japanese foreign exchange control, which abolished a rule that foreign exchange trading had to be conducted with a registered bank, foreign exchange margin trading (commonly called FX dealings) was then introduced. After the liberalization, there was no law or supervisory authority to directly overlook foreign exchange margin trading. Only general regulations of Japanese Civil Code and the Commercial Law were still applied. Foreign exchange margin trading allows investors to trade large positions, which are many times the size of principles by the leverage of borrowed money. This is how foreign exchange margin trading could generate much larger profits or much larger losses compared to regular trading. The absence of regulation led to insufficient explanation of products by salespersons and many investors did not fully understand the products, resulting in unjust transactions. Many troubles arose and such activities developed into lawsuits and social problems. In response to this situation, the Japanese government decided to regulate foreign exchange margin trading. The new regulation categorized foreign exchange margin trading as futures trading and brought it under control with the revised Financial Futures Trading Act. Under the new rule, foreign exchange margin trading operators were required to register with the Financial Services Agency. The Financial Futures Trading Act also introduced entrance restrictions and behavior regulation, including the obligation of clear product explanation and the prohibition of uninvited solicitation. Those contributed to investor protection to some degree. However, the Lehman shock occurred, resulting in bankruptcy of foreign exchange operators and their clients' losses. Therefore, stricter rules on the classification management of margin, the loss cut rule, and the new leverage regulation were introduced. Although the classification management of margin and a loss cut rule are essentially indispensable to foreign exchange margin trading and appropriate rules, they do not influence the essence of financial products. On the other hand, leverage regulation is not exclusive to regulation of operators and their behavior as it restricts the effi ciency of products and harms the essence and attractiveness of margin trading. Evaluated in this paper are the restrictions concerning the essence of financial products themselves under the deregulation and liberalization of the financial system, which the Japanese Big Bang aimed to achieve. Note: This paper is the first of two parts, the next of which will appear in the autumn issue of this journal.