著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.1-17, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
1

The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.

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これまで、鈴木雄大さんが反心理主義の側から反因果説を擁護する研究を発表されてきましたが、私にはむしろ反心理主義vs心理主義という図式が反因果説vs因果説という図式そのものに取って代わりつつあるように見えます。鈴木さんの見解も伺って… https://t.co/3Sqg535oBr
鈴木雄大「理由の反心理主義に基づいて行為の反因果説を擁護する」科学哲学49:1 (2016) https://t.co/kfUc8Q0OGa

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