著者
伊藤 秀史
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.52-62, 2007-12-25
被引用数
2 or 0

The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics. According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally referred to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts. Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, "economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions." (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.

言及状況

Yahoo!知恵袋 (1 users, 1 posts)

ノーベル経済学賞に なぜ、日本人は選ばれないのか? 市場原理主義マーケット(新古典派、ケインズ学派)が 少なく、 マルクス経済学者、 フィールドワーカー(実務家)が多いから? ノーベル経済学賞候補 本命清滝信宏、根岸隆、林文夫、 鈴村興太郎、雨宮健? 以前、本命だった死去した 宇沢弘文、青木昌彦は 本当に本命なのだったのだろうか? ...

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https://twitter.com/uncorrelated/status/785448702932496384 今年の受賞者は主流派中の主流派ですが、それはさておき、ここに契約理論の概要説明があります: http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110009498242 … RT @saitohisanori: 今年のノーベル経済学賞のテーマを探して知ろうとしても、なかなか日本 ...

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[契約理論][経済学][ノーベル経済学賞] メモ

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ツイ友同僚の定評ある論文。契約理論がノーベル賞を得たこの機会に、がんばって読んでみよう。私の仕事にも、何かヒントを与えてくれるだろう。>CiNii 論文 - 伊藤秀史 「契約理論 : ミクロ経済学第3の理論への道程」 https://t.co/qkmLLSgBS2 #CiNii
CiNii 論文 - 契約理論 : ミクロ経済学第3の理論への道程 https://t.co/EDA0RuyMaq
この辺、わしが大学卒業したあとの展開なのでよく知らなかったけど、クッソおもろいな: CiNii 論文 -  契約理論 : ミクロ経済学第3の理論への道程 https://t.co/mkziYw0Tre #CiNii
契約理論 https://t.co/7zU2SW9jQH
CiNii 論文 - 契約理論 : ミクロ経済学第3の理論への道程 https://t.co/jxlPlAUMC9 via @nuzzel
今年の受賞者は主流派中の主流派ですが、それはさておき、ここに契約理論の概要説明があります: https://t.co/0YxRIuaKWw RT @saitohisanori: 今年のノーベル経済学賞のテーマを探して知ろうとしても、なかなか日本語のサイトでは、たどりつけない
電話に出られません.日本語ではとりあえずこれを読んでね. https://t.co/WdKh987EbA
@seibe2 あとhttps://t.co/9zOh2tnnZO と https://t.co/dxaVak4aDS
NowBrowsing:契 約 理 論 ミ ク ロ 経済学第 3 の 理論 へ の 道程http://t.co/9NlQbkhHHz

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http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110009498242 (184)