著者

島村 修平

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012

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It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.