- 著者
-
原田 雅樹
- 出版者
- 日本科学哲学会
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.39, no.1, pp.47-61, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
- 参考文献数
- 17
For a philosophical analysis of the sciences, Jean Cavailles introduced the "philosophy of the concept", which he opposed to the "philosophy of consciousness", in which category he placed Kant's transcendental critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Although he took a position against transcendental philosophy, Cavailles did not make common cause with logical empiricism in this opposition. This paper will first explore Cavailles' reasons for opposing the philosophy of consciousness, and his criticism of logical empiricism. Cavailles' notions of "concept" and of "experience" will be examined in order to shed light on the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of "concept" in his philosophy, i.e. its structure and historical dialectic. The paper will then consider the works of some French philosophers, who adopt the philosophy of the concept as a philosophical method. In these investigations, the paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the philosophy of the concept in the contemporary context of philosophy of science.