著者
君塚 大学
出版者
社会学研究会
雑誌
ソシオロジ
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.3-18,140, 1987

According to Lukes' suggestions, most of the conventional views of power like the pluralist and the reformist one, which have even taken power as relationship, presuppose a priori that one's consciousness of interests is built up by his autonomous choice. However this presupposition precludes the investigation which examines some kind of power effects by the powerful over the formation of the powerless' interest consciousness.<br> Agreeing with Lukes, I deny the presupposition and try to make a conceptual apparatus which helps us understand the power over the interest consciousness. In order to typify the consciousness concerning with the power exercised by the powerful, two criteria are induced, which are not distinguished clearly in Lukes' theory. One is a criterion by which one's interest consciousness can be judged as either built up by his autonomous choice or imposed by the power of the kind. Another is a helpful criterion for us to make a distinction between the morally or normatively relevant consciousness of interests and irrelevant one. There can be four types of the consciousness made by these two criteria. ( 1 ) rational consciousness ; Interest consciousness which is made autonomously by the subject and is normatively relevant. ( 2 ) irrational consciousness ; Interest consciousness formed up autonomously, being normatively irrelevant. ( 3 ) pseudo-rational consciousness ; Interest consciousness which is canalized by the power exerted by other(s) and is in normative relevance. ( 4 ) absurd consciousness ; Interest consciousness canalized by the power, being normatively irrelevant.<br> The kinds of the power which impose the powerless either the pseudo-rational consciousness or the absurd one are analyzed in the terms of the theory on the formation of interest consciousness and are named power of enlightenment and power of meaning deprivation respectively.
著者
君塚 大学
出版者
社会学研究会
雑誌
ソシオロジ (ISSN:05841380)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.3-18,140, 1987-09-30 (Released:2017-02-15)

According to Lukes' suggestions, most of the conventional views of power like the pluralist and the reformist one, which have even taken power as relationship, presuppose a priori that one's consciousness of interests is built up by his autonomous choice. However this presupposition precludes the investigation which examines some kind of power effects by the powerful over the formation of the powerless' interest consciousness. Agreeing with Lukes, I deny the presupposition and try to make a conceptual apparatus which helps us understand the power over the interest consciousness. In order to typify the consciousness concerning with the power exercised by the powerful, two criteria are induced, which are not distinguished clearly in Lukes' theory. One is a criterion by which one's interest consciousness can be judged as either built up by his autonomous choice or imposed by the power of the kind. Another is a helpful criterion for us to make a distinction between the morally or normatively relevant consciousness of interests and irrelevant one. There can be four types of the consciousness made by these two criteria. ( 1 ) rational consciousness ; Interest consciousness which is made autonomously by the subject and is normatively relevant. ( 2 ) irrational consciousness ; Interest consciousness formed up autonomously, being normatively irrelevant. ( 3 ) pseudo-rational consciousness ; Interest consciousness which is canalized by the power exerted by other(s) and is in normative relevance. ( 4 ) absurd consciousness ; Interest consciousness canalized by the power, being normatively irrelevant. The kinds of the power which impose the powerless either the pseudo-rational consciousness or the absurd one are analyzed in the terms of the theory on the formation of interest consciousness and are named power of enlightenment and power of meaning deprivation respectively.
著者
君塚 大学
出版者
佛教大学総合研究所
雑誌
佛教大学総合研究所紀要 (ISSN:13405942)
巻号頁・発行日
no.8, pp.1-17, 2001-03-25

There have been. some argument that traditional Confucian culture has still a strong influence in the lives of the people of East Asia. Some scholars find Confucian ethics to be the main cause for the miraculous economic development in the countries known as the Four Dragons. Furthermore some political analysts foresee the clash of civilizations between Confucian China and Christian Europe, especially the USA. But others deny such ideological functions of Confucianism. In these ways, there are many disputes concerning Confucian culture. In order to discuss these problems empirically, we must construct statistical accounts of the existence and strength of Confucian hegemony. Therefore I try in this paper to construct statistical scales to measure the main elements of Confucian culture. With the data from a comparative survey conducted in Japan, South Korea, and China in 1999, I have devised five indices as measuring scales. The first, Confucian economic culture scale, deals with economic ethics and industriousness. The second, Confucian political culture scale, tests authoritarian orientation and dependency on political leaders. The third, Confucian integral culture scale, is a tool to observe the inclination of social solidarity by ascription principles such as filiality, senior fidelity, and communalism that have been seen as typical features of the Confucian tradition. The fourth, Confucian life-world culture scale, serves to reveal the degree of ancestor worship and cultural ethnocentrism. Lastly, the Confucian whole culture scale, measures the prevalence of Confucian cultural ensemble among the population by combining the four scales.
著者
君塚 大学
出版者
The Japan Sociological Society
雑誌
社会学評論 (ISSN:00215414)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.2, pp.2-16, 1981-09-30 (Released:2010-04-23)
参考文献数
35
被引用文献数
1

従来の権力構造論では、権力現象は、一元的な支配構造ではなく、その時々の争点や状況ごとに多様な形をとる多元的な構造をもつとみる見解が優越であった。しかし、最近の権力分析の傾向の一つは、こうした多様な権力現象を深部から支え、方向づける深層の構造を浮彫にしようとしている。この場合、選択し決定をくだす主体と、深層の構造という二つの要素を、理論図式の中でどう位置づけるかが重大な問題になる。S・ルークスは、構造の規定を蒙りつつもなお自由に選択しうる主体の行為として権力を想定している。これに対し、S・クレッグは、自由な選択とみられるものも深層の社会的な選択基準 (彼のいう「生活様式」) によって拘束されていると考え、しかもこの基準を一元的なものと捉えることによって主体性を排除している。この対立を架橋しうる一つの方途がM・フーコーの権力分析に見出される。彼は深層の基準 (彼のいう「知の原理」) を〈牧人型の権力〉の所産と捉え、主体性を拒んでいる。と同時に、その〈権力〉をのりこえる企てを異なった「知の原理」の体現と考えている。つまり、「知の原理」そのものに対抗的な多元性が示唆されている。そうだとするならば、権力における主体性の契機は、構造の枠内においてではなく、深層の選択基準そのものをめぐるコンフリクトの関係においてこそ成り立つ、という考え方が可能になるであろう。