著者

山口 まり子

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.53, pp.227-236,241, 2002

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Discussions about fictional names provide us an interesting perspective when we try to make clear important notions in the philosophy of language, such as sense and reference, because, so far, few theories have been successful in treating fictional names.<BR>In this paper, I first point out that fictional names raise problems for two influential views in the philosophy of language, namely, Mill's view that proper names do not have meaning but only refer to their object, and Frege's view that proper names do have both reference and meaning(or sense). And then we shall examine three options to overcome the difficulties, namely, the predicate view, Walton-Evans' make-believe theory, and Thomasson's theory of dependent abstracta. Each view has its own merit and demerit when sentences/statements containing fictional names are divided into two types: internal and external. Internal statements express what is the case in a story(say, 'Sherlock Holmes is a famous detective)and external statements express what is the case from the real-world point of view(say, 'Sherlock Holmes is created by Conan Doyle'). I would like to propose that the make-believe theory would be the best option for internal statements and Thomasson's view for external statements. But what about statements that are both internal and external at the same time, such as 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective created by Conan Doyle'? This problem is discussed in§4 and one option is proposed there.

著者

山口 まり子

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

哲學 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, pp.65-85, 1997-03

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(1) ミルの名辞論 : 指示(denotation)と含意(connotation)(2) ミルの本質命題,或いはverbal propositionsと定義についてJ.S. Mill's theory of meaning seems to be opposite to ones which leads us to philosophical solipcism. This can be seen apparently in his statement: 'What does any one's personal knowledge of things amount to, after subtracting all which he has acquired by means of the words of other people?' He insists, 'Names are names of things, not of our ideas of them'. According to him, terms can be devided into two types: nonconnotative names and connotative names. All names (terms) are names of something, i.e. denote something. A connotative term 'connotes', i.e. 'implies' or 'means' an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, while he says that nonconnotative names have no connotation and therefore no meaning. For Mill, meaning of a term is its connotation, i.e. an attribute or a set of attributes of the thing denoted by the term, something objective, not something mental. I think we can say that Mill's intention in his System of Logic is to depsychologize the theory of meaning, though whether he has succeeded in it is problematic. In this paper, I would like to clarify his theory of meaning, in which 'denotation' and 'connotation' play important roles, and criticise it, sometimes referring to other philosophers like Husserl and Wittgenstein.

著者

山口 まり子

出版者

立教大学異文化コミュニケーション学部

雑誌

ことば・文化・コミュニケーション : 異文化コミュニケーション学部紀要 (ISSN:18838197)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.113-128, 2013

著者

町田 一 山口 まり子

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

哲學 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.102, pp.15-36, 1997-12

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Although we speak of fictitious person or things in books, films, or in our imagination very frequently and without any hesitation, the status of the names of fictitious things or things which do not exist has been quite ambiguous and problematic in logic. In this small paper, we would like to consider whether the sentences which include these names are susceptible of truth or false, by mentioning Abelard, who insists that the existence of a name is inseparably connected with the existence of a thing which is signified by the name (or at least, an evidence of the thing's existence), and J.S. Mill, who insists that the existence of a name does not necessarily demand the actual existence of a thing which is denoted by the name.