著者

新見 まどか

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.129, no.9, pp.1-35, 2020 (Released:2021-09-20)

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一般的に、唐代藩鎮は中央集権支配に反目した負の印象が強い。しかし近年の研究により、唐が軍事・行政・財政等、諸方面に亘って藩鎮に依存していたことが明らかとなった。唐は、藩鎮体制というシステムがあったからこそ、安史の乱後も存続することが出来たと言っても過言ではない。ただし、朝廷と共存関係にあった唐代藩鎮は、僖宗(きそう)期の黄巣(こうそう)の乱を境に変質していったとされる。では、唐代藩鎮体制は具体的にどのような過程を辿って破綻に至ったのだろうか。本稿ではこの点を解明すべく、僖宗期の軍事政策に如何なる過失があったのかを分析し、唐滅亡と唐代藩鎮体制との関連を考察した。 黄巣の乱が勃発した際、朝廷は、乱に遭遇した現地の節度使に対応させるという基本戦略を採用した。しかし、現地兵は実は賊と表裏一体であったため、この戦略は有効ではなかった。そしてより重要な問題は、黄巣の乱前半期、本来唐の軍事力の根幹であったはずの遊牧勢力が、ほぼ全く利用されなかったことである。この原因は、黄巣の乱と同時期に代北で起こった李(り)克用(こくよう)の乱であった。黄巣の乱の淵源地と李克用の乱の淵源地とは、藩鎮体制においてはいずれも唐を守るべき戦力が配備されていた地域だった。しかし僖宗期には、その両方の軍事力が利用不能となったのである。そのため朝廷は有効な対策を取れず、二つの乱は相互に連動しながら拡大していった。以上のような藩鎮体制の軍事的破綻が、唐朝の解体に繋がったと考えられる。 従来、唐滅亡の要因は専ら黄巣の乱にあるとされ、李克用に関してはそれを平定した功績が強調されてきた。しかし、唐が滅んだのはむしろ、黄河の南北で発生した二つの乱の相互作用によると見做すべきだろう。このような見方は、ひいては唐滅亡の歴史的意義を、唐内地のみならずより広域的な視野で位置づけることにも繋がる。

著者

新見 まどか

出版者

史学会 ; 1889-

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.129, no.9, pp.1329-1363, 2020-09

著者

新見 まどか

出版者

関西大学東西学術研究所

雑誌

関西大学東西学術研究所紀要 (ISSN:02878151)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.101-119, 2016-04-01

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This paper investigates the use of the title "Great King" (大王) by the military governor of Lu-long (盧龍) at the end of the ninth century, using a stone inscription called the "Zhongcan sheliji (重蔵舎利記)" at Mingzhong (憫忠) temple in You-zhou (幽州) as a reference. In this inscription, Li-Keju (李可挙), military governor of Lu-long, is called "Great King," but this is not an isolated occurrence; I have been able to confirm its use in other historical sources from the 880s and 890s, such as Guiyuan bigeng ji (『桂苑筆耕集』)and Ermu ji (『耳目記』). Around this time, changes in the Tang system of investiture permitted individuals of commoner origin, such as military governors, to use the title of "king" (王), a privilege formerly reserved for members of the imperial family. "Great King" is presumed to be an honorific form of this title. Moreover, the forms of spacing and line breaks employed in the inscription suggest that the monks of Minzhong temple were according a military governor with the title of king even greater respect than the emperor. In the late-ninth century, the power and prestige of the imperial court had been dealt a major blow by the rebellion of Huang-Chao (黄巣), and the military governor of Lu-long had embraced the ambition of overthrowing the Tang court and seizing the empire for himself. Such power relations, political and military, between the Tang court and the military governor would appear to have influenced the style and format of the "Zhongcan sheliji" inscription.

著者

新見 まどか

出版者

関西大学史学・地理学会

雑誌

史泉 = Shisen : historical & geographical studies in Kansai University (ISSN:03869407)

巻号頁・発行日

no.123, pp.17-33, 2016-01

著者

新見 まどか

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.6, pp.1077-1113, 2015-06-20

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The study of the history of Tang China which focuses on the transition from the Tang to the Song Dynasty has recently broadened its purview from the Han Chinese world proper to the whole region spanning eastern Eurasia. In the present article the author focuses on the mid-ninth century civil disturbances occurring among the governors (jiedushi 節度使) of fanzen 藩鎮 regional garrisons and their relationship to the Dynastic transition, taking up the concrete example of the rebellion of Liu Zhen 劉〓, the governor of Zhao-Yi 昭義 in Eastern Shanxi Province. Despite the overwhelming opinion that the rebellion represents an "exception" in the fanzen civil disturbances, the author's analysis of Liu Zhen's close advisors shows that the incident should be directly understood as an element of fanzen civil unrest as it developed after the An Lushan 安禄山 Rebellion (755-63). Moreover, the fact that the imperial court took on the task of quelling Liu's rebellion reflects the defeat of the remnants of the Uighur nomadic empire that had risen during that time on the Tang Dynasty's northern periphery. Also, through its divide and conquer tactic of appealing to common interests it shared with Liu's army, the court was able to avoid one threat by negotiating over succession to the three garrisons of Hebei. However, due to the large demilitarization of the region after the rebellion, a huge outflow of surplus military personnel into Henan took place, resulting in region becoming racked with brigandage, smuggling and outright rebellion. Given the situation described above, the author concludes that the rebellion of Liu Zhen and China's policy regarding the three garrisons north of the Huanghe, as well as the instability characterizing Henan were for the Tang Dynasty problems not exclusively "domestic" in nature, but rather linked to what was going in the hinterlands of Inner Asia. That is to say, from the An Lushan Rebellion on, in addition to need to defend its northern borders, the Tang Dynasty had to amass a huge military campaign into the hinterlands for the defense of the northern three garrisons. Then during the reign of Emperor Wuzong, with the destruction of the Uighur Empire, the court deployed its northern defense forces to quell the fanzhen rebellions raging in the interior. Via such efforts, the court was also able to secure the northern three garrisons, thus almost simultaneously eliminating any military threat to the Middle Kingdom. This is why the court then embarked on the demilitarization of the remote hinterland fanzhen, which were now deemed unnecessary. Consequently, the demobilized troops having no place to settle turned into a domestic source of civil unrest. The rebellion of Liu Zhen was therefore an event which symbolizes the changing situation of the mid-ninth century, in which reverberations caused by the destruction of the nomadic empire of the steppe rumbled through the Taihang Mountains into Hebei, and eventually became an indirect source of civil unrest in Henan.