著者
松村 史紀 Fuminori MATSUMURA
出版者
宇都宮大学国際学部
雑誌
宇都宮大学国際学部研究論集 = Journal of the School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University (ISSN:13420364)
巻号頁・発行日
no.55, pp.75-96, 2023-02-01

The Soviet Union successfully launched its first artificial satellite on October 4th, 1957. This Sputnik incident has been remembered mainly as a shock for the United States because it immediately prompted Washington to emulate Moscow in space developments. In fact, however, the shock was not only for the U.S. but also for many other powers including China.The sputnik shock for China was initially reflected not by its space policy but by its earnest news reports. Both Chinese communists (Beijing) and nationalists (Taipei) were enthusiastic about press reports on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in launching satellites as an effort to conduct propaganda strategies. Previous studies, however, focus more on Beijing's space developments that virtually started in the 1970s but less on China's propaganda or press reports in the late 1950s.This article aims to examine the Sputnik impact on China's newspapers by comparing press reports of the People's Daily owned by the Chinese Communist Party and those of the Central Daily News published by the Chinese Nationalist Party. The initial reports of the three major events consisted of the Sputnik-1 launching on October 4th, 1957, the Sputnik-2 launching on November 3rd and the first U.S. satellite (i.e., "Explorer-1") launching on January 31st, 1958. From these reports, two conclusions can be drawn.First, both parties exaggerated achievements attained by their Cold-War allies. Beijing tried to illustrate that the Sputnik launching proved high growth of a former developing state, the Soviet Union, in the scientific technological field as well as that the incident destabilized the consolidation of the Western bloc. By contrast, Taipei could not show that the U.S. restored its prestige as a leader of the free world until the latter successfully launched its first artificial satellite.Second, Chinese communists and nationalists similarly downplayed great feats achieved by their Cold-War adversaries. Whilst Beijing flouted the U.S. "Explorer-1" that was even smaller than the size of the Sputnik-1, Taipei claimed that Moscow managed to launch its satellites at the great sacrifice of citizens' ordinary life. Moreover, the latter even expected serious anti-communist movements to take place soon behind the iron curtain.
著者
松村 史紀 マツムラ フミノリ Fuminori Matsumura
雑誌
国際研究論叢 : 大阪国際大学紀要 = OIU journal of international studies
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.2, pp.129-145, 2011-01-31

After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union temporarily maintained the “postwar international order” which aimed to establish peaceful cooperation between the victorious powers and to prevent the defeated nations from restoring their military power. The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1945 was established to embody the order. Instead of analyzing the order, however, previous research merely claims that the Sino-Soviet alliance was unequal because the Soviet Union secured interests in some ports and railways in Northeast China in the treaty. This paper argues that Moscow defended such interests by employing the logic of the “postwar international order”. To begin with, this study examines the role of national security and ideology in Soviet foreign policy. Next, the historical process in which Moscow gradually altered their policy from postwar peaceful cooperation to the Cold War strategy is studied. Lastly, this paper argues at length that the Soviets managed to secure their interests in the Sino-Soviet alliance by referring to the logic of the “postwar international order:” victorious powers (the Soviet Union and China) shall cooperatively prevent the defeated nation (Japan) from restoring their military power.
著者
松村 史紀
出版者
大阪国際大学
雑誌
国際研究論叢 (ISSN:09153586)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.2, pp.129-145, 2011-01

After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union temporarily maintained the "postwar international order" which aimed to establish peaceful cooperation between the victorious powers and to prevent the defeated nations from restoring their military power. The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1945 was established to embody the order. Instead of analyzing the order, however, previous research merely claims that the Sino-Soviet alliance was unequal because the Soviet Union secured interests in some ports and railways in Northeast China in the treaty. This paper argues that Moscow defended such interests by employing the logic of the "postwar international order". To begin with, this study examines the role of national security and ideology in Soviet foreign policy. Next, the historical process in which Moscow gradually altered their policy from postwar peaceful cooperation to the Cold War strategy is studied. Lastly, this paper argues at length that the Soviets managed to secure their interests in the Sino-Soviet alliance by referring to the logic of the "postwar international order:" victorious powers (the Soviet Union and China) shall cooperatively prevent the defeated nation (Japan) from restoring their military power.