著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.4, pp.1-27, 2018-03

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There were two types of military force used to suppress rebellions during the late Qing period: bing (兵), or regular troops consisting of the Green Standard Army and the Eight Banners, and yong (勇), or temporary volunteer troops organized into Yongying (勇營), mainly under governors-general and governors, in addition to tuanlian (團練) units on the village level. In Zhili (直隸) Province during the outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion of the 1860s, bing, yong and tuanlian forces were deployed together to quell the insurrection, but the lack of discipline on the part of the bing-yong troops during the operation merely added to the civil unrest caused by the Rebellion. The Qing Court, in consideration of the effects of the worsening law and order on the capital of Beijing, reorganized the Green Army at the hands of the governor-general of Zhili in order to strengthen the government’s control, thus leading to the formation of Zhili Lianjun (直隸練軍).However, after the outbreak of the Nian Rebellion led to the further deterioration of law and order in Zhili Province, and as it became necessary to reinforce Zhili Lianjun with Yongying, the Court designed a new capital defense plan under which Yongying were deployed to limited areas, including southern and coastal areas of Zhili, either far away from Beijing or at the spot of the actual fighting, while Zhili Lianjun was stationed around Peking. This new capital defense plan was partly based on the Court’s, especially its Board of War’s (Bingbu 兵部), suspicion of Yongying, which included former rebels who had surrendered, and were thus deemed untrustworthy to serve around the Capital. This suspicion was further deepened due to the fact that Yongying also served as the governors-generals’ militia. As well, the Board of War had intervened several times during the establishment of Zhili Lianjun, owing to its concern over its close relationship with the governor-general of Zhili. The author takes up the Board as an excellent example of how the center’s attitudes toward the periphery began to change during the late Qing period.

著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

大阪学院大学国際学学会

雑誌

大阪学院大学国際学論集 International studies (ISSN:21899762)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.1, pp.1-30, 2020-12

著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.4, pp.1-27, 2018-03

---

There were two types of military force used to suppress rebellions during the late Qing period: bing (兵), or regular troops consisting of the Green Standard Army and the Eight Banners, and yong (勇), or temporary volunteer troops organized into Yongying (勇營), mainly under governors-general and governors, in addition to tuanlian (團練) units on the village level. In Zhili (直隸) Province during the outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion of the 1860s, bing, yong and tuanlian forces were deployed together to quell the insurrection, but the lack of discipline on the part of the bing-yong troops during the operation merely added to the civil unrest caused by the Rebellion. The Qing Court, in consideration of the effects of the worsening law and order on the capital of Beijing, reorganized the Green Army at the hands of the governor-general of Zhili in order to strengthen the government's control, thus leading to the formation of Zhili Lianjun (直隸練軍).However, after the outbreak of the Nian Rebellion led to the further deterioration of law and order in Zhili Province, and as it became necessary to reinforce Zhili Lianjun with Yongying, the Court designed a new capital defense plan under which Yongying were deployed to limited areas, including southern and coastal areas of Zhili, either far away from Beijing or at the spot of the actual fighting, while Zhili Lianjun was stationed around Peking. This new capital defense plan was partly based on the Court's, especially its Board of War's (Bingbu 兵部), suspicion of Yongying, which included former rebels who had surrendered, and were thus deemed untrustworthy to serve around the Capital. This suspicion was further deepened due to the fact that Yongying also served as the governors-generals' militia. As well, the Board of War had intervened several times during the establishment of Zhili Lianjun, owing to its concern over its close relationship with the governor-general of Zhili. The author takes up the Board as an excellent example of how the center's attitudes toward the periphery began to change during the late Qing period.

著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

洛北史学会

雑誌

洛北史学 (ISSN:13455281)

巻号頁・発行日

no.20, pp.185-190, 2018

著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

史学研究会

雑誌

史林 (ISSN:03869369)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.4, pp.620-648, 2015-07

著者

根無 新太郎

出版者

史学研究会 (京都大学大学院文学研究科内)

雑誌

史林 (ISSN:03869369)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.4, pp.620-648, 2015-07

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一九世紀後半、近衛部隊ともいえる禁旅八旗の中に、北京朝廷は新たに神機営を設立した。その目的は、他の禁旅八旗を再訓練することにあった。そのため、神機営の管理は、朝廷内での権力に直結するものと認識され、西太后は妹婿である醇郡王をその管理に充てる。一方、朝廷の外では、神機営は漢人督撫の率いた勇営と共に、塩匪や捻軍などの反乱を鎮圧した。やがて、勇営による地域の治安破壊に直面した北京朝廷は、神機営にその監視および統制を命じる。ここにおいて、神機営は反乱だけではなく勇営とも相対する役割を課されたのであった。本稿は、これまで看過されがちであった神機営の活動を検討し、清末における北京朝廷(中央) と督撫(地方) の関係について再考を試みたものである。In the latter half of the 19th century, the imperial court in Peking established the Peking Field Force 神機営 within the Eight Banners of the Imperial Guard 禁旅八旗. Their aim was to retrain the other units of the Eight Banners. However, the role played by the Peking Field Force in the late Qing was not confined to this one military unit alone. The Peking Field Force was recognized in Peking at that time as a military force linked with powerful figures within the court. As a result, the court refused to allow the Han Chinese bureaucrats to become involved with the Field Force, despite recommendations to that effect, and Prince Kung 恭親王 became the head of the Field Force. Eventually, Empress Dowager Xi came to view Prince Kung as a political opponent and used accusations against him as an opportunity to remove him from the leadership of the force. Prince of the Second Degree Ch'un 醇郡王, brother-in-law of the Empress Dowager, was then appointed to the post in place of Prince Kung. On the other hand, outside the court, the Peking Field Force and the Yung-Ying 勇営 (lit. Brave Battalions), led by the Han Chinese bureaucrats, together suppressed various rebellions. In 1867, the merchants of the salt monopoly in the Metropolitan Province直隷省rose in armed revolt and in the following year the Nien rebels 捻軍 invaded. Viewing these developments, the court in Peking dispatched the Field Force. Additionally, in order to suppress these rebellions, Brave Battalions led by the Han Chinese provincial viceroys and governors Liu Ch'ang-yu 劉長佑, Tso Tsung- t'ang 左宗棠, and Li Hung-chang 李鴻章 together with the Peking Field Force entered the Metropolitan Province. However, in addition to cooperating with the Field Force in fighting the rebels, these Brave Battalions disturbed the peace of the province through violence and pillage. This was due to the fact that the Brave Battalions were armed groups whose roots were the same as the rebel forces. Faced with this situation, the court in Peking grew wary of the Brave Battalions and tasked the Field Force with the role of surveilling and controlling them. The Field Force thus had to cope with the Brave Battalions as well as the rebel forces. Surveillance and control of the Brave Battalions was at first based on military regulations and censure. However, the situation changed with the setting of a time limit on the suppression followed by the stage when Tu-hsing-a 都興阿, an officer of the Field Force, took direct control of military operations. As can be seen from the fact that the court in Peking and the Field Force were forced to alter their surveillance and control in this manner, surveillance and control were in the end not fully implemented. The Brave Battalions did not follow the orders of the Field Force to the letter, but the punishment for this insubordination was relatively light. This was likely a result of the court placing the highest priority on suppressing the rebels. The Peking court's wariness of the Brave Battalions appears in the their deployment during the fighting. The court stationed the Peking Field Force closest to the capital and sent the Brave Battalions to the front lines. The intent seems to have been to have the Brave Battalions and the rebel forces expend their strength in battle while conserving that of the Field Force in the rear. Furthermore, the Field Force could carry out surveillance of the Brave Battalions from behind, and on the unlikely chance that the Brave Battalions would turncoat and side with the rebel forces, it is thought that the Field Force could play the role of defending the capital against their advance. In fact, after the Nien rebels had been suppressed, the Field Force was not removed from the Metropolitan Province until the Brave Battalions were entirely withdrawn. As can be seen from the above, the court in Peking was quite wary of the Brave Battalions, and it would only be a slight exaggeration to say that this vigilance was of the same order as that shown toward the rebel forces. To the extend the Brave Battalions served as the basis for provincial viceroys and governors, the relationship between the court in Peking and the provincial viceroys and governors was not limited solely to one of increased discretion. It can be surmised that surveillance and restraints were carried out as a matter of course. One can thus question whether it was not actually the policy of the court in Peking to employ the Field Force as a military power in confronting the provincial viceroys and governors. This paper has examined the often-overlooked activities of the Peking Field Force and attempted thereby to reconsider the relationship between the court in Peking and provincial viceroys and governors in the late Qing.