- 著者
-
横田 仁
- 出版者
- 日本メルロ=ポンティ・サークル
- 雑誌
- メルロ=ポンティ研究 (ISSN:18845479)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.26, pp.35-51, 2022-09-17 (Released:2022-09-17)
Some studies of Merleau-Pontian ethics argue that actions should be evaluated in their consequences, not in the motives nor character traits of the agents. This is because, in an intersubjective relationship, actions may be understood in multiple senses, and therefore, motives cannot be determined. However, this paper argues that the motives can be involved in evaluation. To demonstrate this, we first briefly overview the concept of ‘motive’ in both Michael Slote’s ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics and Merleau- Ponty’s philosophy. Then, we will find in “In Praise of Philosophy” that the motivation is closely involved in the way he treats Descartes’ silence with relation to Galileo affair and the Socrates’ narrative in “The Apology”. And finally, we will conclude as follows. Merleau- Ponty suggests that the philosopher’s action is praised, when he/she manifests his/her propre motives in the historical situation, with due regard for the self, the truth and the others, and this is the exercise of a “philosopher’s virtue” for him/her.