著者

花形 恵梨子

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.177-190, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Although Rawls never addressed the issue of affirmative action in his writings, remedying the discrimination-related disadvantages that influence people’s life chances will also likely fall within the purview of justice. This paper discusses the implications of his theory for affirmative action, its justification, and the extent to which it is justified in the framework of justice as fairness. Rawls mainly focuses on ideal theory. He works out the principles of justice under the assumption that people comply with the demands of justice and that favorable circumstances hold, while affirmative action is a problem for a nonideal society. In the framework of justice as fairness, affirmative action is addressed under the principle of equality of opportunity(EO). Formal EO and fair EO together require that people develop their talents regardless of the social circumstances to which they are born. They compete for offices and positions under fair conditions, and motivated, qualified individuals acquire the positions. However, under nonideal circumstances, there are entrenched injustices that hinder the realization of such an ideal. Under nonideal circumstances, principles of ideal theory serve as a guide to a fully just society. It is often claimed that affirmative action is incompatible with fair EO, as it requires differential treatment based on group membership, while fair EO focuses on the qualifications of individuals. By discussing criticisms of affirmative action, I will argue that affirmative action in the form of preferential treatment is justified as a transitional measure to remedy systematic group disadvantages and realize the fair EO ideal. As Rawls’s democratic equality aims not for a meritocratic society but for one in which people can relate as equals, the criticism that affirmative action policies stigmatize the targets of affirmative action can also be answered.

著者

花形 恵梨子

出版者

慶應義塾大学倫理学研究会

雑誌

エティカ (ISSN:18830528)

巻号頁・発行日

no.8, pp.137-160, 2015

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はじめに1. 『正義論』の問題設定 : 「秩序だった社会」にふさわしい正義構想2. 「秩序だった社会」における正義構想の役割3. 『正義論』の「公正としての正義の秩序だった社会」と理に適った多元主義4. 『政治的リベラリズム』の「秩序だった社会」おわりに

著者

花形 恵梨子

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.134, pp.201-134, 2015-03

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特集 : 西脇与作君・樽井正義君退職記念寄稿論文Rawls's political liberalism claims that under the condition of reasonable pluralism coercive laws are legitimate only if they are justifiable to all reasonable citizens. This requirement of public justification is fulfilled when laws are justified by public reason. And the content of public reason is given by political conceptions of justice which can be the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This paper clarifies why political liberalism sets this requirement of public justification and highlights the characteristic features of political liberalism as a kind of liberalism by first, comparing political liberalism to comprehensive liberalism and second, by comparing political liberalism to perfectionist liberalism.