著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

Japan Association for Comparative Economic Studies

雑誌

比較経済研究 (ISSN:18805647)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.2, pp.51-60,92, 2006-08-01 (Released:2009-07-31)

参考文献数

30

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ウクライナの「オデッサ・ブロディ」原油パイプラインは,原油供給源および輸入ルート面でのロシア依存解消を目的として建設された。しかし,供給源のロシア依存解消は主要な国内製油所がロシア資本傘下に入ることにより意味を失い,さらにロシア以外の原油供給源が確保できなかったため完工後も稼働に至らなかった。同パイプラインは,2004年,原油輸出の追加ルートを求めていたロシアが原油を供給することにより輸送を開始したが,結果的に当初の目的を果たしたとはいえず,ウクライナはロシア依存を一層深めることになった。

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.164-180, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

24

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This paper aims to analyze the development of parliamentary systems in Ukraine.Since independence, Ukraine held parliamentary elections three times (1994, 1998, 2002) .There are many articles which analyzed these elections. Their approaches were characterized by two. First of all, they were using the left-right ideology scale to analyze them. For instance, parliamentary camps would be classified by this scale. The Communist party of Ukraine was located on the left edge, on the other hand Ukraine nationalists parties were located on the opposite side. Secondly, the political party was their central analysis unit in these studies.However, these approaches have two problems. First, ideology issues are not the central matter of current political arena. It is insignificant to use this scale to classify today's the political parties. Second, political parties are less important actors during the elections and the session of the parliament. As for elections, independent candidates and the electoral blocks are dominant. Also, parliamentary procedures are ran by the fractions, which are the compositions of independents, parties and blocks. There is little coincidence between the three. This is especially for independents who are less ideologized and frequently change their belongings. Once those deputies form their own parties or fractions, few of them are alive by the time of the next elections. Third, these less ideologized deputies, called “Centrist, ” become more important within the current political arena. We should consider these forces as a main unit of our research.The Centrists begin their career as a high rank bureaucrat or directors of large state industries. Since each of them individually retained certain political resources, they did not form any organization such as political party. The rise of the Super-Presidentilaism and the large scale economic reform as well as the introduction of proportional representation, all had an impact on these Centrists. New counter-elites emerged from the privatization and diversification of economic interests, confront old elites. This drove old and new elites to organize each political structure to compete against each other. Also, they had a interest to support the president not to revive old communist regime.Last year's elections proved the above mentioned tendency. The ideologized parties lost their momentum. On the other hand, the Centrists' parties gained more seats than the previous elections. Furthermore, we observed that the Centrists' split into pro and anti presidential camps within the parliament. This will be the strong evidence of how Ukrainian parliament works well.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.29, pp.105-113, 2000 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

32

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Since independence, Ukraine has heavily relied on Russian gas. Many argue that Ukraine's energy dependency will affect Ukraine's security policy and will lead Ukraine to Russian satellite state (so-called “Second Belarus”) . They describe Ukraine-Russian relation as zero-sum games: Russia is an aggressive imperialistic state and Ukraine has less chance to counter this measure. However, many ignore that Russia also depends on Ukraine's gas pipeline. Without Ukraine, Russia cannot export her energy to European market. It seems that both countries have vulnerability to each other. In this paper, the possibility of interdependency between Ukraine and Russia will be discussed.Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, monopolizes the gas supply to Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine has tried diversifying energy resources. Besides that, Ukraine has huge gas debts and its sum increases every moment. Gazprom demands to compensate for Ukraine's debts with Ukrainian strategic company's share such as gas pipeline systems. On the other hand, Russia also has vulnerability to Ukraine. 90% of Russian exported gas goes through Ukrainian territory. Ukraine controls tariff and sometimes illegally siphons off of Russian gas transiting Ukrainian territory. Therefore, Russia had no way but to agree with the debt-restructuring plan, which gave advantage to Ukraine.Both countries try to decrease their own vulnerabilities. Ukraine seeks alternative energy suppliers. Recently, Ukraine is building a pipeline to import Caspian oil. Due to financial problems, this route is so far incomplete. As for importing Turkmenistan gas, Ukraine has to pay transit fee to Russia. It is obvious that Turkmenistan gas does not contribute to decrease dependency on Russia. Russia also plans to build alternative gas pipelines, which bypass Ukraine. But these routes will not run for the next 10-15 years due to financial and technical problems.As discussed above, both countries are not successful seeking alternatives. For them, the most mutual benefited plan is further using existing pipeline. Then Ukraine could receive the transit fee, Russia saves huge investment capital (or save expensive transit fee for using the newly constructed pipeline) . However, the following problems must be resolved. First, Ukraine has to show her plan to clear huge gas debts. Under recent financial constraints, Ukraine has limited ways to clear debts such as cash emission, asking Russia to reconstruct debts, and selling (or leasing) pipeline systems. Second, Ukraine has to resolve “illegal siphon off”. Russia should ask Ukraine's guarantee or control the rights of pipeline. Under these circumstances, most controversial plan is selling the share of pipeline (wholly or partially) . Its merits are following: clear Ukraine's gas debts, attract Russian capital to renovate pipeline systems, and further transit Russian gas. However, there is a large opinion that joining Russian capital to Ukrainian energy sector should be dangerous to Ukraine's national security. They fear that Ukraine might completely lose the playing card. Since Western investors hesitate to invest in Ukraine, Russian capital is the only investor. Whether Russian or Westerner, the good investor for Ukraine is one who invests well in Ukraine. The worst scenario is that both sides increase suspicion to each other, Russia concentrates building up her alternative pipeline projects and abandons transiting through Ukrainian route. If both sides understand well their mutual benefits, then there should be interdependency between the two countries.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.27, pp.111-119, 1998 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

27

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

Japan Association for Comparative Economic Studies

雑誌

比較経済体制学会年報 (ISSN:13484060)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.183-197,216, 2002 (Released:2009-07-31)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the history of the natural gas wholesale market in Ukraine from the point of view of the "Gastraders". We define the Gastrader as a company which imports and sells to industries. Gastraders are said to be one of the most profitable businesses in Ukraine because of its market scale and non-monetary transaction. Generally speaking, there are three periods in the history of the gas market.The first period is the period of state monopoly (up to 1995), the second is the period of the regionally divided system (1996-97), and the third one is the period of NaftoHaz (Ukraine's state gas monopoly) and ITERA (Gazprom's favorite).Throughout. these periods, external pressure (IMF and Gazprom) as well as the internal political situation took effect on the policy making of the gas market.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.301-325, 2000

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Ukraine draws attention from the international community because it is positioned between NATO and Russia. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were allowed to join NATO. Ukraine welcomed this accession as it would "strengthen security and stability in the European Continent." It seems that Ukraine has consistently moved closer to West European organizations and Ukraine took advantage of this opportunity to significantly improve its relationship with the West. However, the fact is not as simple as described above. Ukraine once proposed its original security plan and denounced NATO's PfP. Furthermore, Ukraine's economy relies heavily on the Russian market and energy supplies. When Ukraine's economy fails, there will be real danger that Ukraine involuntarily drifts eastward. In this paper, attention will be given to Ukraine's unique security policy regarding NATO-Russian relations. In the first chapter, economic problem under which Ukraine has existed will be discussed. In the second chapter, attention will be given to Ukraine's bridge diplomacy. Taking into account Ukraine's economic constraint and neutral policy, the last chapter will discuss Ukraine's policy towards NATO's expansion. 1. Economic factor plays an important role in Ukraine's security policy since its economy depends on Russia. After Russia launched its price liberalization in January 1992, Ukraine chose to leave the Ruble zone in order to establish its own national economic policy. This policy, called the "New economic plan" ended in failure and brought about hyperinflation, decline of GDP and huge energy debts. Kiev realized that Ukraine could not run its economy without Russia's cheap energy and market. A year later, Ukraine switched its orientation to Russia, but claimed that this integration was limited to the economic area. This economic integration with Russia, or the CIS Economic Union, generated great disputes among the citizens. In the presidential election in 1994, Ukrainian opinion was divided into two: Eastern Ukraine voted for former prime minister and pro-Economic integrationist Kuchma, Western Ukraine voted for then President Kravchuk who acted as a guarantor of Ukrainian statehood. Kuchma won, but after the elections, he launched an economic reform with the IMF and did not choose the integration line with Russia. The reason is straightforward. The IMF provided credit to cover the energy debts. After this decision was made, Ukraine's interest for the CIS Economic Union diminished. Ukraine realized that Russia had no intention of selling its energy at a cheap price. As IMF gives credit, Ukraine's interest in Russia is only to secure market for its products. Even with the economic reform launch in 1994, Ukraine's economy still records minus growth and its dependency on Russia has not been resolved. 2. As in the case of Euro-neutrals, their positive image in international arena comes not from their economic or military power, but from their neutral diplomacy, that is, bridge-diplomacy. Ukraine also tries to carry out this diplomacy. In 1993, Ukraine proposed to create a collective security zone for Central and Eastern Europe. This proposal aimed to create a bridge between Western Europe and Russia that would develop a broad transatlantic security system covering the entire CSCE (now OSCE) region. This proposal has found little support in Central and Eastern states as well as U.S. and Russia because it seemed like an anti-Russian alliance. Furthermore, it could be said that unstable Ukraine lacked its positive international image. This proposal was finally eroded by the PfP, since the PfP aimed to create a bridge between NATO and non-NATO countries. In 1996, Ukraine had the opportunity to propose a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central and Eastern Europe which also aimed for a bridge between NATO and Russia. Ukraine connected this proposal with the fact that Ukraine has carried out her commitments to transfer nuclear warheads. However, it appears that Ukraine did not have an intention to institutionalize this proposal. Generally, negative security assurance from nuclear powers is one of the necessary factors to materialize the nuclear-weapon-free-zone. However, there was no security assurance discussion in this proposal. As a matter of fact, this proposal aimed to find a common language with Russia who strongly opposed to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member states rather than creating a bridge between NATO and Russia. 3. Ukraine has shifted its view of NATO and its security policy. Eastern European countries which wanted to join NATO regarded PfP as the first step to NATO membership. Ukraine also did not oppose NATO's expansion, but claimed this process must be evolutionary, and it was necessary to harmonize with neighboring countries such as Russia and Ukraine. From Ukraine's viewpoint, Ukraine would develop her security through the PfP framework. At this point, Ukraine advocated building pan-European security institutions, especially the OSCE, the main pillar of the new European security architecture. This was similar to the Russian vision. Ukraine saw that NATO would be a promotive but secondary factor for this institution. However, soon Ukraine realized that NATO would expand in the near future. Ukraine changed its view of NATO from a passive to a positive one. Russian Duma and politicians have on several occasions called into question Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol. Furthermore, some Russian government officials implied using economic pressure to boost its integration policy within the CIS. In these circumstances, Ukraine must place NATO as the center of its security policy. Ukraine noticed that NATO was changing from a defense organization to a political-military institute, as well as the guardian of democracy and human rights. This could be the reason why NATO would not harm any other states. Furthermore, idealism regarding the OSCE was replaced by a realistic approach to NATO. At this moment, it was vital for Ukraine to conclude a special relationship with NATO. NATO-Russian document seemed likely to be signed, so if Ukraine could not conclude a document with NATO, Ukraine's future would be determined by this NATO-Russian document. In the negotiation process, Ukraine strongly asked NATO to give security assurance or "associate status." Finally, in the document called "NATO-Ukraine Charter," NATO gave vague security assurance to Ukraine. NATO knows that Russia is strongly against the former Soviet Republics joining NATO. NATO had given Ukraine this document to "keep Ukraine quiet" regarding this problem. This Ukrainian government's pro-NATO orientation could not be explained by domestic factors, such as parliament and regional opinions. 4. Conclusion. Since independence, Ukraine has been caught and limited by economic dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, Ukraine pursued its intention of playing an intermediary role in European security issues. In the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine again showed its intention to intermediate between NATO and Serbia, but this initiative had found little support by both sides and as a result, ended in failure. Under the current international environment, there is little room for Ukraine to implement its bridge-diplomacy. Concerning the above mentioned objective and subjective factors, Ukraine gradually shifted its policy toward NATO. However, NATO's expansion continued regardless Ukraine's concerns. Ukraine demanded more security assurances from NATO, but its proposals were rejected. Every Ukrainian leader has to consider this situation. Ukraine's economic slump continues and Russia does not provide energy by cheap price. On the other hand, keeping a distance from NATO and pursuing its neutral policy have little prospect in the short and medium term. If the above-mentioned international condition continues, then there is no alternative for Ukraine but to maintain the current policy, IMF-oriented, pro-NATO but neutral status.