著者
醍醐 龍馬
出版者
日本政治学会
雑誌
年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.72, no.1, pp.1_132-1_154, 2021 (Released:2022-06-15)
参考文献数
28

明治初期の日露国境問題 (樺太問題) に関する先行研究では、明治政府に対する駐日英国公使パークスの樺太放棄勧告の影響が強調されてきた。これに対し国内要因に着目した本稿では、従来思想分析の対象に留まってきた黒田清隆の樺太放棄論が、政府内の重層的な対立構造のなかで政策実現していく政治過程を跡付けた。黒田は大久保利通に推され樺太専任の開拓次官に就任すると、組織内を対露宥和路線に統一した。さらに樺太開拓使と北海道開拓使の合併後は、札幌本庁から岩村通俊を駆逐し樺太放棄論で開拓使全体を纏めた。岩倉使節団外遊中の黒田は樺太放棄を建議し、外征派の外務卿副島種臣の樺太買収論、分界論と対抗した。そして、明治六年政変により副島から対露外交の主導権を奪い、外征優先ではなく内治優先に立脚する対露宥和路線を確立させた。最後には、木戸孝允ら政府内の慎重論を抑えながら自らと政策理念を共有する榎本武揚をロシアに送り込み樺太千島交換条約を結ばせた。こうして終止符が打たれた樺太問題を契機に大久保政権内に開拓使を基盤とした黒田グループが重要な位置を占め、そのなかにその後の対露外交で重要な役割を担う黒田、榎本、西徳二郎を中心としたロシア通の政策集団の原点が形成された。黒田とその周辺の位置付けを明治初期にまで遡り検討することは、長州閥中心で描かれがちな明治政治史の枠組みを薩摩閥の視点から再構成することにも繫がる。
著者
醍醐 龍馬
出版者
北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター
雑誌
スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, pp.45-70, 2021-09-08

In 1875, soon after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty stipulating the exchange of Sakhalin and the Kurill Islands, Japan and Russia agreed on a land lease of Inasa Village in Nagasaki to the Russian navy. This was a juridical confirmation of the Russian Squadron’s long-standing practice of using this locality as its winter base, which would remain intact until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. In fact, this agreement brought about stability of the bilateral relationship, serving as a prerequisite for Japan to embark on its subsequent Korean policy. This article attempts to contextualize this particular land lease in the increasingly entangled relationship between Japan and Russia. Nagasaki’s importance as a resort for the Russian navy increased, with its failure to obtain Tsushima as a strategic base under pressure from the British in 1861 and with its pivotal port moving from Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to Vladivostok in 1871. Against this backdrop in 1870 the Russians succeeded in renting a piece of land Hiradogoya for ten years by directly negotiating with the landowners and the Nagasaki administration. Two years later, when Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich visited Japan, he found it inconvenient to maintain a naval hospital and dock in Hiradogoya. This led one of his attendants, vice admiral of the navy Constantin Possiet, to propose to the Japanese government the Maruoyama foothills as an alternative for the Russian navy base. The Japanese government in turn rejected this proposal for two reasons. First, the Japanese navy was afraid that the occupation of this strategically important location by the Russian navy would raise security concerns. Second, the increase of places of mixed residence outside the fixed enclaves could threaten Japanese sovereignty. Undaunted, K. V. Struve, the Russian minister in Japan, tried to renegotiate in 1874, arguing that the lease of Maruoyama would have a positive effect on Russo-Japanese relations. However, the Japanese navy was a staunch opponent to this deal; it even purchased the disputed land for an admiralty house in haste so as to forge a fait accompli. Ultimately, the Japanese government was forced to propose an alternative land lease in Inasa in exchange for the old one in the same locality. In 1875, after Struve’s on-the-spot inspection of the proposed site along the coast of Nagasaki Bay, the Russian navy and a local landowner Shiga reached an agreement. The timing was crucial: this was right after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the establishment of a navy base in Inasa in the following year caused anxiety among the Japanese and the British, the Russians began to make efforts to maintain their friendship with Japan in order to keep this base. Together with the Maria Luz case in 1875, where the tsar worked as an arbitrator of the dispute between Japan and Peru, this Inasa controversy was a significant opportunity buttressing an improving bilateral relationship under the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the Russian Squadron’s utilization of Nagasaki as its winter base since the end of the Edo era had been possible thanks to the relatively good relationship between the two countries, the foundation of the Russian squadron’s berth in Inasa immediately following the St. Petersburg Treaty only reinforced the cemented friendship. Renewed in 1886, the land lease in Inasa continued to function until the Russo-Japanese War. Despite some negative reactions particularly from the British, the Meiji government’s recognition of the Russian navy base in Inasa alongside the St. Petersburg Treaty was an important factor in maintaining Russia as Japan’s ally and thereby allowing Japan’s strategic leeway in East Asia.