著者

畠中 茂朗

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.3-26, 2018 (Released:2020-09-30)

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The purpose of this paper is to feature Chokichi Toyonaga, the Chofu clansman, as a local entrepreneur in the Meiji period who did entrepreneurial activities in a main stage then and started Nihon Seimi Seizou Kaisya (the Japan chemical medicine manufacturing company), which in the end became an enterprise in a foundational period of the chemical industry of our country, and to consider the process of growing as a local entrepreneur in the Kanmon area. I would like to make it clear that the local entrepreneurs industrialized through Toyonaga's business expansion in our country.Chokichi Toyonaga was born as a low-level clansman of Chofu, but was able to rise in rank as fast as possible because of his talent and also got deep trust from two seigneurs, Motokane Mori and Mototoshi Mori. It was in the establishment of Akamagaseki-Beisyoukaisyo (the Akamagaseki rice Exchange company) that Toyonaga developed independent entrepreneurial activities for the first time. After that, it was added to the establishment of Toyonaga-gumi of a financial institution and Moji-Chikkou-kaisya (the Moji harbor company) where they did maintenance of infrastructure, and he made progress as an entrepreneur and established Nihon Seimi Seizou Kaisya.They had developed the process of the industrial enterprise, because a local entrepreneur like Toyonaga existed, who also raised up a modern industry not only in an urban area but outside of an urban area in the Meiji period, and local entrepreneurs were playing an important role in our country as bearers, too.

著者

田中 光

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.3-28, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

被引用文献数

1

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In the Interwar period, especially the 1920s-30s, the Japanese economy faced a long recession. As heavy industry began to develop again in the late 1930s, urban areas headed to recovery. On the other hand, rural society was strongly tied with light industry (especially silk spinning), and faced continued recession.Worsening the situation, many natural disaster occurred in this period (Great Kanto Earthquake, huge frost damage in Central Japan area, Showa Sanriku Tsunami and so on). The Japanese economy and society were severely challenged. The Japanese central government even planned for emigration to Manchuria to reduce these domestic problems, a policy that would have disastrous consequences after the war.However, not all villages relied on the Manchuria emigration policy for their community's survival. Many rural villages maintained social order without a decrease in population. A major factor in the survival of these communities appears to have been the existence of a local cooperative. This paper shows how local cooperatives mitigated the economic crisis using a case study: Kano Credit Union, in Nagano prefecture.The economy of Kano village was severely damaged by declining silk prices, as well as natural disasters. Despite this, the cooperative maintained profitability. The Kano cooperative had been honored by the National cooperatives' central association in 1910 for its good management practices, so this cooperative provides an ideal model. I analyze the Kano cooperative's business during the interwar period, and show how local community cooperatives provide a source of stability during periods of economic crisis.

著者

鈴木 敦子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.29-53, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

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Naraya (the Sugimoto family), who were kimono fabrics dealers, purchased kimonos in Kyoto, and sold them in the Kanto region during the Edo period, while the major dealers purchased kimonos in Kyoto, and sold them in Edo city. This study examines the Naraya pricing process, using their settlement of accounts statement as well as the statements of Daikokuya (the Tomiyama family) and Echigoya (the Mitsui family).Two important aspects are discussed in this study: the markup pricing method of kimonos, and the convention of changing the price in price tags. Kimono retailers used two markup pricing methods in the Edo period: uchi-mashi and soto-mashi.[1] Uchi-mashi: Cost/(1 - Markup) = Selling price[2] Soto-mashi: Cost × (1 + Markup) = Selling priceThe main store of Naraya in Kyoto purchased kimonos (kudari-mono), priced them at the uchi-mashi, and then sent them to the Kanto branches. More specifically, they classified kimonos and applied a set percentage for each category. That is, using the markup pricing as a standard, Naraya priced each kimono according to aspects such as its quality and mode.However, the price on the tag was not the selling price. The main store priced the purchased kimonos by doubling the selling price, while the branches sold them at the selling price. For example, 200 monme on the tag in Kyoto was sold at 100 monme in the Kanto branches. Thus, the double pricing on the tag in Kyoto by the Naraya was the conventional pricing style, which the Echigoya had established earlier.This study is significant because it is the first in the literature on the economic history of Japan to discuss the above-mentioned aspects.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.54-83, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

著者

竹原 有吾

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.3-25, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

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Jewish entrepreneurs made a great contribution to the development of the Prussian silk industry in the 18th century, and their contribution led to the possibility of building a secular “state community” in Prussia. The silk industry, which originated in Asia, was not seen in Prussia until the late 17th century. After the Thirty Years’ War, the government of Brandenburg-Prussia tried to promote various industries. The government, at first, used Huguenot immigrants from France to promote the silk industry, as they had been producing silk in France. Most of them, however, soon gave up silk manufacturing, because they lacked both money and knowledge of the Prussian market. On the other hand, David Hirsch, a Schutzjude (protected Jew), is the first merchant to have success in silk manufacturing in Prussia. Because Hirsch did not have any Christian business rivals in Prussia, he could begin producing silk there in 1730, using international markets and foreign artisans for his business.The number of Christian and Jewish merchants working in silk manufacturing increased during the reign of Frederick the Great. Jews were not excluded from the Prussian silk industry because they worked for both Jewish and Christian profits. In 1752 Jewish merchants were forced by the Prussian government to sell a fixed amount of silk produced in Christian factories. Furthermore, according to data found in the journal of Jewish silk manufacturer and eminent philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, he bought raw silk from abroad and sold it to both Christian and Jewish manufacturers.Because Jews generally could not join Zünften (associations of artisans) in medieval cities in Europe, it was very hard for Jews to work as artisans or manufacturers in late medieval times. By the 18th century, however, both Jews and Christians worked for the development of manufacturing, which led to the beginnings of a secular community in Prussia.

著者

『経営史学』編集委員会

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.26, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.27-38, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.39-75, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.81-94, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

千本 暁子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.3-23, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

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Under the Edo period's hokonin system, the goal of a merchant house hokonin, a business employee having completed the minimum apprentice-type training period, was becoming an independent merchant — running a business under the master's name with some capital and goodwill — and being raised to bekke (non-kin branch family). During the Meiji period, this system transformed into an employment system based on employer–employee relations.Recently, there have been several studies concerning the hokonin system of individual merchant families and its transformation process, but they do not offer generalized discussions. Despite numerous published research outcomes about the House of Mitsui, a largescale merchant family, no research has generalized it as a hokonin system.Shigeaki Yasuoka compared the bekke-system of the Houses of Konoike and Mitsui, discussing their foresight into the modern era, especially the uniqueness of the House of Mitsui because of their innovative and modernized management. Today, Yasuoka's theory is an important, commonly accepted theory, making it challenging to discuss the commonalities between the hokonin systems of large-scale merchant families.This study attempts to verify Yasuoka's hypothesis using historical records of Konoike's hokonin published after Yasuoka's hypothesis was presented. We produced data on 256 individuals who joined the House of Konoike as hokonin between the end of the 17th century and latter half of the 19th century and clarified the trend of the ages at which they joined the family, began living outside the main family's premises, started their own business, and passed away. Moreover, we verified three of Yasuoka's hypotheses: (1) the House of Konoike had no family-run business aside from inheriting the existing bekke; (2) bekke was non-autonomous from the House of Konoike; and (3) management of hokonin at Konoike was “drifting management.” As a result, we revealed that the House of Konoike also implemented pragmatic management much like the House of Mitsui.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.46-81, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

著者

平松 茂実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.28-50, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

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Dr. Kikunae Ikeda discovered the “Umami” taste associated with glutamate. He thenwent on to apply for a patent for a method of manufacturing a seasoning based on the“Umami” taste associated with foods high in glutamate. Fortunately this patent has turnedout to have an uncommon high availability, making it possible for Ajinomoto Company toestablish and maintain a large new global enterprise.Up to this present day, many technically outstanding patents have failed to succeed inbecoming the base of new businesses, even though these inventions and their patentshave been recognized and appreciated as representing useful technical novelties.The purpose of this paper is to clarify the reasons that Dr. Ikeda’s patent achieved thisrare high availability over a long period. First, I examined the details and the nature of thediscovery of “Umami”, took a close look at the novelty, the technical uniqueness and thedeficits of his patent, and then, in the light of these considerations, investigated the reasonsfor this success, by applying the NASA’s 3 step model developed to analyze barriersto industry development. In 2003, NASA in U.S.A. released a plan development model.This model identifies three barriers that need to be overcome during the course of successfuldevelopment. These are 1st: “the Devil River” R & D barrier, 2nd: “the Valley ofDeath” barrier to getting a business started, and 3rd: “the Darwinian Sea” barrier to successfulcompetition in the market.It is found that even though Dr. Ikeda’s patent had some deficits related to “the DevilRiver” barrier step, which allowed developers in the U.S.A. to get a foothold in the monosodiumglutamate industry in U.S.A., it also contained strong elements to combat “the Valleyof Death” barrier, and so it was able to hold back the emergence of most competitors inthis industry for a long time.Even though it may be difficult to place such a strong defense against “The Valley ofDeath” barrier in many patents, this finding does surely provide some new suggestionsabout how to launch highly available inventions and patents in the future.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.4, pp.51-80, 2017 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

五十嵐 千尋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.25-50, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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This paper aims to provide a brief account of the growth of the Western confectionery industry in Japan, focusing on Morinaga's vertical integration during the interwar period.Western confectionary was introduced into Japan around the beginning of the Meiji period. When Morinaga was founded, in 1899, there was neither a market for the ingredients nor a distribution channel for Western confectionary in Japan. In that case, how did Morinaga procure ingredients and create a market for its new products?The dairy industry was immature in those days but had excellent business opportunities, both inside and outside the country. Morinaga thus developed these and moved into the dairy industry. Consolidating some dairy businesses into a single company after WWI, it was thereby able to steadily secure ingredients. Later, when Morinaga's performance fell, it founded a corporate spin-off as the running costs were too high for Morinaga to maintain it.In the 1920s, in order to strengthen sales when a competitor, Meiji Seika, was established, Morinaga and various wholesale stores established sales companies. There was only a low-level capital relationship between Morinaga and these sales companies, however, so their elimination or consolidation did not damage Morinaga. The sales companies to which Morinaga sold its products had to take the risk of sluggish Morinaga sales, which supported Morinaga, especially through asset liquidation and a capital reduction from 15 to 7.5 million yen. In spite of Morinaga's development of a Beltline store system, however, it was unable to control the small retail-store units.Summarizing, Morinaga took measures towards vertical integration in order to secure ingredients and control its distribution network. The immaturity of the ingredients market meant that the main factor in this aspect of the vertical integration was the stabilization of ingredients provision, while Morinaga was able to maintain its group through corporate spin-off and risk hedging.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.51-95, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

著者

定藤 博子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.3-26, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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This paper aims to provide a fresh and revised view on Société Générale d'Immigration (SGI), a joint-stock company that organized foreign workers for French employers after WWI. As a specialist agent for migrant workers, it played a major role in shaping France's national system of immigration. While France was lacking a workforce, it organized the mass immigration of Polish workers, especially for agriculture and the mining industry.In France, SGI was criticized at that time for acting like a ‘slave trader’. Hence, this paper focuses on the business of SGI as an agent for Polish workers during the 1920s using primary sources. The key sources are in the French National Archives, the official journals of the labour unions, a conservative magazine, the official review of SGI, and the papers of the president of Comité Central des Houillères de France.First, as a joint-stock company, SGI had to ensure profitability, and fees to operate the immigration system were one of the only sources of revenue to provide stable management and stable growth.Second, SGI organized immigration for Polish workers who wanted to come to France and live as agricultural workers. The company prepared farmland and an agricultural centre for workers and their families. However, the agricultural labour market differed from the industrial labour market, so SGI did not have enough internal resources to meet all of French farmers' needs.Third, the company did not complete the selective examinations of migrant workers. Mismatches with the labour market resulted both from the lack of careful research from SGI and from incomplete information related to the market. Workers did not know which jobs were suitable for them, if they were not assigned a position.Consequently, this paper shows the major role of private companies and market mechanisms in immigration during the 1920s. Private companies contributed to the establishment of the national system of immigration, but were highly criticized as they sought profit.

著者

齊藤 直

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.27-48, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the background factors behind “anomalistic” capital increases (hentai zoshi) by Japanese corporations during the interwar period. Hentai zoshi means capital increases by establishing another company and immediately merging it.In most of previous researches, Commercial Code, which prohibited corporations from issuing new stocks before the shareholders pays full face value, has been considered as the background factor of hentai zoshi. However, the authenticity for the idea remains uncertain.In this paper, we analyze the case of the merger between Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company and Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company in 1927, and attempt to demonstrate that not only Commercial Code but also business decision played an important role to choose rather hentai zoshi than other options of raising fund. The main findings of this paper are as follows.1) Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company was established by Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company for the purpose of acquiring the production equipment of Toyo Sugar Manufacturing Company, which had affiliated with Suzuki & Co.2) Stocks of Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company were allocated to the shareholders of Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company.3) When Shin-Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company was merged, the stocks of it were discounted 40 %. Moreover, the information of this discount was announced before the offering of the stocks.4) One of the background factors of this hentai zoshi could be ascribed to Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company's motives to discount overvalued assets.5) The excellent condition of the business performance and the stock price allowed Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Company to implement this hentai zoshi.

著者

小野寺 香月

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.49-65, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.66-88, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.27-45, 2016 (Released:2018-03-30)