出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.41-47, 2018 (Released:2021-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.42-82, 2019 (Released:2021-06-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.55-83, 2018 (Released:2021-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.54-83, 2019 (Released:2022-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.49-82, 2019 (Released:2021-09-30)

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.3-29, 2007

著者

村上 はつ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.71-86, 1979

著者

島西 智輝 梅崎 修 南雲 智映

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.3-27, 2020-12

著者

長井 景太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.27-50, 2020-09

著者

宮﨑 忠恒

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.3-27, 2020-06

著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2011

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The main thrust of this study is to shed light on the management situation at the coastal industrial railway, which performed the function of linking factories of the coastal industrial area with the main trunk line, and also to shed light on its relationship with the companies in the coastal industrial area. This is a case study of the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway Co. that was built in the Keihin Industrial Area after the World War I.<br>What was epoch-making about the coastal industrial area was that it functioned as an 'industrial port' which allowed large ships to berth at private wharves. Many companies in the Keihin Industrial Area of the 1920s required overland transport for procurement of materials and resources, and to ship their goods to Tokyo and Yokohama in the hinterlands. Initially, the coastal industrial railway was a plan which petitioned for construction of a branch link from the main trunk line by the government railway. However, in 1924, this changed to a plan where a private railway called the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway would be built after it received investment from land reclamation companies and other companies.<br>The choice of a private railway helped to rapidly open up the Keihin Industrial Area rail system to traffic, but there were more than a few problems that arose from this. In particular, the high fares for straight-through transport with the government railway led to growing dissatisfaction from the recessionary companies along the railway line during the 1930s.<br>Many similar problems faced by the management of the private coastal industrial railway receded into the background for a period from the war boom in 1937. However, the protracted nature and worsening course of the war, particularly with respect to freight transportation, were a crushing burden on the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway and was a factor in it being nationalized in 1943.

著者

小早川 洋一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.42-64, 1981

著者

山藤 竜太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2009

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The purpose of this article is to determine how and why Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system at its Shanghai branch. We investigated the case of Mitsui & Co. because it is the oldest and biggest general trading company (GTC), and it has increased its Chinese branches in the years straddling the 1900s. We focus on Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch because it was the first Chinese branch for Mitsui & Co., and it served as the headquarters for its Chinese branches. Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch abolished the comprador system in 1899. This was a precedent for the other Chinese branches of Mitsui & Co. and other companies, for example, other Japanese and German trading companies.<br>We illustrate three reasons for the abolishment of the comprador system at Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch. The first reason was Mitsui & Co.'s comprador himself. The comprador had a distinctive character. He drew salary as an employee, earned commission as an agent, and had a group of staffs. A typical comprador has the character of an employee and an agent and a group of staffs.<br>The second reason was the influence of the off-the-job training (off-JT) program. The overseas off-JT program was launched in April 1898 and January 1899. Preceding studies advocate that the off-JT program undermined Mitsui & Co.'s comprador system. However, Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system in July 1899 at its Shanghai branch; thus, the trainees employed thereafter were on training and not on the job.<br>The third reason was the human resource practices of Mitsui & Co. Employees that they cultivated during their professional practice in Mitsui & Co. and went on to become managers to deal with some goods in 1899.<br>Mitsui & Co. cut down costs on the salary and commissions provided to the comprador, increased its trading partners, and adopted a long-term marketing strategy because of the abolishment of the comprador system.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.50-82, 2018 (Released:2020-09-30)

著者

谷口 洋斗

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.3-28, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)

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This thesis examines the case of the Shimizu Port Lumber Industries Cooperative (SLC). This study looks at SLC's (1) background, (2) financing, and (3) activities of purchasing materials and merchandising, since 1952 (when the union was established) through to 1974 (when business declined after the first oil shock). The study relied on the analysis of historical documents held by SLC and a hearing survey.The management executives of the organizations in Shimizu before and during wartime established SLC in 1952. SLC comprised many small-sized firms with commonalities such as facilities and products.Small-sized firms found great benefits in strengthening their nexus with SLC and as such, increased their financial contributions toward the cooperative, significantly improving its capital adequacy ratio.Two noteworthy things occurred: First, SLC - members visited North America multiple times to inspect the forests and sawmills. Second, Tenryu Seizai Co., Ltd., one of the executive firms of the SLC, shared its sales channel with members.SLC played an important role in the import of lumber from North America to Japan. This provided a platform for small-sized firms to conduct business at the start of Japan's high economic growth period.However, at the end of Japan's period of high economic growth, the need for a cooperative for small-sized firms decreased due to their improved marketing capabilities. Further, the sustainability of cooperation was limited under the leadership of management executives.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.30-67, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.68-84, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

著者

青木 洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.3-21, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)

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Japanese computer firms evolved from the electronic and telecommunications equipment industries, while US firms such as IBM and Sperry Rand evolved from the business machines industry. From the late 1950s to early 1960s, the Japanese computer industry lacked computer peripherals and software technology. Therefore, it needed to acquire the technology from US firms.To do so, it needed to negotiate technological partnerships with IBM and Sperry Rand. This negotiation process greatly influenced the later competitive advantage of both the US and Japanese firms in the Japanese computer market. However, previous studies have not examined this influence in sufficient detail. Therefore, this paper focuses on the negotiation process between Sperry Rand and three Japanese parties (Nippon Remington Univac [NRU], Toshiba, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and uses Japanese archives to examine the negotiations' influence on Sperry Rand and Toshiba.This paper elucidates two points. First, Sperry Rand did not benefit from negotiations compared with IBM. Because it fell behind in patent applications and publication of computer principles and related technologies in Japan, it fell behind in the Japanese market. Second, Toshiba's role in founding NRU and negotiating with Sperry Rand delayed the commercialization of its computers. Toshiba expected an earlier technology transfer from Sperry Rand, and planned its computer business on the premise that NRU would order many computers and peripherals, but the partnership did not come to fruition.In the 1960s Japanese computer market, IBM gained a competitive advantage among foreign firms, while Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC did the same among Japanese firms. This situation was a consequence of Sperry Rand's and Toshiba's respective problems.

著者

ドンゼ ピエール=イヴ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.22-42, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)

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Although the German multinational enterprise Siemens dominated the global market of X-ray devices during the first half of the twentieth century, it was unable to maintain its advantage against Shimadzu in Japan, despite the technological superiority of its products. This article analyses hence the sources of Shimadzu's competitiveness.Shimadzu is a family-firm founded in Kyoto in 1875 and specialized in the production of scientific instruments, medical devices, and various parts. It engaged actively in the development of radiological equipment, making the first X-ray image in Japan (1896), and developing a first X-ray device for medical purpose in 1908. Then, during the 1920s, Shimadzu established as the largest producer of X-ray devices in Japan. This success relied on three major points: the internalization of technological capabilities (recruitment of university graduate engineers, subcontracting of R&D activities); the co-development of equipment and devices with medical doctors (joint R&D); and an original communication policy towards the medical world (participation to academic activities, organization of conferences, opening of a training center for X-ray technicians).Finally, this article demonstrates that Shimadzu was able to adapt foreign technology to the specificities of the Japanese medical market. Unlike Western countries, the Japanese hospital system consists in a large number of small private hospitals clustered in urban areas. Competition between them was a driving force for the diffusion of X-ray devices, but their limited budget, due to their small size, made it necessary to develop devices that were lighter, simpler, and cheaper than equipment manufactured by Siemens. Shimadzu understood this need and marketed X-ray devices suitable for the Japanese domestic market. However, it was difficult to export them to Western Europe and the US.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.43-82, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)