著者

浅野 伸一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_30-2_48, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

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Kiso Electric Iron & Steel Manufacture, which inherited water right and hydro-electric power stations of the Kiso River possessed by Nagoya Electric Light Company, was founded in the middle of the economic boom of the First World War, whose business purpose was manufacture of iron & steel using electric power and the wholesale of electric power. This company was the predecessor of today's Daido Steel Company and at the same time the predecessor of Daido Electric Power Company, which was one of the so-called “five great electric power company” in the 1930's and developed to today's Kansai Electric Power Company. I analyse the business, unifying manufacture of iron & steel using electric power and the wholesale of electric power, which has been treated as a separate business so far, then show the reason of foundation of Kiso Electric Iron & Steel Manufacture, which secured water right of the Kiso, and study why water right of the Kiso was separated from Nagoya Electric Light Company. I also demonstrate the transition of iron manufacture plant based upon the newly found material. Kiso Electric Iron & Steel Manufacture came to a dead-lock by the end of economic boom of the First World War, besides technical trouble and turned the wholesale of electric power as main business, and iron & steel manufacture as its side job, and finally Daido Electric Power Company being established. Through these analysis, I want to show the meaning of following issue at the electric power industry; ① the formation of nation-wide wholesale industry of electric power, ② the transformation of electric supply system in the Chubu Area, and ③ the development of management by Momosuke Fukuzawa, so-called “king of electric power”.

著者

青木 洋

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3, pp.3_30-3_55, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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This paper analyzes the institutionalization of testing and research institutes, learned societies, and engineers' associations in prewar Japan. Although some historians examine this subject, they tend to focus on famous or large organizations and their studies are not based on comprehensive statistical data. This paper analyzes the data that public organizations published in the prewar period, although they are partly revised and supplemented because of erroneous and inadequate information, particularly regarding the establishment year of private institutes. The data analyzed are of 773 institutes and 233 societies and associations.As these data comprise establishment year, research field and topic, address, administrator (the central government, local governments, or private organizations), and so on, this analysis possibly elucidates long-term trends of the establishment of various classifications of organization.Consequently, this paper provides some facts about these historical trends. First, although the First World War is considered an epoch for the institutionalization of testing and research institutes, 40% of them were actually established before the War, because there was much activity in the fields of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, and light, traditional industry before the War and these fields are frequently overlooked. Second, the greatest proportion of these institutes were in chemistry, so this discipline is the main driving force of institutionalization in Japan, similar to the U. S. A. Third, these institutes were established at an equal pace among various areas. Fourth, the high number learned societies and engineers' associations established annually occurred in a different era from that of testing and research institutes. The former is the second half of the 1920s; the latter, the WWI era. This fact demonstrates that different factors contributed to the establishment of all the above bodies.

著者

結城 武延

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3, pp.3_56-3_77, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence that shareholders meetings had on corporate governance in modern Japan.We present the case “Osaka Boseki Kaisya” which is a typical enterprise in the cotton spinning industry. Since the cotton spinning industry -a major industry in modern Japan- was dependent on direct financing, its principal agent problem was quite serious. This paper presents how the firm functioned as an organization, wherein salaried managers in pre-war Japan were monitored through shareholders meetings.In really, it was only during a boom period that the stockholders fully supported decision making by salaried managers. This occurred because the opportunity costs produced as a result of monitoring exceeded the profits that were presented at the shareholders meetings and were obtained from the management by acquiring information on the boom period.On the other hand, during the periods when this was not the case, the stockholders did not prefer the investment strategy chosen by the salaried managers. As a result, the level of the capital invested by “Osaka Boseki Kaisya” was lower than that invested by other companies in the same industry that functioned during this period. This was because the stockholders took even the relative profit of competitors into consideration.The moral hazard faced especially in major companies pertains to the actions that change the composition of the board of directors such that it is advantageous to the management. Since this occurred through the long-term route of the management, it might have been favorable to the outside directors who were major stockholders. However, many stockholders requested the management to provide information regarding the determination of such personnel affairs. Further, in the shareholders meetings, the stockholders enquired about real intention of the management, and on the basis of an agreement between the stockholders, a new composition was decided for the board of directors.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3, pp.3_78-3_103, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

著者

田中 光

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_3-4_22, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

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One aspect of Japanese modernization in the early 20th century was rural economic development. Farmers played a large role in the development process because of the importance of agriculture, especially sericulture, to Japanese exports.Micro-finance was one of the factors in the rural development process (as we have seen with Grameen Bank in the present day). This paper analyzes the birth and growth in modern Japan of a local micro-finance system. It does so through a case study of Kano village, which is in the Chiisagata area of Nagano Prefecture. This was the center of Japanese sericulture production.In 1900, the Japanese government adopted the Industrial Cooperatives Act. It was a mixture of ideas taken from overseas. The intent was to provide credit for cooperative members. This kind of cooperative credit union spread throughout Japan over the next two decades or so.Earlier, the construction of a national railway network had not only integrated the Japanese internal market but also connected it with markets outside Japan. By the 1880s, over 50% of American raw silk was produced in Japan. As the industry expanded, it needed capital for seasonal purchases of fertilizer. However, because the scale of production was small, Japanese farmers had difficulty in obtaining credit. The credit unions created in the wake of the Industrial Cooperative Act helped to satisfy the demand for capital and allow the industry to grow.Silk was the main cash crop in Kano village. The Kano Credit Union was organized in 1903 by a young graduate of one of Japanese new universities. Other executives of the cooperative included wealthy farmers and the village's former officials. The cooperative itself was a modern institution but it drew on pre-existing traditions of local credit networks.This paper focuses on the Kano Credit Union through the end of World War I. Its growth supported, and was supported by, a boom in the local sericulture industry. Hence micro-finance provided crucial support for the development of the local economy.

著者

木庭 俊彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_23-4_47, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

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In this paper, I considered the progress of mechanization in port area during the Interwar period and the process of reorganization.Chikuho area, the northern part of Kyushu, is the biggest coal mining area in Japan. Most of the coal was loaded into ships at Wakamatsu port to be transported. In cargo handling industry in Wakamatsu port, a structure of subcontract was formed. It was composed by members as follows; shippers(coal mining companies or coal merchants), stevedoring contractors, “Kogashira”(master of stevedoring) and “Nakashi”(stevedore). Around 1930s, a movement of reorganization by mechanization rushed into the cargo handling industry in Wakamatsu port area. However, as a result of my analysis, it was clarified that the structure mentioned above was maintained.In Chikuho coal mining industry in 1920s suffered by depression, inefficient loading operation and its high cost came to be recognized as serious problems. Therefore, big shippers such as Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Kogyo produced machinery for loading operation to prompt speedy loading and to lower the costs. At the same time, they limited the number of stevedoring contractors and “Kogashira”. On the other hand, they strengthened the business relationship with the rest of them.Stevedoring contractors were forming closer relationships with shippers and that made them stipulate their responsibilities at loading operation. In the process of stipulation, triangular conflicts between stevedoring contractors, “Kogashira” and “Nakashi” were gradually surfaced in cargo handling business. Under the situation mentioned above, stevedoring contractors expressed their strong will that they would protect “Kogashira” and “Nakashi”. The expression led the their trust to stevedoring contractors and that allowed the stevedoring contractors to maintain their base for their existence.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_74-4_87, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_88-4_108, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

著者

都築 晶

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.1_56-1_71, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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This paper examines the asset management practices of local wealth-holders in the prewar era. Based on the cases of the Kamino and Tomita families in Aichi Prefecture, the analysis is advanced from two perspectives: (1) What kind of asset management were local wealth-holders aiming at ? (2) How was it actually practiced ? This paper analyzes the Kaseiyousoku, the family constitution, of these two families and identifies the asset management methods used. The Kaseiyousoku classified the assets of the two families into two categories: assets jointly owned and managed by the two families and assets individually owned and managed by each family. It seems that such mechanism delineated the action of both families afterwards over a long period of time.This paper examines the remunerations of the heads of both families and the activities of Kamitomishokusan, the asset-preserving company for jointly-owned assets, during the relatively long period starting in 1891 to 1945 and clarifies how they were actually undertaken. As a result, the asset management practices of both families, not identified by existing literature, become clear.The circumstances faced by both families were taken into consideration as much as possible in the process of analysis. Both families sought and acted to accomplish the asset management system set by family constitution. This paper shows that, as a result, both families were spending their entire efforts only to preserve their assets. This consists one answer to the question posed by previous literature on why the asset-preserving company of both families did not actively invest in stocks.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.1_72-1_105, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_74-2_102, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

著者

平松 茂実

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3, pp.3_3-3_29, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to confirm that the success of Ajinomoto Company's globalization management after the second world war was due to the development of a unique and new business model. In order to accomplish this purpose, two main subsidiaries of Ajinomoto Company in Thailand and Brazil were examined thoroughly in terms of the developmental process, as well as several other subsidiaries located in Asia, North and South America, and in Europe.This examination revealed that common strategy of management consisted of two steps. (1) At first, these overseas subsidiaries established the management foundation through the monosodium glutamate (MSG) enterprise, which has the internationally, highly competitiveness, but has a limit of revenue as a niche product. (2) After that, they introduced or developed the various kinds of enterprises to expand the global market. Some of these businesses are globally competitive and they were used to expand the global market. The others are locally competitive and they were applied to develop local markets.This type of Ajinomoto Company's globalization management, which concurrently operates multidomestic (M) type businesses pararell to global (G) type businesses in the same overseas subsidiary, is confirmed as a unique one, in comparison with those of traditional and other recently proposed new globalization management models. The strategy to expand the business by adding M type enterprises to a fundamental G type MSG enterprise is just like the structure of planet. This globalization management is supposed to be classified as II(planet) type model amomg eight new globalization management models proposed by Hiramatsu.The following factors appear to have contributed to the success of Ajinomo Compamy's globalization management using the new model. 1) In the earliest stage, Ajinomoto Company in Japan introduced and masterd American Corn Product Company's marketing development technique. 2) Ajinomoto Company was successful in diversifying from the simple MSG business structure, and top management has maintained a strong vision to expand the global market through this business diversification. 3) In order to implement this vision, well trained managers have been dispached from Japan to each overseas subsidiary. 4) The company has kept a skillful organizational system and the systematic ability to use matrix management.

著者

平野 恭平

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_3-4_28, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The Paper aims to elucidate the industrialization of Vinylon of Kuraray, a domestically-developed synthetic fiber, as an attempt to solve the resource problem of Japan. This paper makes an effort to devise it from three viewpoints of the mind-set of top management and engineers, the continuity from prewar to postwar, and the interaction with society and economy (such as the industrial policy, the differentiation fromr other firms, and the market needs). In Kuraray, the limitation of resource had influenced from the technology development to the product development in Soichiro Ohara's thought of substitution of natural fibers, an executive with strong individuality. As a result, though the times' character distorted the search for optimum market, the recognition about new product was modified due to the change of society and economy as well as the slump of business and that resulted in the creation of optimum market. This is a general management phenomenon except the times' character and suggests the importance of marketing in the process from the development of new products to the establishment of market.That is to say, Kuraray set out to develop Vinylon for the purpose of self-sufficiency of fiber resource and the substitution of natural fiber as an “essential fiber” at the beginning. However, to strengthen the ground as a synthetic fiber, it is necessary to respect the fiber's function and to explore new uses, develop product, and promote sale of product taking advantage of the feature of synthetic fiber, which the natural fibers have not. Though the delay in establishing the market resulted in the slump of business, the change of persons' cognition brought about the new idea and practice of marketing. The public offices' needs created by policy have indirectly supported the change. As a result, Kuraray succeeded in establishing the position of Vinylon in the way of practical use clothing and industrial materials.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_77-4_94, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

著者

内藤 隆夫

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_3-2_28, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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Koide Finance Company was established in the early period of the Meiji era in Koide, the center of the silk-reeling industry in Niigata Prefecture. During its start-up stage, the company lent indiscreetly, and made excessive dividend payouts based on its simplistic objective of providing assistance to the silk-reeling industry, while also satisfying its shareholders by making a profit. Hence, towards the end of the 1880s, the company's operations came to a halt. Therefore the company restructured its business, and established a business direction with long-term prospects based on sound management. After the company had renamed itself Koide Bank, it expanded its silk financing, supported the sudden rise of Koide's machine-reeling silk industry, and Koide Bank's banking business and the silk-reeling industry in Koide district grew, from the first half of the 1890s to the mid-1900s. However, the silk produced in Koide was inferior in quality and low in productivity, and in market competition it lost out to Yokohama and Fukui. During this period, Koide Bank was unable to establish a stable revenue base.During the economic crisis after the Russo-Japanese war, Koide Bank strengthened its stance by sound management. However, with the development of the silk-textile industry, silk financing expanded and deepened, due to increased lending to silk-reelers, the beginning of documentary bill financing, and the conclusion of correspondent agreements with banks in the prefecture's silk-textile industry. As a result of such actions, the Bank changed the delivery destination of the silk-reeling industry in the Koide district to markets within the prefecture. In this way, Koide Bank established a fund circulation structure throughout the Koide district, the silk-reeling industry of Koide, and the prefecture's silk-textile industry, from which, as a result of its pivotal position, it was able to receive stable revenue. This business mechanism can be shown to be one of the business models of the local banks that conduct silk financing.

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_29-2_56, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This article is an attempt to analyze the financial activities of Dai-Nihon Cotton Spinning Co., LTD from the late of 1940s to the middle of 1960s.During the latter half of 1940s, the Dai-Nihon Cotton Spinning was heavily in debt to the banks as a result of its restorations of the equipments that were damaged in the war. Thus, during the first half of 1950, the company's number one priority was to repay the above-mentioned debts to improve its equity ratios as much as possible. From the latter half of 1950s to the middle of 1960s, the company regularly paid high dividend rates due to strong demands made by individual stockholders. As a result, however, the company's financial situation became progressive worse. It should also be noted, however, that at no time did the company's main bank, i.e., Sanwa Bank, intervene in the financial activities of the company.In short, this article contends that the financial approach taken by the Dai-Nihon Cotton Spinning was myopic, a criticism which contrasts sharply with the the commonly accepted academic opinion concerning the financial activities taken by the Japanese firms in the rapid growth era.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_75-2_94, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

著者

今泉 飛鳥

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_31-3_56, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The purpose of this article is to observe the effects of land-use regulation on industrial agglomeration, focusing on the machinery industry in Tokyo, and to investigate the net outcome of the merits of industrial clustering and the land-use regulation.In Japan, city planning started in the 1920s. Zoning is one of the measures of city planning, which classified areas into those for residence, commerce, and industry. For manufacturers, it was restrictive in the sense that limits of factory size were imposed in the residential and commercial areas. In Tokyo City, there were six wards where machinery factories had been agglomerated for more than 20 years. Out of them, only two wards were designated as the industrial areas and most industrial areas located in counties surrounding Tokyo City. Consequently, many manufacturers resisted to the zoning, which made the government ease the regulation.Econometric analyses show that designation as residential, commercial and undecided areas, especially residential area, had a negative effect on the size of factory and the number of entries. On the other hand, despite of the negative effects of zoning, according to the documents which the manufacturers filed for petition, they hesitated to move to the counties outside Tokyo City. They complained that in the counties infrastructures were lacked and access to the labor market and supporting industries was difficult. These facts indicate that the merits of industrial clustering, especially the external economy, which Alfred Marshall emphasized, significantly affected the location decision of manufacturers in prewar Tokyo. As a result, zoning failed to expel factories from areas not for industry in Tokyo City.On the other hand, in the counties, unlike in Tokyo City, zoning succeeded to concentrate factories into the industrial areas, to some extent. That was because the start of zoning preceded the formation of clusters in counties.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_57-3_88, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

著者

神谷 久覚

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.4_28-4_50, 2010 (Released:2012-03-23)

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of the competition in the Japanese marine insurance business in the 1890s, including the effect of the premium cartel of 1897.Firstly, the paper examines the business of Tokio Marine Insurance Company (“Tokio Marine”) in London. Tokio Marine was unable to realize growth in the Japanese market and, to seek opportunities, expanded its business to London. Initially, Tokio Marine's business in London was extremely successful, but as a result of issuing a risky insurance, Tokio Marine sustained a very large loss.Secondly, the paper examines the businesses of Tokio Marine, Nippon Sea and Land Insurance Company (“Nippon Sea”) and Imperial Marine Company (“Imperial Marine”) from 1893 to 1896. Tokio Marine, Nippon Sea and Imperial Marine expanded their businesses by issuing insurances with low premiums. As a result, the profitability of Tokio Marine, Nippon Sea and Imperial Marine suffered.Thirdly, the paper examines the spread of agent networks in the Japanese marine insurance business. Low-premium insurances were widely sold through networks of agents mainly comprising bank branches and shipping agents.Lastly, the paper examines the premium cartel of 1897 among Tokio Marine, Nippon Sea, Imperial Marine and Nippon Marine Insurance Company. The purpose of this cartel was to increase premiums and, as a result, premiums did increase temporarily. The cartel did not provide, however, a penalty for violation. Consequently, premiums eventually decreased.