出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_68-1_99, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

青木 洋

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_3-2_26, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

---

Industry-government-university collaboration (IGUC) in Japan during the period from World War II to the postwar time has recently attracted the attention of some historians. However, there are only a few case studies focussing on the development of a specific technology. This paper presents a case history of high frequency (HF) heating and hardening technology from the pre-war to the post-war period in Japan, and examines the role of IGUC for the technological development.Many new technologies were developed during the War, but the most famous and important among them was electronics. It originally led to the development of radio, but thereafter, people tried to apply it in other industrial and technological fields also. The HF heating and hardening technology attracted attention as a promising manufacturing technology after the War. It is one of the reasons for which a lot of idle HF valve oscillators for military use were applicable to HF heating equipments.Consequently, this paper gives a clear picture that the network of IGUC expanded from the pre-war to the post-war period in the field of HF heating technology. In the pre-war period, there was a lack of IGUC because new technologies for Japanese firms were mainly procured from foreign firms. But, the situation changed during the War. Japanese firms needed to develop new technologies by themselves or in collaboration with other domestic institutes. Public research institutes and university professors played an important role in IGUC. As a result of this collaboration, some new enterprises got the opportunity to establish and grow as leaders in the industry.

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_27-2_52, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

63

---

This paper aims to analyze the diffusion of tungsten filament lamps in Japan and the strategy of Tokyo Electric.In the United States, General Electric (GE) developed drawn-wire tungsten lamps in 1910. This electric lamp was three times more efficient (w/candlepower) and lasted twice as long as a carbon filament lamp. In Japan, Tokyo Electric, a GE subsidiary, introduced tungsten lamps in 1911.Initially, this lamp was adopted by small scale electric power companies/utilities in rural areas and new market entrants in major city. Some electric power utilities in major cities were cautious in the introduction of the tungsten lamp. The revenues of electric power utilities may have declined if there was no increase in the demand for electrical lighting service, corresponding to the improvement in the efficiency of electric lamps. Tokyo Electric promoted tungsten lamps, by introducing them in installations with more and brighter electric lights. This served the mutual interest they shared with the electric power utilities, which was building a large customer base for lamp manufacturers.During World War I, many electric power utilities decided to introduce tungsten lamps and the main channel of distribution of the tungsten lamp was through a cooperative relationship with Tokyo Electric. Electric power utilities succeeded in internalizing the effect of improved lamp efficiency by revising the advantageous rates for electric lighting service. The tungsten lamps that were launched in Japan were adjusted for lower efficiency and longer life spans, compared with their US counterparts. Electric power utilities tend to emphasize the longer life spans. Furthermore, Tokyo Electric marked down the lamp price while maintaining quality standards. Thus, Tokyo Electric, which pioneered the distribution of tungsten lamps in Japan, reaped significant profits.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_53-2_93, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_51-3_89, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

著者

塩谷 昌史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_50-4_74, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

The purpose of this article is to examine the cotton industry in Vladimir Province before Emancipation of serfs in Russia (1860), from the viewpoint of print and distribution. In order to accomplish this purpose, I utilize the Vladimir Province newspaper as a main material, which was published from 1838 to 1917, but confine the perusal of the material to the period from 1838 to 1860.Europe imported various commodities from Asia through East India Companies after 17th century. At that time, a cotton fabric (chintz) was one of important commodities from Asia. As the amount of European import of Asian chintz increased, Europe suffered from trade deficit and banned the import of chintz to reduce the deficit. After that, Europe realized the production of chintz by industrialization. From the viewpoint of a long term, we consider that the industrialization of European countries enabled import substitution of Asian commodities. This hypothesis would apply for the history of trade between Russia and Central Asia.Vladimir Province imported chintz from Central Asia after 16th century and first produced chintz in 18th century, based on the printing skills from Central Asia. After England exported cotton products to Russia at the end of 18th century, Vladimir Province introduced technology from Europe and developed modern cotton industry in 19th century. When we see the process of development in a middle term (100 years), we recognize that because Vladimir province learned European experiences, she accomplished the industrialization. But, we can also conclude that the industrialization of Vladimir Province was the process of import substitution of chintz from Central Asia, from the viewpoint of a long term (300 years). This is similar to the experiences of Europe.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_75-4_94, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

白井 泉

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_3-1_25, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

36

被引用文献数

1

---

The Takedate Cooperative is a well-known agricultural cooperative in Japan. This study examines the Takedate Cooperative’s credit activities from 1907 until the 1930s. Established in the backward agricultural areas of northeast Japan, in the Aomori prefecture, this cooperative supported members’ production activities, introduced standardization and trademarking in the apple trade, and created the “Takedate Apple” brand. Since its inception, the cooperative has included purchase, marketing, and production divisions, and in 1914, it introduced a credit division to help its members overcome difficulties in raising money from the financial market after poor rice harvests. An additional aim of Takedate Cooperative was to dominate its member behavior by providing preferential financing terms to frequent users of its production and marketing activities and to members who obeyed to its rules. Before World War I, the cooperative raised finances through individual member deposits, and lent considerable sums of money at low rates to its members for cultivation. This lending practice allowed cooperative members to grow apples as well as rice until the early 1920s. However, in the wake of poor business conditions after World War I and the consequent lower than normal performance of its marketing division, the cooperative was forced to reduce loan amounts and lent money to cover living expenses only. It even urged members to save money. Given the circumstances, the cooperative’s loan rate eventually exceeded that of the Aomori prefecture’s financial market, leading many competent members to withdraw their memberships. However, this action did not result in the stagnation of the cooperative and its surrounding areas. On the contrary, in Takedate village, the core area of the cooperative, peasants could still borrow money and purchase land without pledging security. Thus, 80% of farm households could continue to grow apples, leading to greater affluence in the 1930s.

著者

伊田 吉春

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_26-1_50, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

60

---

The goal of this paper is to show the role technologies used in silk manufacturing played in the development of high quality silk production.In 1878, Kichiroji Tase and his family began producing raw silk through mechanical means in order to improve quality, but the early stages involved a great amount of trial and error, and they were unable to produce silk of very high quality at first.However, the Tase family continued working into the 1890s, aiming to increase production gradually, and eventually were able to produce high-quality raw silk. This improvement in quality was due to a number of factors which included improving the silk production equipment, carefully selecting the cocoons used as raw material, and mastering the processes involved in boiling and reeling the silk. At this stage however, the “sunk reeling” process which required separate boiling and reeling steps had not yet been brought into full use, so while quality had increased, production could not yet be expanded.The “sunk reeling” process was fully established as a part of production after the dissolution of the silk manufacturing association in the 1900s, and efficiency increased. The family had created a system enabling large-scale production of high-quality raw silk, and they were able to further tighten factory management policies in the hopes of increasing operational efficiency. It was at this point that operational differences between the Tase family’s silk company and the Suwa silk industry essentially disappeared. After developing their own raw silk production methods, the Tase family had to begin competing with the large-scale silk producers in the market for high-quality silks, and during this period the Tase family increased production of silk thread for textiles and opened a branch factory in order to expand their operations.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_51-1_94, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

著者

前田 廉孝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_49-2_75, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

This paper aims to determine the factors that led to the improvement of soy sauce brewery management during the Meiji and Taisho Eras. In particular, we focus on how the Takanashi family, now Kikkoman Corporation, procured raw materials from 1887 to 1917.The food manufacturing industry accounted for more than 20 percent of the production volume of all industries in pre-war Japan. Until the 1900s, the soy sauce brewing industry was the third largest producer from among all types of food manufacturing industries. Two factors shaped the brewing industry. First, over 50 percent of the production cost went toward the procurement of raw materials. Second, after the late 1890s, a crucial condition for the expansion of the soy sauce industry was securing stable supply of raw materials not only from domestic regions but also from foreign countries and Japanese colonies. Therefore, we analyze the decision-making process of brewery companies with regard to the raw materials they used.Takanashi produced high quality soy sauce and low quality one. However, the price of the high quality sauce increased considerably after the 1890s. Therefore, Takanashi began to increase the production of the high quality sauce. They also began to procure imported raw materials mainly for the low quality sauce to reduce its cost. For the high quality sauce, they chose good quality raw materials. These raw materials procurement strategies played an important role in improving the competitive position of Takanashi's soy sauce in the market. Nonetheless, because the ratio of the quantity of high quality to low quality sauce increased, Takanashi was no longer able to strike a balance between cost reduction of the low quality sauce and quality maintenance of high quality one. This indicates a limitation of these strategies, and it was one of the causes of the emergence of the Noda Shoyu Company, Kikkoman's predecessor, that was established through a merger of individual proprietorships in 1917.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_76-2_94, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

中西 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.3_3-3_31, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

This paper seeks to elucidate the process through which a kimono cloth store transformed into a modern department store. Additionally, I will analyze the influence of the popularization that occurred as part of that transformation on department store management, and consider the relation between the formation of a mass-consumption society and department-store management. I shall assess the transformation from three viewpoints: (1) expansion of stores, (2) diversification of merchandise sold, and (3) the development of various functions of the department system.Matsuzakaya's transformation from kimono dealer to department store occurred during the 1910s. At that time another Japanese department store, Mitsukoshi, had already been established. In order to compete with Mitsukoshi, Matsuzakaya assembled a line of highgrade products, pioneered modern equipment and fixtures, and thus contributed to the formation of the “department store culture.” However, due to price surges during the final stage of World War I, as well as the economic downturn, which followed the war, there arose a desire among consumers for discount sales which outpaced the anticipation of Matsuzakaya.In response to that desire, Matsuzakaya advanced lines completely corresponding to the bargain sale expectation of consumers during the 1920s. Because of the intense competition among department stores during that period, Matsuzakaya adopted a completely different business strategy in which they purchased merchandise directly from the places of production, and advertised merchandise in cooperation with the places of production. As a result, from the second half of the 1920s, Matsuzakaya expanded their stores rapidly, and began to carry not only high-grade products, but also everyday items. Moreover, Matsuzakaya diversified and increased the kinds of products sold. As a result, not only the highgrade articles but also these everyday articles gradually proved to be an important profit source for Matsuzakaya.Finally, as a result of Matsuzakaya's pursuit of efficiencies based on cost consciousness during the Showa Depression at the beginning of the 1930s, the functioning of the merchandise department system helped Matsuzakaya to undertake an all-inclusive transformation into a department store. In light of that, I argue that the transformation into a department store and the popularization of Matsuzakaya's product line progressed in a parallel fashion, in which the two functioned in a reciprocal relationship.

著者

竹内 竜介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.3_32-3_57, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

management with a special reference to the FDI (i.e. foreign direct investment) from a historical perspective, especially from postwar period. The previous studies regarding the FDI for Japanese market has not fully captured in what ways the multinational enterprises strengthened the ties with Japanese market. It is also unclear how the enterprises have utilized the Social Capital in Japan.In pharmaceutical industry, for example, examining the relationship with Japanese medical practitioners is an extremely interesting question, especially if we view this under the management systems. The multinational pharmaceutical enterprises was urged to build up relation with Japanese medical practitioners and therefore made a good use of their network in order for the growth of their own business. Taking the above problems into consideration, the paper sheds a light on Schering AG of Germany as a case study and clarifies its management method in Japan between the 1950s and 1990s.Schering has strengthened the ties with Japanese subsidiary company since the late 1970s. The corporation tried to strengthen the functional capability of Japanese subsidiary by building up its R&D division as well as educating their employee. The Japanese subsidiary built up good relations with Japanese medical doctors who are supposed to contribute to acting as opinion leaders among Japanese medical circles. The subsidiary, in return, provides cutting edge scientific information to them.By utilizing Social Capital in contrast medium area, Schering had successfully expanded its Japanese market from 1980s. Then, it entered therapeutic medicine area in order to increase the profit. However, this was unsuccessful. This is because there had existed many related network of medical doctors in therapeutic medicine area already. It is also because that Schering has heavily relied on contrast medium business, which made it hard to make use of Social Capital and not succeed in this area.

著者

橋口 勝利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_3-4_24, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

This paper aims to examine the factors of the merger between the local cotton-spinning companies in the late Meiji era.Ichinomiya Spinning Company was founded in 1895 by local and Nagoya wealthy persons, and produced gas-thread as its core product. However, its business activity deteriorated because of the depression after the Russo-Japanese War, so Ichinomiya Spinning Company came to depend the debt much more than before. As a result, a large amount of the stocks of Ichinomiya Spinning Company were sold by major stockholders who lived outside the Ichinomiya area.Since the Meiji government recommended the business combination, Masaka Okuda, who was the then president of Owari Spinning Company, formed Bisei-Rengo which was composed of the cotton spinning companies in the Chukyo area, and promoted the mergers. Okuda negotiated with Shinichiro Saburi, who was the then president of Ichinomiya Spinning Company, about the merger plan, and Saburi decided to merge with Mie Spinning Company. At the same time, Mie Spinning Company tried to acquire Chita Spinning Company.However, the merger terms for Ichinomiya Spinning Company were inferior to those for Chita Spinning Company. Therefore, the stockholders of Ichinomiya Spinning Company fiercely opposed to merge with Mie Spinning Company. In the end, the merger negotiations between Ichinomiya Spinning Company and Mie Spinning Company broke down, and Ichinomiya Spinning Company merged with Nihon Spinning Company.In short, the stockholders' will of the merged company played an important role in the merger negotiations between spinning companies. In addition, the corporate merger between Ichinomiya Spinning Company and Nihon Spinning Company helped to control the capital concentration on the big spinning companies and to intensify the competition among spinning companies.

著者

杉山 裕

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_25-4_49, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between blue-collar workers' personnel management systems and workplace management in the high growth era. We deal with the case of major steel companies as an example, especially Yawata Steel and Nippon Steel that had strongly impacted on labor management in Japan.Previous studies explain that the competitiveness of Japanese firms, especially prior to the “bubble economy”, was based on high “workplace level” skills, i.e., high blue-collar worker skill levels. They make much of competency-based pay (noryoku-kyu) and the ability-based grading system (shokuno-shikaku-seido) because they effectively encouraged employee skill development. Prior research states that these systems had been introduced in the latter half of 1960's. In contrast, the introduction of job-based wages (shokumu-kyu) using job analysis and job evaluation, adopted by the 1960s and called “American-style management” by researchers, has been regarded as a failure because it did not match Japanese workers' values and did not raise worker ability levels. Recently, however, some articles point out that job-based workplace management played an important role in rationalizing workplaces. So we would need to integrate our understanding of the two views.The content of this paper is as follows. Until the 1960's, shopfloor workers could not take on the responsibility of process control because of their low abilities and weak work consciousness. At the same time, it was difficult for managers to carry out efficient shopfloor management because they did not understand actual work conditions. In this situation, job analysis and job evaluation furnished administrators with the methods of rationalization and personnel management. In the mid-1970's, blue-collar workers came to acquire highlevel skills, such as industrial engineering, so they played an important role in supervising shopfloor work. In conclusion, managers of the two companies chose sound strategies. We should acknowledge the strength of their business judgment from a contemporary perspective.

著者

草野 真樹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.1_3-1_25, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

In this paper, I considered the features of the enterprise boom in local area and its carrier focused on the case in Fukuoka prefecture. Considerations in this paper includes only corporations and the period is by 1899. The facts clarified by the considerations in this paper are briefly mentioned as follows.In Fukuoka prefecture, first of all, it started from establishments of financial companies. In the late 1880s, industrial infrastructure, such as railway companies or harbour construction companies, and spinning companies were risen. After the mid of 1890s, number of establishments of companies were increasing and it didn't occurred only in limited area, but also did at several areas. Number of establishment of companies from 1893 to 1899 reached 196 and it peaked in 1897.Seeing the details of the number of companies regarding to their categories, the highest was 86 in banking business, followed by 54 in manufacturing industry, 39 in commerce, 8 in transportation business, 6 in mining industry, 3 fisheries. The capital of railway business, as transportation, was prominantly large. However, 153 companies, 78.1% of 196 of them in total, were medium and small enterprises whose capital was not more than 100,000 yen.Number of directors at 196 companies mentioned above was 929 in total and 744 at actual number. Most of them were local wealth holders in Fukuoka prefecture and to possess a certain amount of wealth was important factor to form entrepreneurs. Considering the relations between establishment of companies and origins of entrepreneurs, landowners were enthusiastic to found banks and local merchants were enthusiastic to set up companies had wide varieties.

著者

菊池 航

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.1_26-1_48, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the features of subcontracting in the automobile industry during the high growth period, using Toyo Kogyo as an example. Toyo Kogyo reallocated its management resources from three-wheeled to four-wheeled vehicles in the era of high growth, and was number three in production of four-wheeled vehicles after 1960.From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Toyo Kogyo expanded its use of subcontractors. The subcontractors were small firms located in Hiroshima. They had high sales dependence on Toyo Kogyo, and performed processing after receiving drawings and materials from Toyo Kogyo. In the process of expanding its use of subcontractors, Toyo Kogyo developed a department to manage subcontractors, and built an institution for adjusting order quantities to suit the management efforts of subcontractors. In addition, in transactions between Toyo Kogyo and its subcontractors, the ownership of dies and tools reverted to Toyo Kogyo. Toyo Kogyo selected governance mechanisms to promote ex post competition.After 1960, the wage differentials between automobile manufacturers and subcontractors exhibited a sharply declining trend. This reduction in wage differentials was brought about by a relative increase in wages at small subcontractors. One cause of this payment of wages was the realization of efficient management at subcontractors. As indicated by Shinei Kogyo (treated in this paper), there were also subcontractors who booked a higher return on total assets than Toyo Kogyo because they increased total asset turnover by using machines efficiently. Part of the development of the Japanese automobile industry was achieved by the automobile manufacturers developing diverse institutions to inhibit opportunistic behavior, and suppliers deploying efficient management over a broad range.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.1_75-1_93, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

---

The aim of this paper is to analyze the development of the Japanese electric lamp industry after the Russo-Japanese war. Subsequent to the war, the Japanese electric power industry grew rapidly, and there was a substantial increase in the supply of electric lighting. In this robust market, the Japanese electric lamp industry gradually gained ascendency over imported lamps.In 1905, the Tokyo Electric Company entered into a capital and technical alliance with General Electric. Tokyo Electric as a subsidiary of GE attained the advantage in the Japanese market. Further, Tokyo Electric had a close connection with large customers and reliable information on the Japanese market. Conversely, GE had superior mass production technology. Owing to the combination of the above-mentioned strong points, Tokyo Electric expanded the supply of market-oriented quality products.Simultaneously, several manufacturers also entered the market. A number of these mature influential firms established close connections with large customers. The competition between Tokyo Electric and those influential firms facilitated the growth of the electric lamp industry.Meanwhile, the technical development of electric lamp was very rapid. In Europe and USA, several new types of lamps were developed. The most important product was the drawn-wire tungsten filament lamp, and it was developed by GE. As a result of the introduction of technology and supply of tungsten filament from GE, Tokyo Electric succeeded in manufacturing the new product.GE's strong patent gave Tokyo Electric a monopoly in the Japanese market. However, the coexistence of Tokyo Electric with several small-scale manufacturers continued. The increase in the supply of engineers and skilled laborers, the formation of related industry, and the close relationship and financial contribution with large customers facilitated entry and growth of small manufacturers. Moreover, several manufacturers attempted to open the retail market and export.