著者

関谷 登

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.1, pp.74-80, 1981-11-30 (Released:2010-12-10)

参考文献数

85

著者

仲 重人

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.26, pp.105-107, 1996-01-30 (Released:2010-10-14)

著者

宇都宮 仁

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.53, pp.30-43, 2009-12-15 (Released:2013-06-28)

参考文献数

21

著者

増山 幹高

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.44, pp.70-72, 2005-07-10 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

5

著者

曽根 泰教

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.38, pp.1-5, 2002-07-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

6

著者

岡崎 哲郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.52, pp.6-24, 2009 (Released:2013-03-22)

参考文献数

19

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The standard Median Voter Theorem says that parties announce a moderate policy. But, in the real world, this does not necessarily hold. In some cases, a party announces an extremist policy and wins the election. In this paper, we try to explain such cases.In our model, the voters do not know the ability of parties. That is, some parties may be less able. If the less able party wins the election, then the voters' utility is reduced. We assume that each party has his own ideological position. The party, announcing the policy that is distant from his ideological position, needs coordination and so on that are costly. So the less able party hardly announces such a policy.Consequently an extremist policy has signaling effect. In this paper, we show that there are the cases where the moderate parties with high ability announce an extremist policy. On the other hand, if each party is an extremist, he announces the moderate policy regardless of his ability. Moreover, we analyze the policies and the welfare in the equilibrium. Some derived results are counterintuitive. For example, if the less able party's ability improves, the policy in the equilibrium goes to more extreme one and has negative effect on voters' welfare.

著者

加藤 寛 黒川 和美

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.49, pp.5-16, 2007-12-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

著者

漆戸 宏宣

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.47, pp.30-42, 2007-01-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

42

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The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between ordinary construction expenditure in local autonomy and attributes of mayors who experienced bureaucrat's career, based on research results about the rational behavior of politicians and bureaucrats mainly accumulated in a public choice theory and public economics and also taking politics, public administration and local autonomy theory into account.In Japan, about 80% of mayors experienced politician's and/or bureaucrat's career in the last twenty years and mainly experienced it in local autonomy. But when we survey research results about the rational behavior of politicians and bureaucrats mainly accumulated in public choice theory, there are few researches taking politician's past career into account and there is no researches which deal with local cities in Japan. In this sense this thesis is very significant.Specifically, when I examine the relationship between the local public finance of all Japanese cities in the last twenty years and the bureaucrat's career which mayors experienced in such cities by multiple regression analysis, I get a positive significant result.

著者

柴田 弘文

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.17, pp.1-4, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-10-14)

著者

篠木 幹子

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.56, pp.58-62, 2011-07-15 (Released:2014-07-13)

参考文献数

26

著者

和田 淳一郎 升永 英俊

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.57, pp.64-71, 2011-02-15 (Released:2014-11-17)

参考文献数

23

著者

小澤 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.54, pp.76-79, 2010

著者

コングレトン ロジャー

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.44, pp.5-23, 2005-07-10 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

54

著者

佐々木 俊一郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.57, pp.59-63, 2011-02-15 (Released:2014-11-17)

参考文献数

10

著者

吉田 和男

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.3, pp.39-55, 1983-12-10 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

48

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This paper is a study of social optimal control rules of enterprise behavior in the framework of optimal control theory. In the neoclassical theory, enterprise are treated as a mere taker of the price given by the market under the principle of profit maximization. But, in the real economic world, enterprises have power to determine prices and the volume of production. Futhermore enterprise behavior must be alalyzed in the feed back system with factor markets as endogeneous variables. And, we must recognize that the real economy is typically disequilibrium.Based on these premises, it is more proper to formulate enterprise behavior as maximizing the following utility functionJ (X, p) =pX-C (X) -μ (X-D (p) ) 2p: price, X : the volume of production, C: cost function, D: demand function, μ: unit penaltyIn the real economy, enterprises do not maximize their utility function in the sense of global optimality, and seem to approach the true optimal point through quadratic optimization. Thus, it may be formulated by Newton method.[Xp]=[∇2J]-1∇JThis system of equations has a locally stable solution. But, when endogeneous factor prices, wage and interest rate, are considered, the system does not always stable solution. If the system is unstable, the feed back control using fiscal and monetary policy would be required. But negative feed back system does not always produce stable conditions. It means that sometimes discretionary fiscal and monetary policy could make the economy more unstable and produce situations such as stagflation. The system must be controled by optimal control rule. In this paper, it is shown by Pontryagin's maximization principle in linear system.But the real economy is typically nonLinear. When the government controls the economy using a linear economic model, adjustment must be made on the nonlinear factor. It may be made by adaptive control rule.In this paper, Model Refference Adaptive Control System Theory, which is a feed back system (optimal control) ajusted by errors between realized values and estimations by linear model, is introduced. The control of system stability theory.Then, general control rules of enterprise activity are shown.

著者

小澤 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.19, pp.94-94, 1992-06-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

著者

遠藤 妙子

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.36, pp.31-46, 2001-07-05 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

8

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This paper examines campaign strategies of parties in elections, and investigates a role of a negative campaign. It shows that a negative campaign can be an optimal strategy in some cases. One interesting case is that one party chooses a positive campaign that accommodates its pledge to that of opponent and the other party chooses a negative campaign that discriminates opponent's pledge from its own in a Nash equilibrium. Although positive campaigns only reveal positive effects of policies, the negative campaign works to reveal negative effects of the opponent's policy. Thus negative campaigns contribute to show the true effects of policies to voters.

著者

小澤 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.57, pp.91-94, 2011-02-15 (Released:2014-11-17)

参考文献数

1

著者

金子 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.50, pp.13-25, 2008-07-05 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

11

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The aim of this paper is to present a new rational choice theory of voting which contains Bandwagon-type voters that all the existing rational choice theories of voting have failed to deal with and to present a way of showing the turnout rate as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the more general and plausible framework.The findings of this paper are (1) There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium which corresponds to substantial turnout in the rational choice theory of voting which contains almost all the types of preference including Bandwagon-type. (2) My research shows that there are unnegligible percentage of Bandwagontype voters in the electorate of the First District in Kagawa at the General Election in 2005. This means all the existing rational choice theories of voting based on the expression ‘R= pB-C+D are not plausible.

著者

大会準備委員会

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.35, pp.45-54, 2000-12-15 (Released:2010-10-14)