著者

金子 太郎

出版者

数理社会学会

雑誌

理論と方法 (ISSN:09131442)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.145-160, 2010-03-31 (Released:2010-10-03)

参考文献数

12

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N人チキンゲームの設定において,プレイヤーの選好のタイプ,利得構造の違いを導入したとき,従来には指摘されていなかった均衡,ベイジアン・ナッシュ均衡が存在することを示す.本稿の理論は,N人チキンゲームの設定において,集団がチキンタイプ,熱意過剰-1タイプ,熱意過剰-2タイプによって構成されているとき,どのような均衡に到達するかを説明する.この理論は,N人チキンゲームの設定において,「k人だけが協力する」,k/Nという協力率以外の協力率を説明する.そして,この理論はColemanの「フリーライダーと熱意過剰行為者」の議論にベイジアン・ナッシュ均衡によって1つのフィニッシュ与えるものである.

著者

金子 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.26, pp.68-78, 1996-01-30 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

10

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This paper is concerned withN-person Prisoners' Dilemma in which every player has a dominant strategyd (defecting) but if every player uses his dominant strategy the outcome is Pareto-inferior.T. Schelling (1973) brought to attention the minimum size of any coalition that can gain by abstaining fromdin his definition ofN-person Prisoners' Dilemma and called this sizek. And he argued thatkplayers can be better off by abstaining from d, so they will cooperate.M. Taylor (1987) criticized Schelling fo having removed the“dilemma”in the Prisoners' Dilemma and left open the question of whether the sizekinfluences a player's incerrtive to cooperate.Cankinfluence a player's incentive to cooperate?In pure strategykcannot influence a player's incentive. Becausedis a dominant strategy.P. Molander (1992), on the other hand, showed in his theorem that the mixed strategy, consisting of both conditional cooperation influenced bykand unconditional defection, is Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (Maynard Smith (1974) ) in a dynamic model.I show his theorem in a simplified model and make clear the role of Schelling'skin the process of reaching the equilibrium.The results is as follows:(1) Schelling's k influences a player's incentive to cooperate in mixed strategy and to take strategy containing cooperation is rational from the standpoint of payoff maximization.(2) The equilibrium reached by the mixed strategies has robustness in that it resists invasion from other strategies.This can be an answer to the open question that M. Taylor proposed.

著者

金子 太郎

出版者

Japan Society of Sports Industry

雑誌

スポーツ産業学研究 (ISSN:13430688)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.1_5-1_9, 2015 (Released:2015-05-27)

参考文献数

2

著者

広川 龍太郎 高野 進 末續 慎吾 金子 太郎 植田 恭史

出版者

東海大学

雑誌

東海大学紀要. 体育学部 (ISSN:03892026)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.93-96, 2005-03-31

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The purpose of study was to analysis the Japanese top male athlete Shingo SUETSUGU of the measuring of velocity courses in the 100m sprint events. The performance of the subject was recorded with the laser doppler style velocity measuring device. The results were as follows: 1. Peak numbers of instantaneous sprint velocity in a race. 1) Two peaks were observed in two races. 2 ) One peak was observed in four races. 2. Maximum instantaneous sprint velocity in a race. 1) The fastest maximum instantaneous sprint velocity was 11.57 m/s, which was observed in 2003 Japan National Championships. 2) The slowest maximum instantaneous sprint velocity was 11.29 m/s, which was observed in 2002 Japan Inter-University Athletic Championships. 3. Length of intervals that he ran faster than 98% of maximum velocity of a race. 1) The longest length of intervals was 56.7 m, which was observed in 2002 Japan Inter-University Athletic Championships. 2) The shortest length of intervals was 37.0 m, which was observed in 2003 Japan National Championships.

著者

金子 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.50, pp.13-25, 2008-07-05 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

11

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The aim of this paper is to present a new rational choice theory of voting which contains Bandwagon-type voters that all the existing rational choice theories of voting have failed to deal with and to present a way of showing the turnout rate as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the more general and plausible framework.The findings of this paper are (1) There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium which corresponds to substantial turnout in the rational choice theory of voting which contains almost all the types of preference including Bandwagon-type. (2) My research shows that there are unnegligible percentage of Bandwagontype voters in the electorate of the First District in Kagawa at the General Election in 2005. This means all the existing rational choice theories of voting based on the expression ‘R= pB-C+D are not plausible.