著者
アローハン(阿如汗)
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.93-117, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-05-26)

This paper discusses the case that a Japanese soldier, Ryutaro Ito, was invited as an instructor in the Töb-i Sakikü Tangkim school established by a noble of Kharchin Mongol's Right Banner, Güngsangnorbu. I then examined the circumstances and the historical background of this case, using materials of the National Institute for Defense Studies Library and the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Japanese newspaper articles and the Mongolian newspaper Mongγol-un sonin bičig, which had been published in Harbin. The schools founded by Güngsangnorbu had been discussed by many scholars from the viewpoints of Japanese intelligence activities and the domestic development of the Kharchin Mongol's Right Banner. Previous researchers evaluated founding schools in Kharchin Mongol as a modernization policy of Güngsangnorbu. However, in this paper I concluded that it had been carried out under a strategy of the Japanese Army. In addition, the Japanese Army was developing intelligence activities in Mongolia on the eve of Russo- Japanese War. This paper pointed out that Ryutaro Ito was dispatched for the military purposes of the Japanese Army against Russia.
著者
塩谷 哲史
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.73-92, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-05-26)

This article analyses the factors behind the failure of the Amu River diversion project initiated by the Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich in the territories of the Khanate of Khiva at the end of the 1870s. Shioya (2014) argued the details of the Grand Duke's project and the response of the government of Khiva to them, but the response of the general-governorship of Turkestan, the then supreme military-administrative organ of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, to the project still needs to be analysed. From the correspondence between the governor-general K. P. von Kaufman and a zoologist, D. Alenitsyn, it is evident that the former's response concerned the militarily strategic importance of the navigation of the Amu River, and the contemporary situation in Afghanistan, that is, the ongoing Second Anglo-Afghan war. Within the war ministry, the logistics connecting the navigation of the major river with the planned railroad between Central Asia and Russia were highly evaluated. In addition, the influence of the Duke's activities on the Turkmens in Khiva was also considered to bring instability to the khanate, regarding which Alenitsyn pictured the worst-case scenario, namely, the collapse of Russian rule in Central Asia with the spread of native disturbances initiated by the British-Indian army, if the army were to march through the Amu River basin. These factors, in line with the Grand Duke's misapprehension of the history and irrigation of the lower basin of the Amu, led to the failure of his diversion project.
著者
辻 大和
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
no.30, pp.1-21, 2015-03-31

This article examines changes in trading between Choson Korea and Qing Manchuria, from 1637 to 1644, focusing on Choson's situation and reaction to the changes. Choson, who was defeated by Qing during the Bingzi War in 1637, was ordered to send regular tributes to Qing, and princes to Shenyang. Choson began to send tributary goods and an annual gift, suibi, to Qing. Suibi was intended to compensate for Qing's weak economy. Choson also began an open market at the Qing border, Hoeryong, in 1638. After 1637, irregular trading between Choson and Qing increased. This increase forced the Choson government to collect goods from all over the country to meet the demands. However, Choson could also buy commodities from Qing for agricultural reproduction, such as cows and cotton seeds. Choson prohibited officials from carrying tobacco and qingbu, Chinese blue cotton cloth, to Qing, and restricted the number of horses that could be taken. Choson was given a lot of additional responsibilities and duties related to Qing from 1637 to 1644. It is likely that Choson was forced to support Qing economically. After Qing entered Beijing, the need for Korean goods decreased dramatically.
著者
上村 明
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.119-143, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-05-26)

In June 1930, over 430 Altai-Urianhai families moved across the Altai Mountains to Xinjiang, China. This "escape" triggered a chain of cross-border movements going out of Mongolia, initially in the region of western Mongolia and then spreading all along the border areas close to China. Altai-Urianhai's reports presented at the national congress meetings, as well as maps they produced and submitted to the governments, show that their territory had shrunk due to Kazakh domination of the region and unfavorable governmental policies. They stated that their motherland was the Chingel River to the west of the Altai Mountains, pleading for the government to return it to them. Furthermore, the government of the People's Republic of Mongolia, which was undertaking nation-state building, had started to introduce the school-education system and the conscription system. The Altai-Urianhai people considered not only those systems but also the government to be those of "Halha's", "red", and therefore "evil". In this context, they did not "escape" from their motherland, but rather returned to their homeland. Those suffering in other areas of Mongolia took the incident to be an "escape from the motherland" or a "form of resistance" rather than a "return home". In other words, they "de-contextualized" the incident from Altai-Urianhais' historical contexts, and "re-contextualized" it into their own positions in the situation of that time. Thus developed the mass refugee movements in the early 1930s in Mongolia.