著者

岩間 徹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.1-15, 1961

著者

佐藤 圭史

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.313-332, 2006

著者

外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.93-112, 1968

著者

外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.1-91, 1971

著者

半谷 史郎

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.181-216, 2000

---

Благодаря все более открытому доступу к архивным документам стало возможным детальное изучение вопроса о депортации немцев Поволжья на основе архивных данных. Опубликованы уже несколько работ по этому вопросу. Из них самым весомым является труд А. Германа -- «Немецкая Автономия на Волге», последнюю часть которого он целиком посвятил депортации и произвел ее тщательный анализ. Задача этой статьи заключается в том, чтобы, согласившись в основном с мнением А. Германа, перечитать изданные архивные документы и с новой точки зрения осветить механизм, цели и результаты депортации немцев целого Поволжья, как Автономной республики немцев Поволжья, Саратовской и Сталинградской областей. Ранее утверждалось, что депортация немцев Поволжья была осуществлена на основе Указа Президиума Верховного Совета СССР от 28 августа 1941 г. Однако исследование архивных документов показало, что перед этим указом было принято постановление Совнаркома СССР и ЦК ВКП(б) от 26 августа "О переселении всех немцев из Республики немцев Поволжья, Саратовской и Сталинградской областей в другие края и области". Другими словами, указ от 28 августа является просто декларативной попыткой придать депортации хоть в какой-то степени "законный" характер, а непосредственным приказанием к ее исполнению послужило постановление от 26 августа. Между прочим, А. Герман утверждает в своей книге, что не было никакого объек тивного основания для обвинения немцев в измене, о котором говорится в указе от 28 августа. Но существование факта измен, мне кажется, для сталинского режима было не столь важным элементом. Действуя по принципу "подозрительный - наказать", характерному для времени "великого террора", заранее пресекались даже потенциальные возможности измены, а именно во время войны этому принципу следуют особенно строго. Аналогичным примером может считаться депортация корейцев из Дальнего Востока в 1937 г. или поляков с западной границы в 1939 г. Руководство депортацией немцев было возложено на НКВД СССР, которому предоставлялось право привлекать к работе по выселению другие наркоматы. Операцией выселения на местах командовала "оперативная группа НКВД" под руководством заместителя НКВД Ивана Серова, затем под ней установилась упорядоченная система командования: "областные оперативные тройки", "участковые оперативные тройки" и "оперативные группы". Перед депортацией на место проведения операции было командировано 1550 сотрудников НКВД и 3250 работников милиции, также были направлены войска НКВД в общем количестве 12,350 человек. На фоне присутствия таких крупных сил подготовка к выселению была проведена чрезвычайно быстро. Оперативные группы выезжали в колхозы, поселки и города, и заполняли учетные карточки на каждую семью, подлежащую выселению. На основе этих данных участковые оперативные тройки составляли план проведения операции с учетом численности выселяемых, наличия подвод и автотранспорта, маршрутов к станциям, и количества оперативного состава. Эта работа началась 29-го августа, а уже 3-го сентября первые эшелоны с депортированными отправились из Поволжья, то есть, все подготовительные работы прошли чрезвычайно быстро, не более чем за неделю. По "Таблице о движении эшелонов с депортированными немцами" (далее "Таблица"), которая составлялась на основе архивных данных о депортации (станция, дата, численность во время погрузки / разгрузки), можно проследить передвижение 451,806 немцев в 188 эшелонах из Поволжья. Операция выселения началась 3-го сентября, а закончилась 21-го, на один день позже, чем планировалось. Депортировали немцев с 30 станций Поволжья, а самое большое число эшелонов было отправлено со станции Покровск. В ходе 19-дневной операции ежедневно выселялось по несколько десятков тысяч человек; максимум составил 38,420 человек (8 сентября), а в среднем выселялось более 23 тысяч человек в день. Из-за того, что отправлялось много эшелонов одновременно, на железных дорогах образовывались пробки. Немцы были отправлены в Сибирь (Новосибирская и Омская области, Алтайский и Красноярский края), а также прилегающие к ней области северо-восточного Казахстана. А. Герман писал, что "чтобы не загружать основные железнодорожные трассы, по которым шли к фронту воинские эшелоны, передвижение составов с поволжскими немцами в Сибирь и Казахстан осуществлялось кружным путем" на юг. Но данные "Таблицы" вызывают сомнение в этом. Подсчитав среднее число дней в пути до станций назначения по административному разделению, можно видеть, что кружным путем на юг проходили только эшелоны к территориям на восток от Новосибирска, а эшелоны в другие регионы (Кустанайскую, Северо-Казахстанскую, Акмолинскую, Омскую и Павлодарскую области) проходили через Чкалов прямо по Транссибирской железной дороге (путь на север). Из-за погрешностей, имеющихся в "Таблице", невозможно точно определить изменения численности в пути. По далеко не полным данным, в эшелонах умерло 165 человек, были также случаи родов, отставаний от поезда и побегов. Из Сталинградской области 26,880 немцев было отправлено водным транспортом в Астрахань, оттуда по Каспийскому морю на пароходах до Гурьева и лишь затем железнодорожным транспортом к Восточно-Казахстанской и Семипалатинской областям. У большинства немцев, никогда не видевших моря, оно вызвало страх, отмечено даже возникновение паники в ожидании отправления. По "Таблице" можно также судить о характере депортации в целом. При рассмотрении станций прибытия, прослеживается неслучайная закономерность в соответствиях мест назначения и номеров эшелонов. Кроме того, рассмотрение дат отправления эшелонов показало, что эшелоны отправлялись не по номерам, а одновременно из всех регионов Поволжья. Номера необходимы для идентификации эшелонов во время отъезда / приезда и при движении, они не могли быть распределены во время составления отчета, значит, для того, чтобы все эшелоны действительно двигались согласно "Таблице", необходимо было до начала операции завершить всю подготовительную работу, подсчитать количество эшелонов и определить дни отправления. Таким образом, "Таблица" показывает тщательную спланированность и хорошую подготовленность депортации. Однако с другой стороны можно указать и на некоторые погрешности в проведении операции. Одним из примеров являются, как указывает А. Герман, цифровые неточности в документах, а наиболее типичными были пропуски (7 случаев) и добавления номеров, имеющие место в "Таблице". Это означает, что людская численность, подсчитанная при подготовке операции, иногда не соответствовала действительности и исправлялась прямо на местах погрузки. Тем не менее тщательная спланированность депортации немцев Поволжья указывает на наличие у властей накопленного в ходе прошлых депортаций народов и массовых чисток опыта репрессий. Автономная республика немцев Поволжья была ликвидирована 7 сентября; 7 ее кантонов были включены в состав Сталинградской области, а остальные 14 кантонов - в Саратовскую область. Не осуществился замысел властей о заселении земель бывшей Немреспублики эвакуированными людьми. Хозяйство региона было разрушено и депортация немцев Поволжья принесла государству миллиардные убытки. Между прочим, постановление от 26 августа сразу было передано на места переселения немцев. В Сибири и Казахстане принимались постановления об их приеме и создавались, так же как при операции выселения в Поволжье, оперативные тройки для приема и расселения немцев, районные оперативные тройки для подготовки жилья, транспортных перевозок, обеспечения питанием и т. д. Постановлением предписывалось осуществлять переселение немцев целыми колхозами, однако в действительности их разделяли на несколько групп на станциях погрузки и в итоге депортируемые размещались среди русских колхозников почти посемейно. Поэтому можно сказать, что в новых местах поселения их поставили в положение "изолированных островов в океане" иных народов. Как уже было сказано, намерение депортировать немцев первоначально основывалось на идее об исключении потенциально опасного элемента. Но положение немцев после депортации указывает на то, что, в условиях нехватки рабочих рук в тяжелое военное время, их рассматривали как "даровых работников". Особенно отчетливо такое отношение просматривается в явлении "трудармии", когда почти все трудоспособные немцы были привлечены на принудительные работы. Развитое общество немцев в Поволжье вследствие депортации было полностью разрушено. Эта депортация также ускорила ассимиляцию немцев в русскоязычном обществе, о чем говорят данные переписи населения Казахстана, проведенной в 1989 году.

著者

奥 彩子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.1-31, 2003

---

Hourglass (1972) is the last book of the autobiographical trilogy of Yugoslav writer Danilo Kiš (1935-1989). This novel is based on a real letter that Kiš's father wrote to his sister Olga on April 5th 1942. Kiš puts it in the last chapter of the novel as "Letter or Contents." Though the letter (which is full of complaints and grudges against relatives) illustrates the agony of the Jews in those times, for the son it is a precious "document" of his father who disappeared in Auschwitz. The novel Hourglass reconstructs the father's psychology and his acts, attempting to recreate his world. Examining the structure of the novel, its technical aspects and the hero, this paper focuses on how Hourglass fulfills the task of modern novels, which is, according to Milan Kundera, to present a new cognition of human existence. This paper starts by pointing out the differences between Halics and the other two books from the trilogy, Garden, Ashes (1965) and Early Sorrows (1969). The trilogy shares the same background -- Hungary and Vojvodina (a northern area in the former Yugoslavia) during World War II. In contrast to the first two books, where the main character is a boy named Andy, Hourglass has only one protagonist, E.S., who is that boy's father. The most important difference is the divergence of the narratives' viewpoint. In Hourglass, "objective narration" becomes an aim of the novel, as the narrator disappears. The paper further discusses some autobiographical facts about the author. The novel, which consists of 67 segments, is built upon four chapters "Travel Scenes" (20 segments), "Notes of a Madman" (34 segments), "Criminal Investigation" (9 segments), "A Witness Interrogated" (2 segments), as well as the two segments "Prologue" and "Letter or Contents." It is evident that this novel is a variation of a poetic form "Glosa," and that "Notes of a Madman" could be considered as a leitmotiv with its substitution of letters for chapters. Furthermore, by examining a chronology of "Letter or Contents" and the text, it turns out that all the events took place in the hero's consciousness during the single night of April 4th to April 5th, 1942. The number of the segments of text is equal to the Bible's 66 books, suggesting that the book could be considered as "a Holy Book". All the chapters could be read as if they had been written from the hero's viewpoint. In other words, the whole story is made up of E. S.'s experiences or delusions. Even the third person narration in "Prologue" and "Travel Scenes" expresses E. S.'s internal images. Furthermore, the paper emphasises that in Hourglass, the story is subdivided in order to reject the reader's empathy. This style could be described as "disnarrative." The paper also examines a number of techniques used for the segmentation: exaggeration of details, usage of images, enumeration, and recursive structure. The text of the "Novel in a Novel" suggests that the novel Hourglass is based upon an original recursive structure. The character of the hero is analyzed, especially from the perspective of his religion. The fact that he is a Jew is not presented at the beginning but emerges thoughout the story. E. S. is not an Orthodox Jew, nor has he completely assimilated into European society. In Hourglass, at the moment he reveals his Star of David, he accepts himself as a Jew, thus becoming subject to forced labour, only to face an even more horrible experience, the Massacre of Novi Sad. Under severe political and social pressure, through agony, hallucination, and a crisis of self-division, E. S. deepens his speculation concerning God, Humanity, and Nature. E. S.'s "real self" becomes a complete existence at the moment his own internal religion harmonizes with the appearance of God. In the last segment of the text, E. S. tries to accept his death with a calm equanimity, just as Noah accepted the destiny of the world and the human race. In the conclusion, the paper discusses Hourglass as the book of the world. Kiš describes his father's book Guidebook in his short autobiography as a "literal heritage," and in Garden, Ashes as "a Holy Book" or "Apocrypha." As a starting point when writing Hourglass, Kiš used the idea of a book as a metaphore for the world, which has a fertile tradition in European literature. To escape the deluge of the Pannonian Sea, E. S., as Noah himself, tries to load the ark with human beings, flora and fauna, all creatures and their experiences. In other words, at night, under the oil lamp, hearing the waves of history, with a pen, by writing letters, he tries to create a book or an ark, which carries the whole world. Hourglass is a true novel which is the reproduction of Noah's attempt to recreate the world and human beings, by the act of writing about one era and the world, through recording one man's entire experiences and emotions, without missing any details. Id est, Hourglass is the book of the world. For this recreation, Kiš concentrates on such structural aspects of the novel of such as the arrangement of chapters, disnarration, fragmentation of timeflow, etc. But the book could have never been written without the symbiosis of Kiš's and his father Eduard's character - E. S. Through this figure, Kiš finally reaches his aim - objective narration. Hourglass fulfills the task of modern novels, telling us that the book, as a metaphor for the world, even now can become an ark for the regenesis of all creatures, who resist death with all their might.

著者

片山 博文

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.117-133, 1995

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.67-93, 2001

---

After World War II Poland experienced a drastic change in the ethno-national composition of the state as a result of the exclusion of national minorities following the shift of her frontiers. The new Polish-Soviet frontier follows quite closely the so-called Curzon line that was considered as the ethnographical borderline between Poles and Ukrainians. In consequence of this shift of frontiers most Ukrainians, the largest national minority in prewar Poland, found themselves on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, or Soviet Ukraine, while it is estimated that there remained as many as 700,000 Ukrainians on the Polish side. By the summer of 1947, these Ukrainians had been excluded from Polish society. The purpose of this article is to examine how the Ukrainian minority problem was settled in postwar Poland and to demonstrate the decisive role played by the Communists in this settlement. At first, resettlements of Ukrainians were carried out on the authority of an agreement on the exchange of populations concluded by the Polish Committee of National Liberation, or the Lublin Committee, with Soviet Ukraine on September 9, 1944. It was stated in the agreement that Poles and Jews who had been citizens of Poland before September 17, 1939 and were living in Soviet Ukraine could be evacuated to Poland. Correspondingly, Ukrainians living in postwar Poland could choose Soviet citizenship and move into Soviet Ukraine. Moreover, according to the agreement, the transfers were to be voluntary. In the course of the implementation of the agreement, however, the Polish authorities, the core of which consisted of Communists, set about to deport Ukrainians, abandoning the principle of free will. When the deportations were completed in the summer of 1946, a total of 482,000 Ukrainians, many of these forcibly, had left their homeland and had been deported to Soviet Ukraine. The second and "final" act of the solution of the "Ukrainian problem" in Poland was Operation "Vistula" executed by the Polish Army with Communist political support. The aim of this operation was to resettle the whole of the remaining Ukrainians including mixed marriage families in ex-German territories allotted to Poland, or the Recovered Territories, where they were planned to be dispersed so as not to form their own community. They were expected to assimilate quickly into Polish society there. Operation "Vistula" began on April 28, 1947 under the pretext that the whole Ukrainian population was collectively responsible for the assassination of the Vice-Minister of Defense by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or the UPA. By the end of July, Operation "Vistula" resettled about 140,000 Ukrainians. In this way the "Ukrainian problem" in postwar Poland was solved by force. Such thorough exclusion of Ukrainians to the extent it could be called "ethnic cleansing" can be explained by a historical factor, that is, the long-standing antagonism between the two nations. It was above all World War II which sharpened national consciousness among these ruled nations and aggravated this antagonism. Memories of the bloody conflict in Volhynia that had entangled Polish and Ukrainian civilians as well as combatants made it difficult to live together in one state. But it is important to bear in mind that the Communists were the executors of the exclusion policy. The Communists, who had seized power lacking the support from the masses, came to call themselves the defenders of Polish national interests, propagandizing the danger of "German revanchism," "Ukrainian anti-Polish armed bandits," etc. For them the settlement of national conflicts in favor of the Polish nation was one of the most effective means to legitimize their power. In the process of the establishment of their rule, they revealed an orientation to a homogeneous Polish nation-state. In this sense, Ukrainians were sort of a scapegoat. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the Communists saw signs of opposition from the Ukrainians. In spite of pressure from the Polish authorities they wished to remain in Poland while clinging to their own national identity. They demanded equal rights, national freedom and even the right to set up a Ukrainian political party during negotiations with Polish authorities on July 24, 1945. These demands seemed to have been excessive to the Communists, who were then on the way to hegemony and were building a quasi-plural party system which they would control as they pleased. The exclusion of Ukrainians was also a manifestation of the Communists' totalitarian character that would not permit the existence of opponents. And Ukrainians were one of a great many opponents at which the Communists struck a finishing blow. When the "Ukrainian problem" in postwar Poland is taken into consideration, particular attention must be given to the above-mentioned factors which were intertwined with each other. To ignore any of them would mean to miss the point of the whole structure of the problem.

著者

伊東 孝之

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.53-96, 1973

著者

中根 研一

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラブ・ユーラシア研究報告集

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.149-155, 2008-12

---

共産圏の日常世界. 望月哲男編

著者

外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.71-158, 1973

著者

中田 瑞穂

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.249-280, 2000

---

This article examines the Czechoslovak way of parliamentary democracy as it confronts the World Depression, specifically during its first phase from the outbreak of economic crisis until 1932. Three features were characteristic of political structure in Czechoslovakia. First of all, there were more than 15 parties reflecting the ethnic and socio-economic diversity of the Republic. Political parties were widely spread on the two dimensional space. The first dimension was ethnical, setting the Czechs in the centre and the Slovaks, the Germans and other smaller ethnic groups on the sides. The second dimension was socio-economic, namely, labour, agricultural, catholic and industrial. From more than these 15 parties, at least five were necessary to form a majority coalition for government. The second feature was the predominance of the Agrarian Party, which became the mass political party of the Czech organized agricultural interest. Largely due to the support from the agricultural Slovakia, the Agrarian Party became the biggest party in Czechoslovakia and used its power to enforce policies for the benefit of agriculture. Its interest-oriented political style influenced the entire Czechoslovak political scene between the wars. The last feature was the multiplicity of parties representing the working class. In addition to the multiethnic Communists, there were socialist workers, who were first ethnically divided, and then further split along dogmatic lines, such that the Czechoslovaks and the Germans had two socialist parties each - the Social Democrats and the National Socialists. These socialist parties, especially the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, had a positive attitude toward participating in the Government. While most social democrats in other European countries remained in opposition, Czechoslovak Social Democrats had kept an affirmative stance to the Republic and reentered into a governing coalition in 1929, after 3 years as an opposition party. The working class had its representative right within the coalition government during the hard years of the World Depression. On October 1929, the parliamentary election was held in Czechoslovakia and as a result a new coalition government was formed under the premiership of agrarian František Udržal. It was a broad coalition government, which consisted of more than eight parties representing various socio-economic interests. Although the Communists and three German and Slovak nationalist parties remained in opposition, the coalition enabled the large majority of the population to be represented in the political decision making process. Concurrent with the coalition formation in late 1929, the World Depression broke out across the seas, which ultimately exerted considerable pressure on the political system in every country. In Czechoslovakia the representation of agricultural interests through both Czechoslovak and German Agrarian parties, workers' interests through two Czechoslovak and German Social Democratic parties, as well as the Czechoslovak National Socialists, helped to canalise their demands into the political arena and secured the stability of the political system during the economic crisis. Due to the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests within the coalition, it was inherently difficult for the coalition government to form agreements. In particular, the Agrarians attempted to use their vantage position as the largest and pivotal party in the coalition to demand subsidies and protective tariffs to ameliorate the disastrous consequences of the agricultural crisis, without any regard for the interests of city consumers or industries. Conflicts within the coalition became intensified and coalition negotiation dragged on. Important measures, which were urgently needed to cope with the effects of depression, were postponed and forestalled. It was necessary to conceive of some means to negotiate, and to find solutions, which would be acceptable to all member parties of the coalition. The coexistence of various organised interests in a coalition had been the perennial problem for the Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy from its inception. In the 1920s, they worked out a special meeting of five people, the Pětka (the Five), who represented at that time the five coalition parties, to negotiate and make compromise. However, under the new broader coalition government, Socialists criticised the Pětka for being unconstitutional and unparliamentary, and asked for alternatives in intracoalition decision making. One proposal was "the political committee of ministers", with representatives from each party of the coalition. While the Pětka, which was an institution outside the government, and its members were not always government officials, but sometimes merely influential persons in each party, "the political committee of ministers" was a committee inside the cabinet, within which ministers negotiated with one another as representatives of coalition parties. Although they could find compromises on discrete problems, they left the cabinet with the responsibility of making final decisions. The other means of intra-coalition negotiation was the organisation of coalition committees in the parliament. With each emergent problem, an ad hoc committee was set up to address the issue, such as sugar production, housing or social policy. Coalition committees were asked to find practical settlement of conflicts among coalition parties to pave the way for the government decision making. In spite of these devices, as the Prime Minister Udržal lost support from his own Agrarian Party, it became harder and harder for the wheel of coalition politics to turn forward. Furthermore, as a result of deflation policies, the state budget could afford smaller subsidies or supports, thus making compromise between conflicting interests even more difficult. In this phase of the economic crisis, since the Agrarians, and the Social Democrats as well, presented their demands without an overall blueprint for the national economy, which would have helped to direct the choice of policies, compromise between coalition parties became the only measure for political decision making. However, the opposition within the agrarian party intensified, and the coalition compromise failed completely in July 1932. With the change of the Prime Minister's seat to Malypetr, who was a skilful parliamentarian, the same coalition was revitalised. Malypetr made it the absolute condition for his acceptance of the premiership that all the coalition parties agree on balancing the budget for 1933. Under this agreement, a budget committee comprised of seven coalition parties in the parliament was established to help Malypetr to solve the budget impasse. In the process of this analysis, this article demonstrates that the Czechoslovak way of parliamentary democracy was still viable even under the pressure from the World Depression. Compromise and logrolling were always the last resort to resolving some conflicting issues, but the arena of decision making shifted from the informal Pětka to the Government or the Parliament, reflective of a degree of maturity in Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy. However, it also became clear that this way of coalition politics became difficult when each interest group demanded the state for help, even though the resources, especially the financial means, of the state were limited. At the end of this article, the author indicates that socialists began to see one solution to this problem in the Agrarians' demand for state regulation in agricultural sectors. The socialists hoped that the Agrarians would understand the necessity of overall state planning and regulation of the national economy. Moreover, after the Nazi seizure of power, the Czechoslovak way of parliamentary democracy was challenged by the requirement for efficacy in decision making and consideration of national interests. The response to that requisite by the coalition parties will be examined in the next work of the author.

著者

村山 七郎

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.105-111, 1960

著者

望月哲男編

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

巻号頁・発行日

2008

著者

櫻間 瑛

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラブ・ユーラシア研究報告集

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.157-174, 2012-03

---

文化空間としてのヴォルガ. 望月哲男, 前田しほ編

著者

早坂 真理

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, pp.191-216, 1978-03-25

著者

西中村 浩

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.57-76, 1987

著者

Strong John W.

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.41-55, 1973

著者

神長 英輔

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.285-299, 2003

著者

Dmytryshyn Basil

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.1-25, 1980