著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.p81-104, 1981

著者

相沢 直樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.1-33, 1998-03-31

著者

森下 嘉之

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.93-114, 2012-06-15

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Right after WWII, Eastern European countries stood at a crossroads, witnessing, to name but a couple, communization of the state and transfer of millions of ethnic minorities, most notably Germans. Postwar Czechoslovakia was no exception. Czechoslovakia had had three republican periods: the first republic from its independence in 1918 to the collapse in 1938, the second from 1938 to the Nazi occupation in 1939, and the third from 1945 to the beginning of Communist Party rule in 1948. The third republic in particular embraced many alternatives for future social policies, neither capitalistic nor communistic. Focusing on the housing policy from 1945 to 1948, this article aims to elucidate postwar Czechoslovakia's search for the optimum social policies, addressing the difference between the prewar and the postwar period. I also examine the policy of the transfer of the German population and the settlement of Czechs in the Czech border area, as it was against this backdrop that the new housing policy took form. While the last president of the first republic, Eduard Beneš, returned as president of the new Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party was dominant in the government. On the one hand, the new republic resembled its prewar predecessors in terms of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, undertaking the nationalization of large enterprises, land reform, and a planned economy, the postwar government attempted to differentiate itself from the prewar regime that had resulted in the Nazi's invasion and the collapse of the state. The Communists as the largest group in the government could propose their own postwar reforms disposed not toward Soviet-type socialism, but toward "the Czechoslovakian way" or "the bridge between the East and the West." The highest on the agenda for postwar reconstruction was the housing policy. The postwar government launched a "two-year plan," the first planned economy for the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. Notably, the government planned to build and supply 125,000 houses from 1947 to 1948. The government and architects worked in tandem to upgrade the poor prewar housing conditions by revising prewar housing laws. On the one hand, socialist parties and architects criticized the prewar liberalist housing market, exhorting the introduction of state control of the market. Some architects were enthusiastic about grand apartment buildings containing small houses as the socialist type of housing of the future. On the other hand, based on the housing law of 1921, the government decided to provide subsidies for family houses with 80 m2 of floor space, instead of 34 m2 as had been stipulated in 1937, with a view toward improving the housing environment. Moreover, the new government adhering to the Czechoslovakian way, neither liberalist nor socialist, even allowed private properties, while some architects influenced by Soviet architecture insisted on the entire socialization of houses and land. It is definitely necessary to contextualize the postwar Czechoslovakian housing policy in the removal of more than 2,000,000 Germans and the settlement of Czech people in the borderland (pohraniči). There, the "settlement office (Osidlovací úřad)" led by the Communist Party played a particularly essential role. The settlement office as well as the national board, which was also ruled by Communists, fulfilled the task of furnishing new Czech settlers with houses that had been expropriated from Germans and Hungarians as well as managing the housing market. The Communist Party had a good reason to expect support from those new settlers who could obtain huge properties, such as houses, thanks to the Communist policy. Despite the abundance of confiscated empty houses, this period did not see the solution to the housing problem, as the condition of these houses remained atrocious. Although the postwar housing policy held an opportunity to realize ideal plans for the future Czechoslovakia, it did not thrive due to the tough reality in the borderland. The policy and the ideal were consigned to oblivion after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1948.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.53, pp.267-298, 2006

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After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.267-298, 2006

---

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

著者

劉 旭

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.157-177, 2010

著者

大野 成樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.91-115, 2000

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In former studies about Russian banks, analysis from a comprehensive viewpoint has been almost completely ignored. In order to clarify the characteristics of Russian banking activities, an analysis from the viewpoints of bank location, foundation and scale is indispensable. Russian banks have shown some distinguishing characteristics in their activities when viewed by these classifications. To analyze this situation, we have classified Russian banks in this article by their location, foundation and scale. To do this we used the lists of large Russian banks that were periodically published in "Ekonomika i zhizn'" (data as of July 1994, January 1995, January 1996 and January 1997; the list has not been published since 1998) and "Finansovye izvestiia" (data as of January 1996, January 1997 and January 1998). The situation after 1998 was not analyzed because of the lack of information. For an analysis of Russian banking activities by bank foundation, banks were classified into former state banks and non-former state banks. Former state banks include the Savings Bank of Russia, Promstroibank of USSR, Agroprombank of USSR, Zhilsotsbank of USSR (excluding the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia) and the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia. For an analysis of activities by their location, banks were classified into those which were located in Moscow city and Moscow oblast (hereafter referred to as Moscow banks) and those in 11 other economic regions (North, Northwest, Central excluding Moscow city and Moscow oblast, Volga-Vyatka, Central Black-Soil, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, West Siberia, East Siberia, and Far East; Kaliningrad was excluded because there were no data about it). The banks in these economic regions are referred to below as regional banks. In addition, regression analysis was applied to clarify differences in banking activities by bank foundation and location. Because of the limited data, in the regression banks were classified by foundation into former state banks and non-former state banks, and banks were classified by location into Moscow banks and regional banks. In the analysis by bank scale, data were taken into account for the banks that were ranked as the 50 top banks in the 100 largest bank lists and for 50 banks from the bottom of the lists. Regression was then used to confirm whether or not differences existed in the activities between large banks and medium-sized banks. Before analyzing Russian banks' activities by these classifications, let us survey the trends and changes of their lending and investing activities. Russian banks earned profits under the hyperinflation caused by the liberalization of prices in January 1992, through devaluation of their liabilities and from other sources. Subsequent government tight money policies led to the suppression of inflation and stabilization of the ruble exchange rate. From about 1994, therefore, banks tended to increase loans to other banks, although they still held a large share of hard currency as non-working assets. The banks made profits by raising funds in the call market and lending the money as call loans under a positive yield curve for terms longer than the call money repayment period. Such a profit-making structure collapsed under tight monetary and fiscal policies, however, and some banks fell into default in August 1995. Banks therefore began to place more emphasis on their lending activities to non-bank sectors or to holdings of state securities. Especially after 1995 the amount of outstanding state securities has increased dramatically, because the government was prohibited in 1995 from compensating its budget deficits with Central Bank loans. Because the inflation rate decreased further in 1996-1997, the refinance rate of the Central Bank also was reduced. This resulted in the decline of the yield on state securities. During these years banks tended to increase the amount of loans to non-bank sectors, reducing the proportion of non-working assets. In the following sections we will analyze loans to non-bank sectors, loans to other banks and holdings of state securities. 1. Loans to non-bank sectors. In this section we will analyze the general situation regarding loans to non-bank sectors and the situation of foreign currency-denominated loans to non-bank sectors. (1) General situation of loans to non-bank sectors. First we analyzed the situation by foundation of banks. In the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank was high. This was because these banks had strong relationships with their customers, industrial and agricultural companies. In contrast, the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of the former Zhilsotsbank was lower than that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank. Banks that originated from the former Zhilsotsbank did not tend to participate in unprofitable government economic programs such as agricultural programs. Activities of these banks were quite different -- some of them gave priority to loans to non-bank sectors, while others gave weight to operations of state securities. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia was much lower than that of banks of other categories. That was because its main activities were to hold its assets in hard currency in foreign banks. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at non-former state banks was lower than that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank but higher than that of the former Zhilsotsbank. Let us further analyze the situation of loans to non-bank sectors by the location of banks. In the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" the share of loans to non-bank sectors at Moscow banks was much lower than that of regional banks in 1994 and 1995, but in 1996 and 1997 differences between Moscow banks and regional banks became smaller. Furthermore, regression indicates that the share of loans to non-bank sectors at smaller Moscow former state banks tended to be greater in 1994 and 1995. From the viewpoint of the scale of banks, the share of loans to non-bank sectors at larger banks tended to be lower. But in 1996 and 1997 differences between classifications were smaller. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of non-former state banks was the highest of all categories by foundation of bank. At the former Promstroibank, Agroprombank and Zhilsotsbank and at the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia, the share was about 20-30%. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" the share of loans to non-bank sectors at non-former state banks exceeded that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank. This is different from the result of the analysis based on the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" and is caused by the difference in the definition of "asset" in the data. This means the share of interest arrears, the inter-office account and other assets in the assets of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank was larger than the share at non-former-state banks. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at the Savings Bank of Russia was much lower than that of other categories. This was caused by the weakness of the bank's relationship with companies in the Soviet era. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" regression shows that larger non-former state banks tended to loan more, whereas differences between Moscow banks and regional banks were weaker. On the other hand, differences between large banks and medium-sized banks became greater as years passed, which is distinguished by the smaller proportion of loans to non-bank sectors at larger banks. (2) Foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors. The data of "Finansovye izvestiia" were used for an analysis of foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors (there were no such data in "Ekonomika i zhizn'"). The data showed that of loans to non-bank sectors, the share of foreign currency loans tended to be larger at the non-former state banks than at the former state banks, but differences by location of banks were weak. Regression shows that the share of foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors denominated at larger non-former state banks tended to be greater. Differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were evident. 2. Loans to other banks. In this paper we defined "loans to other banks" as loans that were included in the category "Loans" on the balance sheet, excluding deposits in correspondent accounts at other banks. Only the data in 1994 and 1995 of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" were consistent with this definition. According to the data the proportion of loans to other banks in the total of all bank loans was high in Central (excluding Moscow city and Moscow oblast) in 1994, and high in Moscow city and Moscow oblast and Urals in 1995. Therefore differences in loans to other banks between Moscow banks and regional banks were not so evident. From the viewpoint of the foundation of banks, the share of loans to other banks at non-former state banks was higher. This was related to the weakness of their relationship with companies when compared with the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank, as well as the lower overall share of loans to non-bank sectors (in the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'"). Moreover, regression proved that non-former state banks tended to loan to other banks more than former state banks. On the other hand, differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were not observed in the data. 3. Holdings of state securities. Data about holdings of state securities were available in "Finansovye izvestiia." From the viewpoint of the foundation of banks the share of state securities in the assets of the Savings Bank of Russia was far larger than that of other categories, and the share in the assets of the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia was relatively high. Differences between former state banks and non-former state banks were clear. From the viewpoint of location, the share of state securities in the assets of Moscow banks tended to be higher than the share at regional banks. Analysis by regression showed that in 1996 and 1998, differences in holdings of state securities by both foundation and location were clear, and the share of state securities at larger Moscow former state banks tended to be higher. Furthermore, in 1996 and 1998 differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were clear, judged from the higher share of state securities in the assets of large banks than those of medium-sized banks. Conclusion. In many phases of Russian banking activities, differences in characteristics according to the foundation of banks came to the fore. Differences in characteristics by the location of banks were weaker, except for holdings of state securities. Differences based on the scale of banks were outstanding, especially differences in loans to non-bank sectors. Recently differences in the activities between large banks and medium-sized banks have attracted more media attention. On the other hand, differences by foundation of banks in particular have tended to be ignored. Our analysis indicates, however, that viewing bank activity from the standpoint of the foundation of banks is still effective to explain Russian banking activities. Our work may as well be the first step towards understanding the changing activities of Russian banks since the collapse of USSR. The task of analyzing the situation after the crisis of August 1998 remains to be addressed.

著者

林 忠行

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.30, pp.p71-94, 1982

著者

飯尾 唯紀

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.95-112, 2001

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In Habsburg Hungary, the religious liberty of all estates came into force by the Act of 1608. This article was enacted in the years of crisis of the Habsburg rule, and had been valid, with a little modification, until the end of the 17th century. It has been proposed that this article, accordant with the system of "Neo-Serfdom," gave the religious liberty only to the feudal lords and free royal towns, not to the serfs. In the struggle between the foreign dynasty and domestic feudal lords, the former gave up to intervene in the affairs of serfs. On the other hand, feudal lords reinforced the power on their serfs not only in the physical, but in the spiritual sphere too. For feudal lords, their privilege on religious affairs was self-evident on the premise that they assigned to themselves the power of exercising the right of church-patron. This paper aims at questioning this established account and pointing out two central problems. First, this account regards the act as a part of the regulation of serfdom. Investigating the process of enactment, however, it appeared that the main issue was not on serfs but on the people who lived on those lands belonging to the crown. The second point of debate is about an understanding of the word "villa" [village]. This was interpreted as an expression of the right of non-Catholic church patron to keep their serfs on their side. However, concerning the understanding of the word "villa," we must take into consideration the discretionary power of congregation, which had been developed through late medieval times. As the role of congregation was diverged in each part of the state, there were frequent signs of clashes of opinions among Hungarian feudal lords on the question of the religious liberty of villages. The Act of 1608 declared that the king could not interfere in religious affairs in Hungary, but the right of the villages was not denied. The relation between patron and congregation became a keen issue on the Diet after the 1610s, when the western magnates returned to the Catholic church, and friction between them arose again throughout the Kingdom.

著者

三苫 民雄

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.367-384, 2000

著者

ボブロフ アレクサンドル 越野 剛 宮野 裕 毛利 公美 佐光 伸一

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.261-280, 2005

著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, pp.183-205, 2007

著者

渡辺 圭

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.193-215, 2006

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В данной статье мы попытаемся проанализировать идею «пустыни» схимонаха Илариона. Схимонах Иларион, пустынножитель Кавказских гор, известен как автор церковной книги «На горах Кавказа» (1907). В этой книге раскрывается сущность традиционной молитвы православия - «молитвы Иисусовой», которая включает в себя выражение «имя Господа Иисуса Христа есть Сам Он, Господь Бог». Это выражение вызвало богословский спор об имени Бога. Монахи, которые разделяли идею Илариона, называли самих себя «имяславцами». «Имяславие» известно как еретическая проблема русской православной церкви начала ХХ века. Так как вообще «На горах Кавказа» исследуют в рамках проблемы «имени Бога». Однако в ней есть и еще одна важная идея, а именно, т.н. идея «пустыни». В монашестве русской православной церкви «пустыня» имеет большое значение как место подвижничества монаха. Пока исследования книги «На горах Кавказа» с точки зрения идеи «пустыни» весьма скудны. В этом заключается актуальность темы данной статьи. Данная статья состоит из шести глав. В первой главе мы рассматриваем, как понимается идея «пустыни» в истории христианского монашества. Это основа полемики данной статьи. В Ветхом Завете «пустыня» выражается как место встречи Моисея с Богом (Исх. 3,1). И в Новом Завете «пустыня» - это место, в котором жил Иоанн Креститель (Мат. 3, 1-3. Мар. 1, 3-6. Лук. 3, 2-б. Иоап1, 23.), и место искушения Иисуса нечистой силой (Мат. 4, 1-11. Мар. 1, 12-13. Лук. 4, 1-13.). В начале христианского монашества много подвижников вступило в «пустыню» для того, чтобы подражать Иисусу и встретиться с Богом. Следовательно, «пустыня», является местом подвижничества и встречи с Богом. Во второй главе мы анализируем, какое значение имеет идея «пустыни» и как она выражается в истории монашества русского православия. Как отмечает И.К. Счолич, в России сама природа севера стала «пустыней» для монахов, особенно лес. Густые леса севера давали монахам покой для безмолвия и внутреннего моления. Исихасты России подвизались в такой «пустыни». Схимонах Иларион, пустынножитель Кавказских гор, также находился в рамках этой традиции. В третьей главе мы даем краткую биографию Илариона. Для того, чтобы рассуждать об идее «пустыни» Илариона, сначала нужно выяснить, кем был Схимонах Иларион. В четвертой главе мы рассматриваем то, как выражается «пустыня», в книге «На горах Кавказа». Здесь мы отмечаем, что для Илариона богатая природа Кавказских гор есть место встречи с Богом, т.е. «пустыня». Через природу Кавказских гор Иларион славил Господа Бога. В пятой главе мы анализируем, как Иларион понимал разницу между общинной жизнью в монастыре и жизнью в «пустыне». Здесь обнаруживается, что для Илариона жизнь монаха в «пустыни» представляет собой самый высокий уровень подвижничества монаха. В последней шестой главе мы рассмотрели взгляд Илариона на «молитву Иисусовую». Путем этого анализа мы выяснили, к чему восходит высокая оценка Иларионом «молитвы Иисусовой». Иларион развил мысль о «молитве Иисусовой» под влиянием молдавского старца Паисия Величковского Особенность идеи «пустыни» Илариона заключается в утверждении о том, что именно в «пустыне» нужно делать внутреннее дело, т.е. «молитву Иисусовую». В результате анализ данной статьи позволяет нам сделать вывод о том, что схимонах Иларион, пустынножитель Кавказских гор, находится в линии традиции монашества русского православия, но у его идеи о «пустыне» есть свои особенности. Особенность идеи Илариона заключается в том, что в «пустыне» монахам нужно делать «молитву Иисусовую». Этот вывод дает новый взгляд на богословскую мысль схимонаха Илариона.

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.52, pp.1-37, 2005

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This article examines political dynamics in Poland immediately after World War II, paying particular attention to the multiparty system in that period and the communists' policies toward non-communist parties. Postwar Poland started in July 1944 with the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin Committee) in which the communists exercised hegemonic power. The Lublin Committee and its successor, the Provisional Government, were nominal coalition governments that consisted of four parties: the communist Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Peasant Party (SL), and the Democratic Party (SD). Postwar Poland was initially characterized by coalition government and political pluralism, which both the domestic and foreign environment made necessary. As for the latter, the Soviet Union had in particular elaborated a "national front" strategy in order to help weak communists in Eastern Europe to participate in postwar administrations, a strategy which was intended to relax the Western Allies' vigilance against the establishment of puppet communist governments. In Poland, the communists, who seized power in spite of their lack of mass support and who, at the same time, had to follow the Soviet "national front" strategy, created for themselves their "allied" parties and adopted their prewar party names. In this "multiparty" system, which this article calls "the Lublin system," the communists allowed only those who accepted the hegemony of the PPR and had no intention to struggle for hegemonic power to be an allied partner. They carefully nipped in the bud any intention by their "allies" to be independent. It was often the case that they used the "plug," the party member dispatched to allied parties as an executive in order to control these parties. These tactics helped the communists to make the SL and the SD their satellite parties, though the excessive use of the "plug" tactic, which took the teeth out of the multiparty system, aroused criticism even in the PPR leadership. The formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity in June 1945, which was to be set up according to the Yalta agreement, together with the return of Mikołajczyk, the former prime minister of the Polish government in exile and an outstanding leader of the Polish peasant movement, caused a change in the Lublin system and the political situation as a whole in Poland. The communists made an effort to draw Mikołajczyk and his followers into their Lublin system, but he refused to be involved in a political framework initiated by the communists and founded a new party in substantial opposition, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), relying on wide support from the masses. Confronted with the challenge of the PSL, the communists tried to modify the Lublin system into a bipolar structure which would compel the PSL to play the role of the only legal opposition. In this way, they intended to limit the energy required in dealing with scattered targets in struggles for power. At the same time they continued efforts to induce the PSL into the platform of the Lublin system. They offered the PSL an electoral bloc which assured the PSL the same number of seats in the parliament as the PPR and the PPS would occupy, but again Mikołajczyk and his party refused to accept the proposal and decided to enter the general election on its own. In such a situation, the communists played for time by carrying out a referendum. The result of it, however, disappointed the communists, revealing a largely hostile attitude which forced them to falsify the official results in favor of the communists. This falsified referendum cast a shadow on the stability of the Lublin system, activating the socialists (PPS) who intended to mediate between the PPR and the PSL and, by doing so, find their way out of dependency on the communists. Facing such a crisis of the Lublin system, the communists reaffirmed the bipolar structure of the political scene and aimed both to shake the PSL and to bring the PPS back to their side by the time of the forthcoming general election. They succeeded at the latter task, but failed at the former. After recognizing the difficulty in reaching an agreement with Mikołajczyk, the communists decided to destroy the PSL by resorting to underhand means, including far more intensified violence. In the end, the general election was won by force. The collapse of the PSL marked the beginning of the last stage of a political pluralism which had somehow functioned within the limitations of the communist hegemony. It was indeed a significant step toward the establishment of a substantial single-party system in Poland, but this process did not proceed smoothly according to any blueprint. The political unification in postwar Poland was not a linear process of realization of the initial, clear and unchanging purpose of the communists, but rather the result of a series of reactions to circumstances the communists came up against. The political dynamics contributed by various elements, including non-communists, should not be overlooked. It would be more appropriate to say that the series of events which took place in the first period of postwar Poland reveal the problems and obstacles faced in establishing their desired system of hegemonic communist rule.

著者

巽 由樹子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.249-272, 2008

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In Russia, the printing press began to develop rapidly during the era of the Great Reforms under the reign of Aleksandr II (1855-1881). At the same time, readership expanded, implying not only a rise in the number of readers but also a change in the readership structure. A. I. Reitblat analyzed this changing readership structure in his Ot Bovy k Bal'montu (Moscow, 1991), in which he divided readers into three groups: (1) intellectual readers (scholars, students, and intelligentsia) who read voluminous academic journals and polite literature; (2) semi-intellectual readers (merchants, middle and lower class officials, servants, intellectual workers, etc.) who read illustrated journals and popular novels; and (3) village readers (peasants and migrant workers) who read religious books, educational pamphlets, and lubki (booklets with illustrations and short texts on wood blocks or copper plates). His study provides important insight, particularly related to the inadequately studied Russian readership in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, his study has two shortcomings: One is that his scheme is too static to demonstrate the emergence of new readers and the accompanying change in the readership structure, and the other is that he relates each group of readers to one particular printing medium too clearly. This paper aims to resolve these problems and further explore the readership analysis of the period after the Great Reforms. For this purpose, we will examine Russian public libraries, one of the main institutions through which books were circulated in those days. First, we will examine the history and environment of Russian public libraries. The process of the establishment of libraries in the Russian Empire comprised three phases: (1) gubernskie publichnye biblioteki (provincial public libraries) in the 1830s and 1840s, (2) obshchestvennye or gorodskie biblioteki (society libraries or city libraries) in the period 1860-1890, and (3) narodnye biblioteki (libraries for the common people) in the 1890s. Geographically, the public libraries were spread across provincial cities (gubernskie goroda) in the 1830s and 1840s, county towns (uezdnye goroda) in the period 1860-1890, and to villages in the 1890s. However, they served as information repositories only for Russian users. Studying public libraries provides us with useful material for solving the two problems mentioned above. The first point concerns the social ranks of readers. They were recorded in the libraries' annual reports and provide us with the following concrete evidence on the process of the expansion of readership: The small group of the nobility and clergy in the 1830s and 1840s expanded to encompass merchants and townspeople in the period 1860-1890, and further to include peasants and workers in the 1890s. Second, we examine the emergence of various readers' groups. Library reports proved that new reading practices such as "light reading" and reading popular novels and illustrated journals appeared after the era of the Great Reforms. Librarians contrasted these practices with those of "serious reading" and reading polite literature and voluminous academic journals. The reports indicated that none of the readers' groups were directly related to a particular medium; instead, readers from various social ranks gradually made a transition from serious reading to light reading. We conclude that in the second half of the nineteenth century, reading in Russia was not limited only to the privileged classes, as is evident from the changing readership structure. Moreover, in the words of J. Habermas, we can consider the readers with new reading habits as "a culture-consuming public." Thus, it can be concluded that the expansion of readership is one of the important phenomena that occurred during the change of the social structure in nineteenth-century Russia.

著者

横手 慎二

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.41-69, 1982