著者

橋本 伸也 野村 真理 小森 宏美 吉岡 潤 福田 宏 姉川 雄大 梶 さやか

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2013-04-01

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東中欧諸国・ロシアで深刻の度を増している第二次世界大戦と社会主義時代の歴史と記憶をめぐる政治化と紛争化について、現地調査や国際研究集会の開催などを通じて、実相解明を進めた。6回の国内研究会の開催、個別研究論文の執筆に加えて、2014年度にはエストニアのタリン大学で夏季ワークショップを開催して成果をproceedingsとして公開するとともに、2015年には関西学院大学で国際会議を開催して、東アジアの歴史認識紛争との対比により問題構造の多元的把握に努めた。研究代表者の単著(既刊)や雑誌特集号に加えて、2017年中に国際的な論集と研究分担者らの執筆した共著書2点の刊行が決まっている。

著者

剣持 久木 近藤 孝弘 西山 暁義 川喜田 敦子 吉岡 潤

出版者

静岡県立大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2012-04-01

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本研究では、ドイツ、ポーランド、フランス各地で、歴史博物館、教科書対話そして学術交流の現状を視察し、各国から専門家を招請して、数多くのシンポジウムを開催してきた。その結果、ヨーロッパ公共圏の形成の展望とともに、現在依然存在している限界の実情も確認できた。本研究の成果は、2016年度中に公刊予定の論文集に掲載する予定である。そこでは、独仏(西山)、独ポ(吉岡)国境地域の歴史博物館、ドイツ(川喜田)とフランス(剣持)における歴史教養番組、さらには歴史娯楽教育(近藤)の分析に加えて、ドイツ、ポーランド、フランスの研究者からの寄稿も予定している。

著者

篠原 琢 戸谷 浩 吉岡 潤 割田 聖史 青島 陽子 古谷 大輔 小森 宏美 秋山 晋吾 中澤 達哉 小山 哲 池田 嘉郎 平田 武 梶 さやか

出版者

東京外国語大学

雑誌

基盤研究(A)

巻号頁・発行日

2010-04-01

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本プロジェクトは、ポーランド=リトアニア連合王国(ロシア帝国西部諸県)、ハプスブルク帝国、沿バルト地域を中心に、近世から現代にいたるネーション、およびナショナリズムの動態を分析してきた。ここでは近世から20世紀にいたる各時代の政治社会におけるネーションの多次元的な機能と構成が分析された。近世期のネーションは、多様な政治的、文化的文脈で構築され、さまざまな価値と関連付けられ、ネーション理解は単一の政治社会に収斂しない。近代のネーションは政治社会における多様な交渉を全的に文脈化する傾向をもつ。本研究は個別研究と比較史の方法で境界地域におけるこの過程を明らかにした。

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.67-93, 2001

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After World War II Poland experienced a drastic change in the ethno-national composition of the state as a result of the exclusion of national minorities following the shift of her frontiers. The new Polish-Soviet frontier follows quite closely the so-called Curzon line that was considered as the ethnographical borderline between Poles and Ukrainians. In consequence of this shift of frontiers most Ukrainians, the largest national minority in prewar Poland, found themselves on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, or Soviet Ukraine, while it is estimated that there remained as many as 700,000 Ukrainians on the Polish side. By the summer of 1947, these Ukrainians had been excluded from Polish society. The purpose of this article is to examine how the Ukrainian minority problem was settled in postwar Poland and to demonstrate the decisive role played by the Communists in this settlement. At first, resettlements of Ukrainians were carried out on the authority of an agreement on the exchange of populations concluded by the Polish Committee of National Liberation, or the Lublin Committee, with Soviet Ukraine on September 9, 1944. It was stated in the agreement that Poles and Jews who had been citizens of Poland before September 17, 1939 and were living in Soviet Ukraine could be evacuated to Poland. Correspondingly, Ukrainians living in postwar Poland could choose Soviet citizenship and move into Soviet Ukraine. Moreover, according to the agreement, the transfers were to be voluntary. In the course of the implementation of the agreement, however, the Polish authorities, the core of which consisted of Communists, set about to deport Ukrainians, abandoning the principle of free will. When the deportations were completed in the summer of 1946, a total of 482,000 Ukrainians, many of these forcibly, had left their homeland and had been deported to Soviet Ukraine. The second and "final" act of the solution of the "Ukrainian problem" in Poland was Operation "Vistula" executed by the Polish Army with Communist political support. The aim of this operation was to resettle the whole of the remaining Ukrainians including mixed marriage families in ex-German territories allotted to Poland, or the Recovered Territories, where they were planned to be dispersed so as not to form their own community. They were expected to assimilate quickly into Polish society there. Operation "Vistula" began on April 28, 1947 under the pretext that the whole Ukrainian population was collectively responsible for the assassination of the Vice-Minister of Defense by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or the UPA. By the end of July, Operation "Vistula" resettled about 140,000 Ukrainians. In this way the "Ukrainian problem" in postwar Poland was solved by force. Such thorough exclusion of Ukrainians to the extent it could be called "ethnic cleansing" can be explained by a historical factor, that is, the long-standing antagonism between the two nations. It was above all World War II which sharpened national consciousness among these ruled nations and aggravated this antagonism. Memories of the bloody conflict in Volhynia that had entangled Polish and Ukrainian civilians as well as combatants made it difficult to live together in one state. But it is important to bear in mind that the Communists were the executors of the exclusion policy. The Communists, who had seized power lacking the support from the masses, came to call themselves the defenders of Polish national interests, propagandizing the danger of "German revanchism," "Ukrainian anti-Polish armed bandits," etc. For them the settlement of national conflicts in favor of the Polish nation was one of the most effective means to legitimize their power. In the process of the establishment of their rule, they revealed an orientation to a homogeneous Polish nation-state. In this sense, Ukrainians were sort of a scapegoat. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the Communists saw signs of opposition from the Ukrainians. In spite of pressure from the Polish authorities they wished to remain in Poland while clinging to their own national identity. They demanded equal rights, national freedom and even the right to set up a Ukrainian political party during negotiations with Polish authorities on July 24, 1945. These demands seemed to have been excessive to the Communists, who were then on the way to hegemony and were building a quasi-plural party system which they would control as they pleased. The exclusion of Ukrainians was also a manifestation of the Communists' totalitarian character that would not permit the existence of opponents. And Ukrainians were one of a great many opponents at which the Communists struck a finishing blow. When the "Ukrainian problem" in postwar Poland is taken into consideration, particular attention must be given to the above-mentioned factors which were intertwined with each other. To ignore any of them would mean to miss the point of the whole structure of the problem.

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

東欧史研究会

雑誌

東欧史研究 (ISSN:03866904)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.103, 2019 (Released:2022-06-09)

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

東欧史研究会

雑誌

東欧史研究 (ISSN:03866904)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.48-55, 2002 (Released:2019-04-14)

著者

吉岡潤

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究

巻号頁・発行日

no.48, 2001

著者

吉岡 潤

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.52, pp.1-37, 2005

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This article examines political dynamics in Poland immediately after World War II, paying particular attention to the multiparty system in that period and the communists' policies toward non-communist parties. Postwar Poland started in July 1944 with the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin Committee) in which the communists exercised hegemonic power. The Lublin Committee and its successor, the Provisional Government, were nominal coalition governments that consisted of four parties: the communist Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Peasant Party (SL), and the Democratic Party (SD). Postwar Poland was initially characterized by coalition government and political pluralism, which both the domestic and foreign environment made necessary. As for the latter, the Soviet Union had in particular elaborated a "national front" strategy in order to help weak communists in Eastern Europe to participate in postwar administrations, a strategy which was intended to relax the Western Allies' vigilance against the establishment of puppet communist governments. In Poland, the communists, who seized power in spite of their lack of mass support and who, at the same time, had to follow the Soviet "national front" strategy, created for themselves their "allied" parties and adopted their prewar party names. In this "multiparty" system, which this article calls "the Lublin system," the communists allowed only those who accepted the hegemony of the PPR and had no intention to struggle for hegemonic power to be an allied partner. They carefully nipped in the bud any intention by their "allies" to be independent. It was often the case that they used the "plug," the party member dispatched to allied parties as an executive in order to control these parties. These tactics helped the communists to make the SL and the SD their satellite parties, though the excessive use of the "plug" tactic, which took the teeth out of the multiparty system, aroused criticism even in the PPR leadership. The formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity in June 1945, which was to be set up according to the Yalta agreement, together with the return of Mikołajczyk, the former prime minister of the Polish government in exile and an outstanding leader of the Polish peasant movement, caused a change in the Lublin system and the political situation as a whole in Poland. The communists made an effort to draw Mikołajczyk and his followers into their Lublin system, but he refused to be involved in a political framework initiated by the communists and founded a new party in substantial opposition, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), relying on wide support from the masses. Confronted with the challenge of the PSL, the communists tried to modify the Lublin system into a bipolar structure which would compel the PSL to play the role of the only legal opposition. In this way, they intended to limit the energy required in dealing with scattered targets in struggles for power. At the same time they continued efforts to induce the PSL into the platform of the Lublin system. They offered the PSL an electoral bloc which assured the PSL the same number of seats in the parliament as the PPR and the PPS would occupy, but again Mikołajczyk and his party refused to accept the proposal and decided to enter the general election on its own. In such a situation, the communists played for time by carrying out a referendum. The result of it, however, disappointed the communists, revealing a largely hostile attitude which forced them to falsify the official results in favor of the communists. This falsified referendum cast a shadow on the stability of the Lublin system, activating the socialists (PPS) who intended to mediate between the PPR and the PSL and, by doing so, find their way out of dependency on the communists. Facing such a crisis of the Lublin system, the communists reaffirmed the bipolar structure of the political scene and aimed both to shake the PSL and to bring the PPS back to their side by the time of the forthcoming general election. They succeeded at the latter task, but failed at the former. After recognizing the difficulty in reaching an agreement with Mikołajczyk, the communists decided to destroy the PSL by resorting to underhand means, including far more intensified violence. In the end, the general election was won by force. The collapse of the PSL marked the beginning of the last stage of a political pluralism which had somehow functioned within the limitations of the communist hegemony. It was indeed a significant step toward the establishment of a substantial single-party system in Poland, but this process did not proceed smoothly according to any blueprint. The political unification in postwar Poland was not a linear process of realization of the initial, clear and unchanging purpose of the communists, but rather the result of a series of reactions to circumstances the communists came up against. The political dynamics contributed by various elements, including non-communists, should not be overlooked. It would be more appropriate to say that the series of events which took place in the first period of postwar Poland reveal the problems and obstacles faced in establishing their desired system of hegemonic communist rule.