著者
山口 尚 YAMAGUCHI Sho
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, pp.19-30, 2019-09-16

本稿は〈リチャード・ダブル論〉と〈自由意志の概念工学への批判〉の二側面をもつ。すなわち本稿は、一方で、自由意志と道徳的責任の哲学における極端な相対主義者リチャード・ダブルの思想的発展を(1)非実在論の主張(2)メタ哲学的相対主義の提示(3)自由意志論の心理学化の提唱という三段階に分け、彼の全体的思想をアウトラインする。他方で、ダブルの立場の考察から《自由意志や道徳的責任に関する私たちの概念枠組みは簡単に改訂されうるものではない》という洞察が得られるのだが、かかる洞見はいわゆる「自由意志の概念工学」の理解を批判的に深めることに繋がる。本稿の終盤では、私たち自由意志の概念工学者が、或る意味で「十中八九、敗れ去る」ことが指摘される。そして、こうした限界を見据えることによって却って自由意志の概念工学の使命が明らかになる、と言いたい。
著者
森田 紘平 Morita Kohei
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, pp.9-18, 2019-08-08

GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics are typical interpretations of quantum mechanics. One of the problems for these interpretations arises from the gap of the space-dimensionality. Quantum mechanics is high dimensional, but its experiences appear in our three dimensional space. Primitive ontology has been proposed, in order to fill the gap, but Ney recently criticized this approach. Admittedly, the primitive ontology approach is not sufficient at all. But her criticism remains ambiguous, or at least not enough. Instead of her criticism, this article reveals that the main drawbacks for primitive ontology lie in the relationships with classical mechanics.
著者
Kureha Makoto
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, pp.1-8, 2019-04-05

In this paper, I make a consideration about the relationship between phenomenology and empirical sciences about conscious experience. Recently, it has been suggested by proponents of `naturalized phenomenology' that phenomenology and cognitive sciences should exchange with each other. This proposal prompts us to abandon the `puristic' conception of phenomenology, according to which phenomenology is independent from empirical sciences. I show that, though abandoning purism and exchanging with cognitive sciences is fruitful for phenomenology, proponents of naturalized phenomenology underemphasize an important feature of phenomenology -- its autonomy of a certain kind.
著者
伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21

This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.ファイル公開日:2018年6月21日
著者
伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21

This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.
著者
杉原 桂太 SUGIHARA Keita
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, pp.1-15, 2018-05-02

This paper examines ways to discuss various issues related to autonomous driving technology. These problems include the trolley problem, promotion or regulation of autonomous cars, and social receptivity to driverless cars. The author focuses on Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) as a forum to discuss these issues. The paper investigates concrete ways to host a CTA workshop for discussing these problems. Furthermore, the author draws attention to how philosophers can contribute to discussions on the issues surrounding autonomous driving technology.