著者
伊藤 遼
出版者
京都大学哲学論叢刊行会
雑誌
哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.別冊, pp.S37-S48, 2010
著者
伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21

This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.ファイル公開日:2018年6月21日
著者
伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
出版者
名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21

This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.