15 0 0 0 OA タイプ理論の起源と発展
- 著者
- 池田 真治 伊藤 遼 久木田 水生
- 出版者
- 京都大学哲学論叢刊行会
- 雑誌
- 哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.38, no.別冊, pp.S49-S60, 2011
4 0 0 0 OA 証明論的意味論とその課題
- 著者
- 伊藤 遼
- 出版者
- 京都大学哲学論叢刊行会
- 雑誌
- 哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.37, no.別冊, pp.S37-S48, 2010
1 0 0 0 OA 初期ラッセルの存在論における世界の十全な記述可能性
- 著者
- 伊藤 遼
- 出版者
- The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.53, no.2, pp.25-44, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)
- 参考文献数
- 27
A standard interpretation of Bertrand Russell’s early work on logic revolves around the doctrine of the unrestricted variable—the idea that the genuine variable of logic must range over all the objects in the universe. Those who endorse this interpretation view the doctrine as ‘the centerpiece’ of The Principles of Mathematics. My aim in this essay is to examine some of the given and possible grounds for this view. I attempt to show that Russell in that book does not endorse the doctrine as it stands but the idea that there are no objects that cannot, in principle, be fully described—the idea that there is no logical bar to making simply true judgments about objects.
1 0 0 0 OA 分析哲学のいわゆる「心理学的起源」について
- 著者
- 伊藤 遼
- 出版者
- 日本哲学会
- 雑誌
- 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2021, no.72, pp.67-78, 2021-04-01 (Released:2021-05-20)
- 参考文献数
- 12
- 著者
- 上ヶ谷 友佑 白川 晋太郎 伊藤 遼 大谷 洋貴
- 出版者
- 一般社団法人 日本科学教育学会
- 雑誌
- 日本科学教育学会年会論文集 45 (ISSN:21863628)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- pp.535-538, 2021 (Released:2021-12-20)
- 参考文献数
- 10
本稿の目的は,「推論主義」と呼ばれる現代哲学に基づき,生徒達にとって既知の概念をさらに発達させていくような数学的タスクのデザインの原理を開発することである.より具体的には,推論主義の示す資格保存的推論/コミットメント保存的推論といった実質推論の考え方を用いて,数学の授業における問題解決の様相を特徴付けることを試み,生徒達がどんな場面でどんな風に推論することが概念発達に寄与するのかを検討した.結果,次の3点が原理として導出された.[1] より概念化させたい既知の概念を2つ以上定める.[2] 本来はある概念の適用が有効であるにもかかわらず,思わず別の概念を適用してしまうようなタスクを設計する.[3] 生徒同士でなぜ自分がそのアプローチを選んだのかを議論させたならば,自分がどんな条件の下でどんなアプローチを使用しているのかを明示化する必要性が生じ,概念化が促進される.
1 0 0 0 IR ブラッドリーの判断論と初期ラッセルの判断概念
- 著者
- 伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
- 出版者
- 名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
- 雑誌
- Nagoya journal of philosophy
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21
This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.ファイル公開日:2018年6月21日
1 0 0 0 OA ブラッドリーの判断論と初期ラッセルの判断概念
- 著者
- 伊藤 遼 Ito Ryo
- 出版者
- 名古屋大学情報科学研究科情報創造論講座
- 雑誌
- Nagoya journal of philosophy
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.13, pp.16-25, 2018-06-21
This paper is an attempt to cast light on an idea shared by F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell even after the latter revolted against the former's monistic idealism. I argue that both accepted, at least when the latter completed A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, the idea that every judgment has a state of affairs as its content, where a state of affairs is understood as part of the universe that can be described by a declarative sentence. First, I attempt to show that Russell's tacit acceptance of the idea underlies his claim, developed in the commentary on Leibniz, that if every judgment comprises a subject and a predicate, there can be at most one substance. I then turn to Bradley's thought, arguing that the idea is an immediate consequence of the central tenet of his theory of judgment: every judgment ascribes a universal to reality. Finally, to show that he was indeed aware of the consequence, I introduce what he called the 'problem of error'.