- 著者
-
辰沼 広吉
- 出版者
- 慶應義塾大学体育研究所
- 雑誌
- 体育研究所紀要 (ISSN:02866951)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.15, no.1, pp.p1-6, 1975-12
Introduction: While climbing mountains, the direct object is nature, therefore, consideration is given to the methods of recognition of nature, subjects to which recognition is to be given and techniques by which such recognition is to be exerted. Main subjects: 1) Recognition of physical nature As to the recognition of nature, we have a great number of discourses written since many years ago. Here, I like to take up the subjects of perceptive recognition; they are "Material" such as mountains, ice, snow, etc. which are commonly experienced, and can be seen and touched by us. These perceptive subjects are recognized as those in which sensory subjects are consolidated. These subjects represent the physically so-called facts which are observed directly and macrospically. Observations of this kind can average the movements of molecules which vary considerably. In some cases the difference in movements is large enough to make it enable to record only the general non-equilibrial error as if in the case of the movement of an object. If further studies are given to sensory subjects which are the most simple sensory subjects, objects are classified as chemical substances into objects of various kinds, and further divided into molecules and atoms. However, these physical subjects are static compound substances of molecules having the average invariability during a certain minimal period of time. However, as long as the mathematical power of probability theory is applied, we must know that there is a gap between the existence of such compound substances and the overall fact. Consequently, if a macroscopic method is used in the observation of nature, for example, an avalanche fall down to low places, which is an invariable fact. However, if consideration is given by using a microscopic method, we must be ready for admitting the limits of recognition as long as the theory of probability as existence is introduced. 2) Subjects of recognition The recognition of nature is the recognition from within nature, and the consciousness of natural relationships. Although the theory is classic, the mental phenomenon of a person who recognizes is a fact and at the same time has a meaning and value. Natural phenomena are facts and things happened. Firstly, natural phenomena and occurrences are observed by innate subjectivity which is represented by mathematics or theory. In this case experiences cannot escape from uncertainty. Especially, even if correctness is proved physically, it is not possible to include objectively all natural environmental conditions. What is called fate seems to call on us by chance, however, this is not true; in many cases we are visited by fate because we do not know all the causes which control it. Microscopically, it is impossible to predict exactly the location of an electron; it seems that the same probability theory is controlling, however, there is an essential difference in this case. Secondly, experiences are known as they really were, and foresighted recognition cannot be able to foresee exactly everything which will happen in the future. Here, there is a gap between experiences and foresighted recognition ; uncertainty of measurement is explained simply as what is unknown. As long as what has been said is admitted, it cannot but be said to be subjective. Results of observations rather show possibility than mathematical facts; this possibility will merely allow a probable conclusion as to some of future results. However, important is human relations with the general order, and in order to avoid partial contingency, it is essential to move by looking at the general order. Thirdly, the subject of recognition is the personality which points meaning and value to natural phenomena, and is the experiential subject which grasps historical and social actualities. For instance, mountain-climbing acts are moved by some motive, and mountains are climbed because the act is liked. Nextly, there is a process where the meaning and value are considered; and further, it is usual that danger makes its appearance. It is at this point that value and danger are often weighed, and as a result, an attitude to permit danger of some degree is generated naturally. 3) Techniques and the subject-environment medium (Description is omitted). Conclusion: Mountain climbing acts should in principle be made by recognizing macroscopically the order of nature in accordance with the law of cause and effect. On the other hand, inevitability and contingency must be recognized by means of the method to recognize from the microscopic standpoint, however, efforts should theoretically be made so as to make contingency naught. For men, as experiential subjects, it is difficult to recognize nature because they are part of it. However, apart from this problem, as long as we climb mountains because we are fond of mountain-climbing, it is very difficult for us to escape from the act, a historical reality, from the viewpoint of inevitability. Accordingly, efforts should always be made to fill up the experiential gap by means of pursuing scientifically the causes which control partial contingency. While, if viewed from the hisorical reality point, the established social structure and its process of dynamic progress are inevitably urging us to climb mountains. This is the inevitable tendency prevailing among the mountain climbers of today. In some cases they, due to the over-recognition of value or the temporary sense of excitement, may take a process in which they as men forget the joy of living in the midst of nature. In order to prevent disorder caused by such things as partial contingency, we are required to act properly by respecting order and by recognizing the importance of relations between human beings and the order of nature. Mountain climbings ought to be made by the liking of man and based on scientific investigations, however, the present tendency is that people climb mountains under conditions in which some of danger is involved, this is the reality.