著者

長谷川 岳男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.12-24, 2010-03-24

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Fustel de Coulange considered that ancient Greeks had never had any private spheres in their poleis and the polls was a fusion of state and society. In the entry 'polis' in the 3^<rd> edition of OCD 0. Murray basically followed his ideas and gave Sparta as a typical example. Thus the general understanding seems to have been that polis could not be translated as 'state'. M. Hansen, however, argued against taking Sparta as a typical case and insisted that there was a differentiation between public and private spheres in Athens and many other poleis and consequently concluded that we may view a polis as similar to a modern state. However S. Hodkinson, as part of his studies aimed at rescuing Sparta from a 'fossilized society' themepark and normalizing her position as a polis, objected to the idea that Sparta was a polis where the state and society were inseparably fused together. He argued that Xenophon showed no clear cases of Spartan authorities taking active control over every aspect of Spartan citizens' life in his Lakedaimonion Politeia which is the most credible source concerning the Classical Spartan society. Moreover, building on Humble's thesis that the characteristic feature of Spartan citizens was not σωψροσυνη but αιδωζ, it seems that Spartan citizens were only careful how they behaved in public spaces and in private they could do as they pleased. Therefore it can be recognized that there was a distinction between the public and private sphere in Sparta. Indeed, not only Xenophon, but also Thucydides painted the picture of the Spartan society as a system of voluntary corporations among citizens rather than one of severe controls over them. Hodkinson then insisted that there was no social control on the part of the Spartan authorities, but only social pressure from the citizens themselves within their society. I agree with his conclusion regarding the importance of social pressure in Sparta, but I do not think that there was no social control over the citizens, because the existence of social pressure reveals the existence of Gramsci's theory of the 'hegemony'. I think it is a flaw in Hodkinson's argumentations that he did not point clearly to the substance of the authorities in Sparta so that the reality of social control became obscured. In order to complement his contention, I would introduce the thesis on which Berent insisted in a series of articles, namely, that a polls is not a state but a stateless society. A polis did not have the public coercive power so that Greeks had to devise ways to keep order in their polis and prevent an outbreak of a stasis. If we are right to perceive a polis as a stateless society, it followed that it was of paramount importance for Greeks to reach consensus on public matters. As a result, politics became entangled with ethical considerations and education which internalized ethics became important. In consideration of this context, the images of Spartan society seem fit for achieving consensus among its citizens, the fact that made it an object of high esteem among other Greeks. We should realize from this conclusion that a polis was not a monolithic entity and that it was susceptible to being torn apart because of the lack of public coercive power, and that Sparta (and Athens) were exceptional in preserving their stability.

著者

高橋 宏幸

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.44, pp.96-108, 1996

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This paper reexamines an inconsistency considering the fatal spear in the Cephalus-Procris episode in Met. 7 : one of the companions of Cephalus says that the spear flies back spontaneously after hitting the target, whereas it remains stuck in Procris at the ending of the story told by Cephalus. It will be suggested that the inconsistency hints at a transformation of the story as narrated by Cephalus. I have observed three recurrent story patterns in the episode : someone (thing)comes back after being lost(or gone) (P1) ; a rumor is believed before eventually turning out to be false(P2) ; happiness follows a disaster (P3). P1 fails only at the ending, where Procris dies, never to return. This failure of P1 corresponds to the inconsistency about the spear, since its power to fly back after launched exactly matches P1, whereas it did not return when piercing Procris. Why not an ending that would imply a return of Procris, in accord with P1? We note that there is no metamorphosis of a main character in the episode, that the spear is almost identical to Procris with regard to fate (7531, 846) , beauty(679, 730) , and name(Procris<procuris ; cf. Fasti 2.477), and that mirabere(682)is one of the words suggestive of metamorphosis(cf. mirandum 758). Seeing these points, it would not be quite hard to imagine that, the moment Procris dies, her soul enters the spear to give it the miracle power, so that, every time Cephalus launches the spear, it would come back into his hands, as she did in her life. This would have happened, if only Procris had not emitted her soul in the mouth of Cephalus(861) , but into the spear. With this ending by metamorphosis, the inconsistency about the spear would not have occurred, since it obtained its power after she died, but, instead, an eternal, spiritual union of the couple would have been achieved, quite a suitable finish for the story of mutual love (800). Considering P2 and P3, we should note that Cephalus echoes the phrases in the Orithyia story in Bk. 6(esp., 681f.). When Cephalus comments that he was said(dicebar 698)to be happy, he seems to presume that such a rumor is prevalent(cf. also 694), coming from the story told in Bk. 6. He rejects it as untrue with his tragic story, which fits in P2, but, it would be different with the ending by metamorphosis, which implies a kind of bliss for Cephalus as Procris' spear never goes without returning as if to ease his bad conscience, granting pardon for his wrongdoing. This version would match P3, and support the rumor of Cephalus' happy marriage with Procris. Then, we may assume that Cephalus did not speak of the metamorphosis because he intended to deny the rumor about his marriage, and I think this is where the inconsistency arises. What, then, was his motivation? On his arrival at Aegina he was spectabilis hews, which is a reminiscence of what he looked like(496f.), and Procris, when dying, was looking at him as long as possible(dumque aliquid spectare potest, me spectat 860). Then, after she exhales her soul(if exhaled into the spear, there would have been the metamorphosis), that is, at the end of his story, Cephalus appears as lacrimans hews (863). It looks as if, instead of narrating the metamorphosis of Procris, Cephalus himself has transformed from a good-looking hero into a hero in tears. Why, then, in tears? Presumably because it is a mark of great heroes, to Cephalus' eyes. In fact, Cephalus is presenting himself as a great hero like Odysseus or Aeneas, not only in his marital or tragic love as pointed out by Labate and Segal, but also in his story-telling, which takes place at the palace of a king(or queen), whose assistance the hero needs to return home, as in Od. Bks. 8-12 and Aen. Bks. 2-3. It is such an enchanting tale of his own sufferings that causes all listeners to cry. A tragic story like this, which enables Cephalus to play a role of great hero, would have been ruined if he had told of the metamorphosis of Procris, which would have made her a heroine, with him serving as a foil. This is, it seems, where his motivation lies : to make himself a hero, not her. Returning to the inconsistency about the spear, we should note that "nullo referente" (684)can be translated as "as nobody(else)tells it" (also note the frequent use of referre in the story), and that "in ore"(861)can mean "spoken" as in 1.708. Here it seems to be implied that the metamorphosis of Procris goes unspoken as nobody tells that story, while Cephalus stands out as a great tragic hero as a tearful tale of his own is put in his mouth.

著者

牛田 徳子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, pp.19-31, 1983

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The most important locus classicus of the 'Third Man Argument' (TMA) in Corpus Aristotelicum is found in the Sophistici Elenchi(178b36-179a10). There the TMA, the last example of sophistical refutations depending on the form of expression, is said to presuppose the admission that the common predicate, like 'man', expresses, because of its form, just what is a 'this' (hoper tode ti), that is, the substantial essence of a being (e.g. Callias) , in spite of the very fact that it expresses a quality, a quantity or some one of the other non-substantial attributes. Depending on Alexander's report of the lost work De Ideis and on his comment on Metaphysics 991a2 ff. that the Platonic Form is a 'universal' essentially predicable of individuals, many scholars explain Aristotle's TMA as follows : that which produces the 'third man' is the individualisation of the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars. This interpretation has nothing to do with the TMA above in the Soph. El. which will then assert that 'the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars' does produce the 'third man' without the 'individualisation' of that predicate, for any universal expressing an attribute, once admitted that it expresses an essence, will produce something like a third essence. The TMA in the Soph. El. depending on the similar form of expression of things that are not categorially the same, can be elucidated by a passage from the Topics (103b27-39) which distinguishes two kinds of 'what-is-it' expressions, the intercategorial and the categorial. By the former, one can give the species-genus definition to whatever the given being is, e.g. man, white, a foot length, the latter two of which are not substances, while that definition does not express any categorial 'what-is-it' (the substantial essence), but a quality or a quantity or some one of the other attributes. The truth is then as follows. That which the Form and the particulars have in common is not the eidos qua substantial form, but the eidos qua species (Met. 1059a13) whose one logos is predicated both of the Form and of the particulars as synonymous entities, so that it is limited to setting forth differentiae -a sort of 'quality' {Met. 1020a34)- to the question "what is the species 'man'?", differentiae specific and generic ('biped', 'sensitive' and so on) which are valid to all individual members belonging to the species 'man', but not valid to a substance like Callias himself, endowed with the essence identical with himself. That which causes the TMA is, therefore, to assimilate the inter-categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is in fact an attributive expression, to the categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is, according to Aristotle, the only substantial expression. Aristotle's criticism of the theory of Forms, therefore, does not consist in the following: in spite of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms which makes it express the individual, should recognize not only the second being, but the third being both having the same essence as the sublunary beings, but in the following: because of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms making it express the essence should recognize not only the second, but the third being both having the same attribute as the sublunary beings. By the first formula of criticism one could be inclined to think that Aristotle purports to emphasize the idealistic character in the theory of Forms, while in the second to see Aristotle's tactics to make the Forms 'universalized attributes'-accidental phenomena-separated from the sublunary substances, which inverts the very relation of Paradeigmata of that world and eidola of this world.

著者

藤沢 令夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.1-19, 1973-03-20

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Although Aristotle's view in the Protr. on the nature of philosophy may, generally speaking, be called anti-Isocratic and Platonic in character, this paper, by analysing esp. Frr. 5, 12 and 13, traces Aristotle's real intention in his conception of philosophy as the following: (I) There are two distinct provinces of knowledge (επισγημη=ψρονησιζ) , each of which is different from the other in its function and character, viz., (1) Knowledge that deals with 'nature and the rest of reality' (Fr. 5), i. e. ,'philosophy' (Fr. 13), which is 'theoretical' and 'good' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (2) Knowledge that deals with 'the just and the expedient' or 'the virtue of the soul' (Fr. 5), i. e. 'politics' or 'legislation' (Fr. 13), which is practical and 'useful for our human life' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (II) The relation between (1) and (2) is such that knowledge-(2) requires knowledge- (1) as the basis for its work (cf. προσδεονται ιλοσοψιαζ, Fr. 13) ; the task of knowledge- (2) should be performed 'in accordance with' (κατα) knowledge-(1) ; or the norms by reference to which the task of knowledge- (2) is to be performed should be 'taken from' (απο) nature and truth itself which are the proper objects of knowledge- (1) . The contrast, then, between Aristotle's position in the Protr. and those of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his later treatises may be described as follows: (A) The difference from Isocrates will be obvious to every interpreter since he confines the task of philosophy to the realm of (2) which he thinks can be grasped only as 'doxa' (not as 'knowledge'). (B) While Aristotle in his later years (Eth. Nic. Bks. Z, K, etc.) comes to make a sharp separation of the province of (2) (which alone is called ψρονησιζ and concerned with that which is contingent) from that of (1) (which is called επιστημη and concerned with that which is necessary), he in the Proty. is still making (2) related to (1) (by κατα, απο etc.) and using the term ψρονησιζ to cover both. This must be called a radical difference in the sense that Jaeger once argued. (C) The relationship between the two kinds of knowledge, (meta) physical (1) and ethical (2), may seem to reflect a Platonic character; but in fact it involves an entirely un-Platonic distinction, the distinction, that is, between the good (αγαθον)belonging to theoretical knowledge and the useful (ωψελιμον, χρησιμον) belonging to practical knowledge. And, whereas for Plato Being and Value, knowledge and action, coalesce in the contemplation of the Forms, so that knowledge- (1) is at the same time knowledge- (2), Aristotle in the Protr. is virtually thinking of knowledge- (1) as the proper function of human intellect, of which knowledge- (2) is only secondary and derivative and can in consequence be dispensed with in certain conditions. This difference of thought, which again must surely be considered a radical one, is strikingly shown by comparing two philosophers' descriptions of the state of pure bliss in an ideal life: the life of the gods in 'the place beyond the heavens' (Phaedrus 247 AB) and the life of the inhabitants of 'the Isles of the Blest' (Protr. Fr. 12). In the former passage the Forms of ethical virtue such as 'Justice' and 'Temperance' are mentioned as ones which nourish and prosper the souls of the gods, but in the latter it is said that all the ethical virtues are not present since they are no longer needed and there remains nothing but theoretical knowledge- (1). In submitting these points the present writer departs significantly from the views of I. During, E. de Strycker, S. Mansion, and J. D. Monan as well as W. Jaeger.

著者

井上 文則

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.84-94, 2004

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In 1903 E Ritterling put forward a new theory the emperor Gallienus created four independent cavalry corps, all under the control of one commander Aureolus This theory was developed by A Alfoldi who used coins as a historical source to argue that these four independent cavalry corps were converted into the central cavalry corps stationed at Milan Alfoldi's argument was generally accepted However, H G Simon recently rebutted it and denied the existence of such corps on the grounds that the main Greek sources concerning Gallienus' reform of cavalry are unreliable In this paper, I examine Gallienus' supposed reform of cavalry to clarify the military system of the Roman Empire in the mid-third century First, I attempt to reconstruct the career of Aureolus who is key to understanding cavalry reform According to the Greek sources, Aureolus was commander of the central cavalry corps at the time of his rebellion against Gallienus But there are many inconsistencies in the Greek sources and further the Latin historian Aurelius Victor said that Aureolus was commanding the army in Raetia when he revolted In Simon's view, the Latin source is more reliable and he reinterprets the Greek sources to reconcile them with the Latin source Since his interpretation seems unconvincing, I here propose another solution to this problem I argue that Aureolus was the commander of the central cavalry corps at the time of Gallienus' war against Postumus in 265, not in 268 and that after concluding the war Aureolus remained in Raetia to defend the invasion of Postumus into Italy I observe that there is no evidence for the existence of the central cavalry corps except the title of Aureolus Rather it is recognized that independent cavalry corps, such as the Dalmatian cavalry corps, played a prominent part in many battles Moreover there were some independent cavalry corps not included into the central cavalry corps, though it is commonly said that they are all created to form it Form these observations, I suggest that Gallienus originally intended to create the independent cavalry corps and the central cavalry corps was temporarily formed from the independent cavalry corps which happened to be under the direct command of the emperor To understand the real significance of the independent cavalry corps, it is necessary to consider to the phenomenon that prior to the cavalry reform, Roman legion, which mainly consisted of infantry, divided into the vexillatio for independent use By creating a new cavalry unit corresponding with vexillatio, Gallienus probably intended to form mobile field forces, containing both cavalry and infantry I can find it not only under the direct command of the emperor but also deployed by other military commanders elsewhere It seems probable that such military condition in the mid-third century shaped Diocletian's later policy to divide the Roman Empire into four parts

著者

水野 有庸

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, pp.86-108, 1966-03-28

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The contents of this book have long been regarded as a 'theory of propositions', to be naturally placed between the Cat. and the Anal. Pr. -a traditional view originated by the ancient Greek commentators and Boethius, and still presupposed more or less uncritically by most modern scholars. On the other hand, a conventionalism has given currency to 'De Interpretatione' as the title, leaving unsolved the question what 'ερμηνεια' really means; for upon the validity of the definition of 'interpretatio' by Boethius (I.p. 215), though in reality a merely tautological definition, no doubt has been thrown, while the valuable though short and minute suggestion on that point by Waitz (Organon I. pp. 323 sq.) has in fact been neglected. According to the present author our work does not treat of propositions (προτασει&b.sigmav;), of abstract entities, like the Analytics, for the ονομα and ρημα are essentially different from the two οροι that are homogeneous and can easily be represented by alphabetical signs, and we can find nothing of a copula here. Again, instead of a proposition, it is a λογο&b.sigmav;, though of a particular kind, which forms the main subject of our work, and this λογο&b.sigmav; retains such concreteness that it cannot be separated from our ordinary thinking and verbal processes. This way of looking at the λογο&b.sigmav; is precisely shown when it is laid down as an αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (one must think of the phrase 'γνωμην vel δοξαν αποφαινεοθαι'), when it is defined to be a φωνη σηματικη καγα συνθηκην and when 'ο λογο&b.sigmav; λεγων οτι…' is made to correspond strictly to η δαξα η δοξαζονσα οπι…', etc. Besides, 'καγαφασι&b.sigmav;', 'αποφασι&b.sigmav;' and 'αντιφασι&b.sigmav;' ought to be construed with a stress on '-φασι&b.sigmav;'. The peculiar relation of the λογο&b.sigmav; in our work to the πραγμα, or the peculiar extent to which this λογο&b.sigmav; is true, reveals much in this respect, much which is characteristic of the way of thinking and its verbal expression which does not rise above the level of laymen. The relevant points are as follows: (i) The attack against the Megarics in Ch. 9 results substantially in indicating that the power of knowledge corresponding to the αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (though the special αποφανσι&b.sigmav; related to future contingents) can be no επιοτημη since the latter is always true and has only the necessaries for its objects. (ii) Every καγαφασι&b.sigmav; or every αποφαοι&b.sigmav; is is necessarily either true or false and can be neither above nor below that; it is therefore a λογο&b.sigmav; of δοξα or υποληψι&b.sigmav; indeed, but just by being precisely half-true (so to speak), it makes known the πραγμα with the perfection highest possible on this limited and lower epistemological level and with such distinctness as 'either so or not'. (iii) Ch. 11 also, where such an av ripaols plays no role, keeps the same thing in view. The discrimination between the καγα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; and the καθ αυτο does not explicitly lead to a higher-order consideration, e.g. that on the nature of the δοξα and iεπιοτημη, but is performed within the lower range of inquiry, i.e. in the form of an inquiry whether or not a given φασι&b.sigmav; can be regarded as having unity. The recondite question is adapted for beginners of philosophy and something of Aristotle's protreptic intention might be concealed here. Such being the character of the whole contents, the title to be given might be expected to run: 'on Elucidation of realities in laymen's language'; and that is the meaning of 'ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ. But some attestation from other sources is required which may confirm that the term ερμηνεια was in use in at least analogically the same cases. When it is realities (various as they are in kind case by case) which are elucidated, and the elucidation is neither more nor less complete than it can be under such and such unavoidable conditions, and its means are nothing but verbal expression-then that elucidation is signified by the term ερμηνεα or the like (Pl. Resp. 524 b, Tht. 209a; Arist. Po. 1450b13-14, SE 166b11). Further, at Arist. Top. 139b12, the ερμηνεια is closely connected with the oaprlveia indispensable for general intelligibility, and it is especially at Pindar o1. 2.86 that it is a thing for laymen. That its σαφηνεια is pregnant with a secret intention of elevating other people's minds is seen at Diog. Apoll. fr. 1 and Diog. Laert. 9.7. Thus we may conclude that the extant title rather characterizes the philosophical level and purpose, than simply summarizes the contents, of the work, and that, apart from the history of the manuscripts and pertinent records, it is not impossible that Aristotle should himself have attached the title.

著者

藤井 崇

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.84-95, 2011-03-23

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The aim of the present paper is to investigate into the imperial cult performed on Roman Cyprus, placing a special emphasis on the so-called Cypriot oath to emperor Tiberius preserved in a Greek inscription from the Aphrodite sanctuary of Paphos Vetus (T. B. Mitford, A Cypriot Oath of Allegiance to Tiberius, JRS 50(1960), 75-79). In the oath, the Cypriots swore to the goddess Roma, Tiberius and his family at the accession of the emperor to the throne in 14. After providing an overview of studies on the imperial cult and of the Cypriot oath, the present paper tackles the oath and its text from the following three viewpoints: the theoi horkioi, i.e., the guarantor deities of the oath; the oath and the imperial cult; and the context of the oath. The Cypriot oath to Tiberius, though fragmentary in part, provides us with some fascinating insights into the religious status of the emperor on the island, the rituals of the imperial cult, and the religious and political communication between the centre and the province. The elaborately structured list of the theoi horkioi not only connects the local deities with the communal and Roman deities of greater importance, but also places Augustus and his descendants into the local context of Cyprus by means of representing the first emperor as an offspring of Aphrodite, patroness of the city of Paphos and of the island as a whole. The living emperor Tiberius also received the cultic veneration of the Cypriots, though his religious status was modified 'downwards' by means of depriving him of the epithet theos and including the goddess Roma in the objects of the final clause, which would pertain to the sacrifice to the emperor. The practice of the oath was perhaps focused on the city of Paphos, which retained the Aphrodite sanctuary and (probably) that of Hestia; however, this does not mean that the Paphians drafted and performed the oath exclusively for their own purposes and that the other cities were excluded from it. The Cypriot oath is probably a 'provincial-civic' oath in which all communities on the island participated. The oath would have involved communication between the Cypriots and the imperial power (imperial agents and the emperor himself), e.g., through the supervision of the oath by proconsules and the dispatch of a delegation to the emperor. The oath, therefore, offered the occasion for a communicative network between the Cypriots in the provincial capital and other communities, imperial agents, and the emperor himself at the religious and political levels.

著者

和田 廣

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.67-74, 1976-03-31

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Im allgemeinen hat man bisher fur bewiesen gehalten, dass das griechische Feuer in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. von einem syrischen Ingenieur namens Kallinikos erfunden worden sei. Diese These, die von der Mehrheit der Byzantinisten kraftig unterstutzt worden ist, basiert auf einer kurzen Nachricht von Theophanes Homologetus in seiner Chronik aus dem Jahre 678. In einem der glaubwurdigen Berichte von Malalas aus Antiochia, namlich im 16. Kapitel "Vbev den Kaiser Anastasius I.", ist von einer Feuerwaffe die Rede, die "το λεγομενον θειον απυρν" heisst und die starke Zerstorungskraft besitzt, sowohl zu Lande als auch zu Wasser. In "Kestoi", jener popularen Enzyklopadie der Kunste und Wissenschaften, finden wir ferner eine Mitteilung(cap. 44), wonach es Feuer gabe, das sich automatisch entzundet. Als ihr Teilautor gilt Sex. Iulius Africanus aus dem 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Zwei Nachrichten, Malalas und Kestoi, sind bisher meines Wissens kaum im Zusammenhang mit dem Ursprung des griechischen Feuers erwahnt worden. Studieren wir sie genauer, kommen wir zum folgenden Ergebnis: Das griechische Feuer ist nicht, wie bisher behauptet worden ist, in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts plotzlich erfunden worden. Die sog. Erfindungsgeschichte von Kallinikos stellt nur eine Stufe in der historischen Entwicklung der Feuerwaffen dar. Das Feuer fur die Seeschlacht, πυρ θαλασσιν, wie wir es bei Theophanes vorfinden, ist keine alleinstehende Erscheinung selbst in der Geschichte der byzantinischen Waffenkunde. Wie wir in diesem Aufsatz gezeigt haben, sind seine direkten Vorlaufer "το λεγομενον θειον απυρον" von Malalas und "το πυρ αυτοματον" von Kestoi. Und die vollendete Form von jenem πυρ θαλασσιον von Theophanes sehen wir in der Vorschrift von dem "Liber ignium" von Marcus Graecus. Es lasst sich zugleich feststellen, dass die Bezeichnung "Griechisches Feuer" viel zu vage ist und kaum in der Lage sein kann, um die verschiedene Arten der foyzantinischen Feuerwaffen dementsprechend zu benennen.

著者

伊藤 雅巳

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.176-178, 1999-03-23

著者

井上 忠

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.41-54, 1975-03-29 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In the Categories (1^a20-^b9, 2^a12-^b6, etc.), Aristotle makes a contrast between (1) καθ' υποκειμενου λεγεται (is said of a subject) and (2) εν υποκειμενω εστι (is in a subject). But why does he use λεγεται (is said) in (1), and εστι (is) in (2)? Aristotle is making an inquiry into the field of ordinary language, or rather actual language: while in (1) both τουνομα (the name) and ο λογο&b.sigmav; (the definition) are explicitly presented as the predicate (κατηγορειται) , in (2) neither the name nor the definition is presented as the predicate except some incidental coincidence of word formation (2^a27-34). We may adequately call (1) Predication and (2) Inherence. Later, (1) will develop to be the substantial predicate and (2)to be the accidental predicate; and Inherence ought to be present as predicate in some form in actual language. Making Inherence predicative results from παρωνυμα (the derivation from the name). That is, in (1), the name and the definition of substance are identically related, as being homonymous (ομωνυμα 1^a1-6) or synonymous (συνωνυμα 1^a6-12). On the other hand, the inherential predicate presents itself in actual language as nothing but η κατα τουνομα προσηγορια (addressing on the basis of the name). This name, however, is not set up through abstraction or induction of those addressings, but, from the view point of the actual use of language, must be preceded by the name. This name, being different from that in the case of substance, appearsonly as the classifying language in actual language, its definition showing "what it is" does not turn up in actual language. If one dares to look for that, one is to go beyond the level of actual language.

著者

千葉 槙太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.50-63, 2020 (Released:2023-05-19)

著者

中畑 正志

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.101-114, 2020 (Released:2023-05-19)

著者

小池 澄夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.130-133, 1993-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

青木 巌

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.31-38, 1962

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It lias been said that Aristotle, being intent on establishing his own system, was often inaccurate or negligent in his description of the presocratic philosophers He is said to have written about them only for the purpose of either illustrating how they are wrong as compared with his own views, or showing their ideas as confirmations of his own, which are always true He is, after all, not motivated by any historical sense, and turns out to be incorrect and at times unjust in his historical treatment As against him, it is said, Theophrastus, thought not prompted by any different motive, is more impartial and correct concerning the early Greek philosophy There is a third opinion that Theophrastus is in all essentials only repeating interpretations he found in Aristotle and they have, therefore, the same deficiencies, in fine, he too is a biased witness and even less trustworthy than Aristotle In view of these three interpretations, the present writer scrutinizes the problem deliberately confining himself to a single item το απειρον of Anaximander He knows that such a limited method of treatment is inadequate, and may even be dangerous, but he is also convinced that even though he restricts hisv problem to such a small aspect, he can come to a conclusion which has some value In sum there can be no choice between Aristotle and Theophrastus in regard to the presocratic causes in general Sometimes incorrect and inattentive as he is, the former is quite reliable as a historian, and the latter surely follows his master's interpretations faithfully without being blind to the blunders and omissions on his part Any issue has to be solved through consulting both of them together with other sources, and, carefully adopting or rejecting them

著者

三浦 洋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.48-59, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)

著者

小西 晴雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.55-65, 1968-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The structure of the Archaeologia is a product of three preconceived ideas of Thucydides'; namely, his conception of power, his conception of cyclic history and his conception of proof. 1. Conception of Power: the power of a state consists of four elements; stability (A), unification of city-states (B), seapower (C) and wealth (D). In the Archaeologia each element is surveyed in turn. 2. Conception of Cyclic History: Thucydides seems to have thought, at least when he was writing the Archaeologia, that these four elements of power developed successively from (A) to (D) during a certain period, and that after (D) there was a war, and then another cycle. Since he knew that there had been two large wars before the Peloponnesian War (i. e, the Trojan War and the Persian War), he divided the past into three periods marked by the two wars, and believed that each period constituted a cycle. 3. Conception of Proof: Thucydides seems to have thought that he had to prove that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest war of all. He employs a specific form of proof. First he states what he is going to prove (T); then he explains his theme (E); and then finally he states again what he has proved (T). This TET form is only applied to the parts of the Archaeologia where he wanted to prove his case. (E) can further be divided into two parts, X and Y. [table] Thucydides' a priori attitude is apparent in the Archaeologia. His subjective attitude in the structure of the First Book and in the Pentecontaetia has already been discussed by the writer in JCS XIV 1966, pp. 77-85. By tracing the changes and developments in the character of his subjectivity, one can discover the path that Thucydides' thought took for thirty years. Using the results of this study, one may possibly establish the chronological order of his writings.

著者

西村 洋平

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.164-167, 2010-03-24 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

永井 滋郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.52-62, 1967-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

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It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.

著者

筒井 賢治

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.121-129, 1996-03-15 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Marcion, a Christian heretic in the second century A. D., is known as a docetist. This is closely related with the widely-accepted assumption that he used a special term, phantasma, with regard to the body of Jesus Christ. Admittedly, there is an exclusive connection between Marcion and the term phantasma. On the one hand, we know nobody else among his contemporaries who referred to the body of Jesus by this term. On the other hand, a number of Early Church Fathers speak of Marcion's phantasma so frequently that it is virtually impossible to deny that he has actually used the term for Jesus Christ. And Tertullian, by far the most important source of information about Marcion/Marcionites, knew two interpretations of phantasma : (a)vision, an noncorporeal entity that can be seen and heard, but cannot be touched ; (b)something comparable to the body of the angels who appeared to Abraham and Lot and associated with them just like normal human beings(cf. Gen 18-19). This juxtaposition of two essentially different interpretations indicates clearly that the term phantasma itself, at least, was not an invention by Tertullian, but a special word actually used by Marcion himself. However, if we investigate Marcion's own texts, i. e. his canon(Evangelium, Apostolicum) and Antitheses, we come to an unexpected conclusion : Nowhere can we find a clearly and directly docetic element in them, as far as reliable textual reconstruction is possible. On the contrary, there are a lot of "nondocetic" passages which show that Jesus undoubtedly had a tangible body(which contradicts the meaning(a) of phantasma ; see below). The word phantasma itself does not appear anywhere apart from Evangelium (Lk)24 : 37. In this verse, according to Tertullian, Marcion's text reads phantasma (cf. also Adamantius/Rufinus) instead of pneuma. But we should not accept this report without qualification. First, it is not a literal quotation. Tertullian may well have employed an anti-Marcionite cliche here, as he often does. Secondly, Jesus' disciples, who think he is a "phantasma", are not praised but scolded by Jesus himself in the following verses. Further, this reading destroys the contextual relation with v. 39, where pneuma is undoubtedly retained in Marcion's text. Last but not the least, this Jesus is the so-called resurrected one, not the proper subject of docetism. For these various reasons, we cannot consider this verse to be sufficient evidence for Marcion's phantasma-docetism. We must conclude, therefore, that neither docetism nor the term phantasma is clearly to be found in Marcion's own texts. To explain this contradiction, we must introduce the perspective of chronological development in Marcion : His phantasma-docetism belongs to his "pre-canonical" times. Although the "post-canonical" Marcion did not positively use the term any longer, the polemical cliche against it remained in use on the side of the orthodox church. As regards the two meanings of phantasma attested in Tertullian(see above), (a)must certainly be older than(b). (b)appears to be an alternative, ad hoc explanation given by the post-canonical Marcion or more probably Marcionites, who wanted to remove the discrepancy between their canon and the phantasma-docetism. in the meaning(a). A relationship in the reverse order, i. e. a development from(b)to(a), is hardly imaginable. As a matter of course, it does not necessarily mean that(a)was the original meaning in which Marcion used the term phantasma. This remains an open to debate. Our argument is based on the assumption of a critical change in Marcion. "Critical change" does not mean here a conversion from one definite, ready-made system of belief to another. Rather, it is creation of a new paradigm, which is usually preceded by a long, chaotic period of preparation. There is no doubt that the pre-canonical(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

山形 直子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.1-11, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)