著者

中務 哲郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.26-37, 1986-03-18 (Released:2017-05-23)

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ヘロドトス『歴史』のテーマは何か,という大問題にこのような小論で答えようとするのは,いわば「鶏刀を以て牛を割く」類の暴挙との誹りを受けるかもしれないが,以下に筆者の考えの大要を述べてみたい.

著者

木原 志乃

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.12-23, 2002

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In this paper, I would like to examine the change of the soul (psyche) in fr 36 and reconsider the significance of Heraclitus explaining the soul in the physical process In fr 36, Heraclitus says that the soul becomes the water, the water becomes the earth and vice versa There is little agreement as to what the changes of the soul should be It is a disputable question whether the reciprocal changes in fr 36 are in macrocosm (that is, the extinction or production of the soul from its relation to the sea and the earth cf fr 30 and 31) or in microcosm (that is, the physiological process of the soul from its relation to the blood and the flesh) Many commentators have interpreted it as being in macrocosm However, I do not share this interpretation First, I will examine the two typical interpretations in which the soul in macrocosm is supposed (Kirk and Kahn) According to Kirk, the soul is equated with cosmic fire and 'the death of the soul' means the death of individuals in an eschatological context However, this interpretation is unsound when Kirk must suppose the relation of two fires, between 'a fiery soul' of individuals and the 'cosmic fire' Although Herachtus indicated 'the soul out of water', Kirk discounted this point and supposed falsely the soul out of cosmic fire through respiration On the other hand, Kahn intended that the soul is equated with the air Inasmuch as Heraclitus described the soul as 'dry' or 'wet', so Kahn considered that 'fire' is not suitable as a substitute for the soul from the expressive viewpoint in the fragments Although Kahn's interpretation is a correct one in view of his insistence that the soul is not fire, he overcomplicated the relation between the 'airy soul' of individuals and (cosmic) fire or water The soul as the fire or the air, which is also macrocosmic, is not suitable for the explanation of 'the death of the soul' The important point is the relationship between life and death We must recognize that, for Helaclitus, the psyche has the fundamental meaning of 'life force' and that his 'life and death' is a unity of opposites Heraclitus did not uncritically accede to antecedent ideas of the soul The traditional problem of immortality is reconsidered by Heraclitus in fr 36 The 'death of the soul' is not the biological death of the individual Rather, his use of the soul enables him to combine these aspects of the life and death of individual I would like to emphasize this point and elucidate that the soul includes death and is incessantly renewed as life by death Heraclitus refused the traditional idea that the soul of individuals continues separate from the body after death For him, the soul is not a transcendental substance separate from the body, but constantly maintains the material aspects of the bodily force So for Heraclitus the soul is not like an airy or fiery element or a cosmic soul, but the constitutive principle of the life force That is the meaning of the physiological process This suggests that the soul in fr 36 is a principle for physiological activity as the subject of the life force Finally, I wish to conclude by referring briefly to two connected contents of the soul, as a subject of this physiological activity and of the cognitive activity in other fragments.

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

鈴木 幹也

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.20-31, 1977

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Aristotle attempted to reduce the thought structure of Empedocles' On Nature to his own unique philosophical pattern by interpreting Empedocles' four indestructible elements as being the material causes, and interpreting Love and Strife as the efficient causes. Judging from Theophrastus' Physical Opinions, Frag. 3, the basis for Aristotle's reasoning is thought to be contained in the couplet of Empedocles' Frag. 17. 7-8; αλλοτε μεν φιλοτητι συνερχομεν ει&b.sigmav; απαντα αλλοτε δ' αυ διχ' εκαστα φορευμενα νεικεο&b.sigmav; εχθει and particularly in the participle φορευμενα found in the latter half. In other words, Aristotle interpreted (φορευμενα to be a passive voice, from which he deduced his understanding of the four elements as being the material causes, and Love and Strife as the efficient causes. The present writer, however, cannot agree to such an interpretation of φορευμενα. The writer here attempts to reject one of the traditional viewpoints in the history of philosophy-the Aristotelian schematic understanding of Empedocles-by elucidating that the φορευμενα in question is not a passive voice but rather a direct reflexive intransitive middle voice, through the examination of three points, namely: (1)other groups of expression illustrating the spatial movement of the four elements; (2)similar verses in Empedocles Frag. 20. 2-5; and(3)usage of the verb φερω which has the same etymological origin as φορεω.

著者

澄田 宏

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.56-59, 1972

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Heraclitus' Fr. 101 (DK) is regarded as one of the fragments referring to the basis of his philosophical thoughts. But there is little reference to it in most of the studies of Heraclitus' philosophy. This is, I suppose, because of some difficulty in the interpretation of Fr. 101. For instance, the fragment is given different interpretations from the two different sources and it is isolated from any of his other fragments. The purpose of this essay is to approach the problem of its interpretation with the help of his other fragments, especially Fr. 22 which is something like a proverb. The author examines the meaning of each word of Fr. 22 in which there is the participle form of the same verb as used in Fr. 101. In Fr. 22, where are found at least four terms of his philosophy, i. e., 'much', 'little', 'earth' and 'gold', the verb 'search' is paraphrased in his analytical way into two other verbs, 'dig' and 'find'. Then my work is to make clear the meaning of the whole passage. Fr. 22 is a kind of proverb saying that whoever seeks for something valuable will. take much pains and get small profits. Now there rises some doubt whether he was talking by metaphor about his own philosophical method. The preferable way to get the true meaning of this metaphor is, I believe, to refer to the following fragments one after another: Frr. 29, 104, 41, 32, 90, 118; 10, 40, 35; 55, 107, 56. The conclusion is as follows: (1) Fr. 22 suggests his philosophical method of recognition and so its metaphor proves to be a formula of recognition. "The subject that searches 'digs' (se. perceives or inquires) the medium and 'finds' (sc. understands and recognizes) the object." (2) The object is called by many different names, but in fact it is 'one'. (3) On the other hand the medium is a sensible object whose structure is of many forms. The medium is significant for the investigator only when it is related to the object. (4) The subject is the soul, ψυχη. Now self-search is one way of philosophical research. To this, therefore, must be applied the formula. If not applied, it is obvious by reference to Fr. 45, that self-search does not take any means i. e., the medium. But the same fragment seems to say that to "discover" is needed for the soul to know everything. So to "find" or "discover" is to research without digging or perceiving. Self-search is research in absence of the medium. It is self-discovery. I think self-search may be proposed to be a major premise of Heraclitus' philosophical thoughts of ψυχη.

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.44-55, 1998

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<p>Critias is known as the leader of the cruel "Thirty Tyrants", who governed defeated Athens after the Poloponnesian War(404/3 B.C.), and killed over 1500 people under their reign of terror. Critias raises two important issues in the history of philosophy. First, as a relative of Plato, he seems to have influenced young Plato ; Plato later says in the Seventh Letter that he was initially attracted by Critias' invitation to the oligarchic government, but soon got disappointed on seeing its evil deeds(324B-325A). Second, Critias is regarded as a major cause of the decision to bring Socrates to trial in 399 ; the Athenians believed that Socrates was guilty of "corrupting youth" because he had educated anti-democratic politicians, such as Critias and Alcibiades(cf. Aeschines, 1. 173). These events kept Plato away from real politics and forced him to contemplate politics in philosophy. I believe that Plato confronted the issues concerning Critias in his early dialogue, the Charmides, in which young Critias plays a major role in discussing sophrosyne(temperance or prudence). However, the commentators have scarcely considered political issues in this dialogue, probably because they take the "evil image of Critias" for granted. First, therefore, I reexamine the historical figure of Critias and show how his image was created. It is Xenophon who is most responsible for making up our image of Critias. He describes Critias as a cruel tyrant and ascribes all evils of the Thirty to his personal motivations. Xenophon's account in the History of Greece II. 3. 11-4. 43 reflects the strong reaction against oligarchy in democratic Athens, and originates both in his hostility against the Thirty and his intention to defend Socrates' education(Memorabilia 1. 2. 12-38, 47). This has concealed the Thirty's real political intentions under the "evil image of Critias". On the other hand, we have some positive evidence to indicate that the Thirty originally intended to restore justice and morality in Athens (Lysias 12. 5 ; P1. Ep. VII 324D) ; they executed the sycophants("villains" in democratic Athens). We cannot deny the possibility that Critias and his group seriously aimed for ideal justice, and philosophical examination of the ideology of Critias is therefore necessary. The problem lies in what they understand as justice and sophrosyne. This is the main target of Plato's examination of Critias in the Charmides. Most commentators have ignored the political aspect of the dialogue. Sophrosyne is(unlike Aristotle's definition in the Ethics)a major political virtue along with justice, and the leading ideal for the Spartans and the oligarchs. Sophrosyne is said to bring about good government(Charm. 162A, 171D-172A, D). A crucial point in interpreting the Charmides is how we can understand the shift and relationship between several definitions of sophrosyne which Critias provides. He often gives up his earlier definitions easily and presents new ones ; there seems no logical relation between these. I see his definitions not as logically consequent, but as implying and revealing Critias' underlying ideology. I focus on two shifts : the first comes when Critias abandons his first definition "to do one's own", and gives a new definition "to know oneself" (164C-D) ; the second shift explicates "to know oneself" as "knowledge of the other knowledges and of itself" (166B-C). In each case, the direct cause of shift is Socrates' using an analogy between sophrosyne and techne (skill). Critias opposes Socrates' analogy and tries to separate two kinds of knowledge : self-knowledge and particular skills. Since the relation between the two is explained in terms of "rule" and "supervise" (173C, 174D-E) , I conclude that the clear distinction between the two</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

生島 幹三

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.87-97, 1965

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This article is intended to analyse the part of the dispute between Thrasymachus and Socrates in Book A of "Republic", in relation to the preceding part of the book, i e Polemarchus' definition of "justice" and Socrates' criticism of it Polemarchus defines "justice" as "to do good to the friends and to do evil to the enemies" This principle of the right action is composed of two rules, opposite to each other and applied in each case to only one of the two groups of men Socrates, in his criticism, expelling "to do evil" from "justice" and extending over the whole the rule applied to the friends by Polemarchus, seems to suggest "to do good (to everybody)" as the general principle, advocating, as it were, the cause of "justice" On the contrary, Thrasymachus recommends "to do evil to others", i e "injustice" as the punciple, applying to everyone except oneself the rule that Polemarchus has done to one's enemies only In Thrasymachus' view, "to do evil to others" is one's own good (as it were, justice, δικαιον), while "to be righteous" is another one's (i e the stronger man's) good and one's own evil From Socrates' standpoint again, if we might infer so, "to do evil to others" is the gravest evil to oneself, and despite his unerring skill in the art of evil, an unjust man is in the grandest error in mistaking it for a good and is possessed of grossest ignorance, and he is less strong and more unfortunate in the true sense than a righteous man The problem of justice is, on the other hand, treated by Thrasymachus in relation to the law and the ruler who makes it, and thus is given a public meaning (not only a private one) in the whole state or community But the two disputants differ diametrically from each other as to what the ruler and his τεχνη essentially consist in Throughout the whole of their dispute, Socrates appears to be triumphant, but we should rather think that the question is, in reality, of the difference of standpoint between Socrates, who thinks a man always does good when he knows good and evil and who considers the whole community to be a world all composed of brothers, and Thrasymachus, who again regards the society as a battlefield where everyone fights with others for his own good, which is nothing but another's evil When refuting Thrasymachus, however, Socrates is found showing in the sharpest contrast his own views and their implications, by means of treating from his own point of view the problems presented by his opponent

著者

西川 亮

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.28-38, 1969

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トラシュロスがデモクリトスの作品を四部作に分類して配列した目録の中に,認識論的傾向のものを扱ったとおもわれる若干の作品名が残されているが,その内容に至ってはほとんど知られない.もしそれについて考察を試みようとすれば,セクストス・エンペイリコスやガレノスによって引用された断片や,アリストテレスやアエティオスなどの記録,さらに諸感覚についてのテオプラストスのかなり詳細な記述などによらなければならない.しかし皮相的にみれば,これらの資料間における齟齬が,統一的見解を阻んでいるかのように見做される.むろんデモクリトスのいわゆる認識論についての資料の処理にすでにかなりの努力が払われてきた.ここでは,それらの諸資料を三区分し,その間の差異を検討して,デモクリトスのいわゆる原子思想における認識論的問題の一端にふれてみたい.

著者

戸塚 七郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.118-121, 1973

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, pp.27-38, 2016

著者

仲手川 良雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.1-11, 1989-03-15 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Both isegoria and parrhesia have the meaning "free speech", which seems to have been indispensable to the Greeks, especially the Athenians The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between isegoria and parrhesia, two ways of realizing free speech at meeting It is noteworthy that the parrhesia, which came into being about the last third of the fifth century BC, came to be used widely in a short time and invaded the large sphere of the word isegoria What does this mean historically? The essence of isegoria is manifest in the expression heralds conventionally used to urge free speech in the assembly "Who wishes to address the assembly?" On the other hand, according to Aischines, the expression was formerly as follows . "Who of those above fifty years of age wishes to address the assembly?", this practice of addressing according to age was aimed at obtaining the best counsel for the polis, though it went out of fashion in Aischines' day An attitude of πολει χρηστον (rendering service to polis), which also is proclaimed in Euripides' Suppliants' "Who desires to bring good counsel for his polis to the people?", predominated among Athenians in the moderate democracy It declined remarkably, however, with the rise in radical democracy and the spread of individualism Moreover, we must consider the growth of class antagonism between οι χρηστοι and οι πονηροι, as is proven in Pseudo-Xenophon, Ath Pol 1 2, 1 6, 1 9, 3 12-13 In this situation, the word χρηστοζ might be viewed with a strong tincture of classconsciousness The multitude must have had some doubt as to whether the practice of addressing according to age and the principle of πολει χρηστον were serviceable to them or to οι χρηστοι alone They did away with that practice and introduced the parrhesia, by which every citizen could speak out on whatever he regarded as important and right, free of the restrictions of πολει χρηστον The shift in stress from isegoria to parrhesia corresponded with the momentous change in the actuality and the sense of polis-community

著者

松平 千秋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.136-138, 1969-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

松本 仁助

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.37-50, 1957-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

長谷川 岳男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.12-24, 2010-03-24 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Fustel de Coulange considered that ancient Greeks had never had any private spheres in their poleis and the polls was a fusion of state and society. In the entry 'polis' in the 3^<rd> edition of OCD 0. Murray basically followed his ideas and gave Sparta as a typical example. Thus the general understanding seems to have been that polis could not be translated as 'state'. M. Hansen, however, argued against taking Sparta as a typical case and insisted that there was a differentiation between public and private spheres in Athens and many other poleis and consequently concluded that we may view a polis as similar to a modern state. However S. Hodkinson, as part of his studies aimed at rescuing Sparta from a 'fossilized society' themepark and normalizing her position as a polis, objected to the idea that Sparta was a polis where the state and society were inseparably fused together. He argued that Xenophon showed no clear cases of Spartan authorities taking active control over every aspect of Spartan citizens' life in his Lakedaimonion Politeia which is the most credible source concerning the Classical Spartan society. Moreover, building on Humble's thesis that the characteristic feature of Spartan citizens was not σωψροσυνη but αιδωζ, it seems that Spartan citizens were only careful how they behaved in public spaces and in private they could do as they pleased. Therefore it can be recognized that there was a distinction between the public and private sphere in Sparta. Indeed, not only Xenophon, but also Thucydides painted the picture of the Spartan society as a system of voluntary corporations among citizens rather than one of severe controls over them. Hodkinson then insisted that there was no social control on the part of the Spartan authorities, but only social pressure from the citizens themselves within their society. I agree with his conclusion regarding the importance of social pressure in Sparta, but I do not think that there was no social control over the citizens, because the existence of social pressure reveals the existence of Gramsci's theory of the 'hegemony'. I think it is a flaw in Hodkinson's argumentations that he did not point clearly to the substance of the authorities in Sparta so that the reality of social control became obscured. In order to complement his contention, I would introduce the thesis on which Berent insisted in a series of articles, namely, that a polls is not a state but a stateless society. A polis did not have the public coercive power so that Greeks had to devise ways to keep order in their polis and prevent an outbreak of a stasis. If we are right to perceive a polis as a stateless society, it followed that it was of paramount importance for Greeks to reach consensus on public matters. As a result, politics became entangled with ethical considerations and education which internalized ethics became important. In consideration of this context, the images of Spartan society seem fit for achieving consensus among its citizens, the fact that made it an object of high esteem among other Greeks. We should realize from this conclusion that a polis was not a monolithic entity and that it was susceptible to being torn apart because of the lack of public coercive power, and that Sparta (and Athens) were exceptional in preserving their stability.

著者

片山 英男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.98-100, 1994-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

桜井 万里子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.114-121, 2003-03-20 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

三浦 洋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.72-83, 1997-03-10 (Released:2017-05-23)

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アリストテレスは『形而上学』Θ巻第6章(以下, Θ6)で様々な行為を「エネルゲイア(活動)」と「キーネーシス(運動)」に区別している.その一方の「ネルゲイア」とは,現在進行と完了が同時に成立する行為であり,「見る」がその典型例である(「見ている」と同時に「見てしまった」といえる).他方「キーネーシス」とは,一定の目的に向かう末完了的な過程を持つ行為であり,現在進行と完了が同時には成立しない.その典型例は「建築」である(「建築している」と同時に「建築してしまった」ということはない).この区別をめぐっては従来,他のテキストとの関連が注目される一方で,このような排他的区別の成立を根本的に疑う見解が研究者から示されてきた.とりわけ,アクリルが投げかけた疑問と,それを解消するべくペナーが提起した「二局面構造説」は,区別の成否を検討する上で重要な論点を提示している.本稿は,ぺナー説を批判的に検討しつつ,アクリルの疑問の発生源である「一つの現実態を構成する二つの項」をめぐる問題を解明し,疑問の解消を目指すものである.関連テキストにおけるアリストテレスの議論を検討することにより, 「エネルゲイア」と「キーネーシス」の区別が,単一の現実態,すなわち単一の事態について必然的に成立する区別であることを明らかにしたい.

著者

松平 千秋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.167-169, 1975-03-29 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

川本 愛

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, pp.62-73, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)