著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.177-179, 2007-03-16 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

内川 勇海

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.12-24, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.87-94, 2010-03-24 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

津村 寛二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.67-72, 1973

著者

森 俊洋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.52-63, 1970

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『ソピステス』251-9で,プラトンは所謂エイドスのコイノーニアという問題を論じているが,実は一様にコイノーニアとして語っているのではなく,そこに一つの重要な区別を示しているように思える.小論の目的は,その区別がどこにポイントを置かれたものであるのか,そしてまたその区別が意味するところは何であるのかということを,明らかにしようとする一つの試みである.

著者

野津 悌

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.24-34, 2002-03-05 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In Rhetoric 1 2 Aristotle says that artistic modes of persuasion are of three sorts, which he calls ethos, pathos, and logos, and he recommends all three modes However, among them pathos consists in arousing emotions, and in Rhetoric 1 1 he prohibits arousing emotions because it is not right to corrupt judgement This inconsistency between the first and second chapter of his treatise has been much discussed In this paper, I examine one prevailing explanation of the inconsistency, which one can find in E M Cope's Commentary, and with which other scholars, e g A Hellwig and J Sprute, agree According to this explanation Aristotle's statements in 1 1 concern only an ideal rhetoric, which can function only if an ideal system of laws exists which prohibits the litigants from speaking outside the subject, just like in the Areopagus, and he does not claim that under real circumstances of public life arousing emotions must be prohibited Therefore, it is not inconsistent that he prohibits arousing emotions on the one hand and recommends it on the other He regards it, so to speak, as a necessary evil under real circumstances, to be used for morally irreproachable ends But this explanation is not persuasive in that arousing emotions is regarded as corrupting the hearers' judgements, and yet allowable only if it is used, as a necessary evil, for morally right ends I argue that Aristotle regards arousing emotions not only as corrupting the hearers' judgements, but also as playing an important role in the hearers' recognition of the truth Then, in order to make clear the difference between the corrupting one and the other which enables hearers to recognize the truth, I reconsider what Aristotle means by saying in 1 1 that it is right to prohibit "speaking outside the subject" According to the above explanation, which supposes "speaking outside the subject" is identical with arousing emotions, Aristotle means that arousing emotions in itself must be prohibited But, in my view, that is not right "Speaking outside the subject" here is identical with, not arousing emotions m itself, but a corrupting kind of arousing emotions, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things totally extraneous to the issue Aristotle means here that only arousing emotions in such a way must be prohibited According to this view, we can suppose, there is another kind of arousing emotions, which Aristotle does not prohibit, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things which are related to the issue and so enable hearers to recognize the truth To conclude, I propose that the primary function of pathos which Aristotle recommends in 1 2 consists rather in making hearers recognize the truth than in corrupting their judgement Indeed it is undeniable that pathos in 1 2 can function also as a necessary evil, as the prevailing view has it, but I claim that it is rather a subsidiary function of pathos

著者

長瀬 真理

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.69-80, 1987

被引用文献数

1

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The questions of the authenticity and chronology of Plato's texts are long-standing arguments This paper deals with the analysis of some prose style 'concerned with word order. One of the particular features of the Greek language is its freedom with word order The choice of word order is supposed to reflect personal habit or style which can be defined by studying the frequencies of certain patterns of combination of words. The conclusions are based on data obtained in a pilot computer project organized by Dr. L Brandwood from the University of Manchester in which I participated from October 1, 1980 to March 31, 1982 The purpose of the project is to investigate some specific stylistic features of texts from different periods of Plato's career, with the aim of producing certain quantitative measures of sentence structure and establishing new methods or principles of stylistic comparison The study was carried out usmg a system of classifying elements of sentence according to their syntactic function. The categories and code numbers are twelve : noun (0), verb(1), direct object (2), indirect object (3), predicate (4), attributes of these items (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), adverb (62) and prepositional phrase (63) The combinations of word order in each category are checked according to two patterns, 'coordinate' and 'split' The coordinate is the case where more than two words of the same class are used in parallel position m a sentence The split means the gap between a word and other related words in the same class The Greek texts of Plato were already available to us on magnetic tape Among Plato's writing we chose three texts, Laches, Theaetetus, and Philebus which are generally agreed to come from three different periods of his life We were also able to obtain a tape of Xenophon from which Memorabilia was chosen In order to check the consistency of our measures withm individual works, each text was sub-divided into four sections As the project is still underway, it is too early to make many claims for our methods. But I can say that in this instance, at least, checking word order has proved an effective measure of stylistic difference. It is fully recognised that the style of Philebus stands out clearly from that of the other three dialogues The figures for coordinate and split in Philebus are extremely high compared with the other three, especially in the case of the split in the prepositional phrases. We could say, 'the greater the frequency of splits, the more complicated the sentence' Philebus is commonly grouped chronologically with Leges, Timaeus, Pohticus and Sophistes as belonging to the later period of Plato's writing These dialogues are famous for being difficult to read It is an open question how far our syntactic code system would cover the complicated implication of sentence structures But whatever the interpretation, it is important to have some quantifiable and objective methods with which to work.

著者

山下 正男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.87-93, 1957

著者

村上 正治

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.31-44, 2003

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In the Philebus, Socrates (Soc) attempts to attribute a true-false distinction to pleasure and pain On the contrary, Protarchus (Prt) insists that pleasure can never be false My aim in this paper is to make cleai what supposition underlies Prt' insistence, and how Soc undermines it I would like to show Soc' view about pleasure and pain Soc introduces an analogy between belief and pleasure, and distinguishes the mental process (believing that, being pleased that)from its content (which can be described in the that-clause) Most interpreters suppose that Soc tries to prove the falsity of being pleased depending on the falsity of its content, just as one believes p falsely when p is false However, they fail to see that Prt denies such attribution of falsity to pleasure Prt thinks that the actuality of being pleased is always true for the person in pleasure, even if the content with which one is pleased is false All Soc must prove is that one can be pleased falsely in spite of the actuality of being pleased The Book-Simile explains how belief and pleasure are differently formed in our mind When we perceive and judge something unknown, we form a belief about it We believe p in judging something If p is false, the falsity is equally, not derivatively, attributed to believing p, since we fail to judge something correctly On the other hand, we do not make a direct judgment about something, concerning whether it is pleasure or pain Once we judge something and believe p about it, we are pleased or suffer with a mental image based on judgment or belief How are pleasure and pain related with our judgment or belief? First, Soc takes the physiological form of pleasure and pain when we are thirsty (in the state of deficiency), we suffer, then, when we are drinking (getting satisfied), we are pleased This form of pleasure and pain reveals their basic features 1 Pleasure and pain function as the indications of satisfaction and deficiency in our body 11 The occurrence of pleasure and pain contributes to the restoration of our body's nature Next, anticipatory pleasure explains more clearly the occurrence of pleasure and pain When we are now suffering from deficiency in our body, and also in anticipation of what we think is satisfaction, we are already pleased with the anticipation although we are not yet satisfied The occurrence of pleasure depends on what we think is satisfaction So, if our cognition about satisfaction is false, that is, what we think is satisfaction does not really satisfy our deficiency, then, our pleasure which arose from our false cognition is false in spite of our being pleased, because pleasure and pain are supposed to contribute to the restoration of our body's nature Soc thinks that pleasure and pain are not directly given, but arise from our cognitive state about satisfaction, deficiency, and also our nature Therefore, the occurrence of pleasure and pain can be modified through revising our cognitive state about them

著者

千葉 恵

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.47-56, 1994-03-28

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I offer an interpretation, mainly on the basis of Physics II 9, of Aristotle's claim in his biological writings that explanation by necessity involving only material and efficient causes is consistent with an explanation of the same phenomena by purpose. My argument is directed towards the further question of whether Aristotle also believes that while the essences of certain biological phenomena are partly determined by their role in a teleological system, there is a complete account in terms of material and efficient causation of the conditions under which they exist. Physics II 9 presupposes his argument for the final cause as the nature in the primary sense in II 8, and is similar in theme to Parts of Animals 1 1 where Aristotle criticises the physiologoi on the ground that when they claimed that biological phenomena come into being by necessity, they fail to distinguish what kind of necessity is involved. At the beginning of II 9, Aristotle considers two alternative ways of understanding the necessity involved in generation ; either hypothetical necessity(HN) or HN plus simple necessity(SN). HN depends on a goal. If the goal is to be, it is necessary that certain other things come to be. SN, by contrast, depends on the nature of simple bodies and their movements. Aristotle locates the SN which the physiologoi take as the main cause of generation as a "necessary nature" (200a8) and regards this as explanatory of the goal, only insofar as the latter is purely materially specified as the matter of the goal(ω&b.sigmav; δι υλην). The goal taken as its matter is simply necessitated by its material components in the sense that the material components yield a specified condition for the existence of the goal. Thus Aristotle expresses two modes of necessity involved in generation as follows ; "The necessity, then, is on a hypothesis, but isn't necessary as the same way the goal(ω&b.sigmav; τελο&b.sigmav;) is necessary. For in the latter case the necessity lies in the matter, but in the former case the purpose lies in the λογο&b.sigmav; (account as design)." (200a13ff) Aristotle confirms the two modes of necessity in comparison with a mathematical reasoning. He compares both (1) "things which come to be based on nature(κατα <φυσιν)"(200a16) and (2) "things which come to be for something" (al9) with the necessity involved in a specific mathematical proof : given that the straight is thus and so, necessarily the triangle has angles whose sum is two right angles. While (1) is wider than (2) in terms of their extensions, they differ from each other in that the necessity involved in (1) is determined by the nature of underlying(υποκειμενομ), but the necessity involved in (2) is determined by goal. Aristotle defines nature in "κατα φυσιν" in (1) as a certain underlying based on simple bodies which have "natural tendency for change" (ορμη 192b18 cf. 95 al, 276a26) for both "substances" which "have a nature"(192b33) as formal or final cause and "their per se components" (cf. 73a34ff)which "do not have a nature" (193 a1) specified above as moving upwards belongs to fire. In that mathematical reasoning, the premises or components of the conclusion determine the necessity of the conclusion. This is said to be "in a parallel fashion" (200a16) with the case in (1). On the other hand, it is said to be "in a reversed fashion"(a19) with case in (2) in the sense that the goal which is achieved at the end of generation determines the necessity of the antecedent which comes no doubt earlier than the end. In this way, these two modes of necessity in generation are indirectly compared with each other via an example of mathematics. I conclude that while the purpose as design at the level of Adyoc determines what kind of matter should be employed in generation "as matter of λογο&b.sigmav; (200b8) , matter at the level of generation necessarily generates the matter of a goal by its own power, according to the program which is laid as design at the level of λογο&b.sigmav;. This allows us to say eg. eyeball and optic nerve etc. are an eye by themselves for the sake of seeing(cf. 1041a26). By distinguishing the level of λογο&b.sigmav; in which the purpose lies from the level of generation in which material necessity lies, Aristotle sets up the compatibility between teleological explanation of biological phenomena and explanation by material necessity in which both HN and SN lie.

著者

一色 裕

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.41-51, 1999

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<p>Although there is some controversy about the authenticity of Hippias Major, the majority now take it to be Plato's own work. But the assessment of 'philosophy' involved in it has just begun with the commentary of P. Woodruff. But most scholars including Woodruff who think the fine to be open to definition regard the aporia of search as representing the failure of Socratic argument depicted by Plato. But in my view, this is a grave fault of interpreters. As a result, the definitions of the fine by the beneficial and the beneficial pleasure, which are the key points of the dialogue, have not yet been given proper and successful interpretation. My task in this paper is to give a new interpretation of this dialogue, focusing on the concept of the beneficial. Hippias, Socrates' interlocutor in this dialogue, displays the fine practices desirable in youth through a fictional discourse based on Homer. Conversely, he teaches fine things without himself knowing the fine. The problem of the beauty of virtue lies hidden in the initial situation of the dialogue. Examining Hippias' ideas of the fine, Socrates shows the fine to be an incomplete predicate during the refutation of Hippias. To refute Hippias' first proposal (fine girl) and his third one (happy life), Socrates refers to the existence of gods. But Hippias' second proposal (gold) is refuted by the notion of appropriateness he himself applied. The appropriateness is at first introduced as a visual one, but is immediately transformed to a moral one, i. e. the appropriateness to ends. The visual appropriateness per se has not yet been examined. In Socrates' self-refutation, his proposal for the definitions of the fine is concerned with human motivation, whose archetype was presented in Grg. 474de. Motivations which are introduced into the argument through visual appropriateness have two series. 1. utility : the useful-the beneficial. 2. pleasure : pleasure through sight and hearing-beneficial pleasure. In each series, the last definition makes explicit the relation of the fine and the good through the notion of beneficial, which leads to aporia. But among fine things, there are some which cannot be perceived as fine. These are the beauty of law and practice Plato esteems highly. The visual appropriateness is concerned with perception, not with being. Then, the appropriateness to ends, that is, utility comes in. But usefulness for doing bad things cannot receive approbation. If good things are substituted for bad things, can the definition of the fine be formed successfully? But, if the good is made consequent of the productive agent (doing or making) and the fine is made antecedent of it, this results in the non-identity of the fine with the good. The beneficial does not explain the fine. The fine cannot be composed of objective good things. With this result, Socrates turns to the examination of the second series of motivations : pleasure. Does pleasure through sight and hearing, i. e. pleasure (s+h), explain the fine? The problems with which Plato is faced in this definition are the following. 1. Is the beauty of law and practice explicable by pleasure (s+h)? 2. Does pleasure (s+h) explain the fine? But the definiens, pleasure (s+h), which takes the form of a conjunction, cannot denote a single thing. (The same is true with disjunction.)Problem 1 can be answered only after problem 2 is settled definitely. But because the definition of the fine by pleasure (s+h) failed, problem 1 remains open. Why is the term 'fine' applied to pleasure (s+h)? The ground for predicating 'fine' about pleasure (s+h) is asked here. Is there any explanation convertible with and inherent in the fine? To this question Socrates answers that pleasure (s+h) is the most harmless and the best. When one asks with reflection the ground of predicating 'fine', the other name of the term</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

早瀬 篤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.50-62, 2012

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The main purpose of this article is to show that, in rejecting Theaetetus' first answer to the question 'What is knowledge ?'(Tht. 146c-147c), Socrates is appealing to what I call the principle of the priority of the definition of the whole over the definitions of parts, namely: (PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know the definition of any part (or any kind) of F, rather than, as many scholars have supposed, to the principle (PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any x, that x is an F (where 'x' stands for anything that may possibly turn out to be F). Some scholars have noticed that (PDWP) is at issue in the relevant context in the Theaetetus, but they regard (PDWP) as an equivalent or a version of (PD), to which they think Socrates is committed. By contrast, I argue that these two principles are independent of each other, and that (PD) is not relevant here (in fact, I have argued elsewhere that Socrates is not committed to (PD) at all, as it stands). A significant difference between the two principles is that (PD) prevents us, but (PDWP) does not prevent us, from using examples of F as reliable data for the definition of F. Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 is the source of the problem. Many scholars have supposed that Socrates employs (PD) as a basis for rejecting the examples of knowledge enumerated by Theaetetus as reliable data for the definition of knowledge. I argue, however, that on closer examination the text shows Socrates actually encouraging Theaetetus to make use of the examples before proposing the definition (cf. Tht. 147d-148d), which is a clear sign that he was not appealing to (PD). I then propose an interpretation of Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 along different lines. I suggest that the cases Socrates is talking about there are not cases in which one enumerates many examples, but cases in which one gives a single example. The point of his argument is, then, that giving a single example of F is useless for understanding F as a whole. I suggest that Socrates argues this because of his commitment to (PDWP). I finally and briefly discuss another context in which Socrates mentions (PDWP), i. e. Meno 79c-79e. On the basis of the passages discussed in the article as a whole, I suggest that Socrates treats (PDWP) as one of his key methodological principles.

著者

松浦 明宏

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.36-47, 2017

著者

久保 徹

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.63-75, 1999

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『パノレメニデス』第II部の意義をめぐっては,とりわけ第I部のイデア論批判との関連でこれまでさまざまに論じられてきた.近年では,C.C.Meinwald らの論考が口火となって再びさかんに論じられている.しかし多くの解釈が試みられてきたにもかかわらず,いまだに研究者らの見解は大きく分かれており,基本的な合意さえ得られていない.だがこの第II部をどのように理解するかは,第I部のイデア論批判の解釈にも関わり,その意味は大きい.本稿は,あらためて第II部の意義をとらえ直し,そこから第I部のイデア論批判の議論に対するプラトン自身の応答を読み解こうとする一つの試みであり,このようなアプローチから『パルメニデス』におけるイデアの分有について考察することを意図する.

著者

式部 久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.112-113, 1975

著者

戸祭 哲子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.37-49, 2012

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This article considers Plato's description of the rhapsode in his dialogue Ion as a critique of the New Music which flourished in late fifth- and fourth-century Athens. At this time, mousike, which may be understood as a body of skills and activities presided over by the Muses, including poetry, instrumental music, dancing, and drama, began to change and diversify. The development of new practices of mousike was stimulated by the growth of public festivals, such as musical contests held at the Panathenaea and theatrical performances held at the Great Dionysia. The new style of mousike attracted the attention of intellectuals, most notably Plato, who subjected it to severe scrutiny. I view the rhapsode in Plato's Ion as a social critique of the innovations in mousike. The New Musicians and Plato's rhapsode share two important features. Firstly, both are professional performers on the public stage. Secondly, both emphasise superficial aspects of public performance, for example mimesis and emotional expressions, purely for entertainment. These aspects were criticised by Plato, who understood that mousike was important in nurturing people's minds and perpetuating Athenian cultural identity. He was afraid, therefore, that the New Music might be socially disruptive. This essay draws attention to a neglected aspect of the New Music as a social phenomenon, and brings social and cultural studies to bear in the examination of a literary text.

著者

田中 利光

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.1-11, 1992

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Plato said that names are instruments with which we differentiate things according to their nature and teach one another something(388B10-C1). The text is written in the figure Hysteron Proteron. It appears to be commonly unnoticed. By the correctness of names, Plato means two states which concern names. One is the correctness in the sense of using names as instruments correctly(cf. 387C1). The other is the correctness in the sense that names in themselves are fine as instruments(cf. 388D6-7). Plato's view on the correctness of names in the first sense is as follows : Determination is not according to a man's fancy, but according to their nature by names which their nature prescribes(cf. 387B11-C4, D4-8). In this connection 'names' does not mean the sound only, but the combination of sound and meaning. If we pay attention to sound only, we cannot understand why truth-falsehood of names and Protagoras' theory became the topic in the Cratylus. When Hermogenes first argues that the correctness of names is not natural but conventional and arbitrary, names which he has in mind are combinations of sound and meaning. When he later mentions that names for the same things differ with languages(385D9-E3)in order to support his view, names that he mentions imply their sounds only. In this point, he is confused. Plato denies Hermogenes' view, but it is a matter of course that Plato recognizes the fact Hermogenes mentions. Plato describes the fact in the style of a myth(390A4-7). The importance of Plato's view on the correctness of names cannot be understood well if we pay attention to their sounds only. It is best understood, in connection with what is said at Thucydides 3, 82, 4. Plato's view on the correctness of names in the second sense is as follows : It is to have a likeness to "that which is a name(Collective Singular)" (389D7). Also, names given by custom have it to some degree. To what degree? It is the dialectician that judges it case by case(388D6-390C12). If fine names are to be given as custom, it requires the dialectician as its supervisor (390D4-5). The nomothete is not the philosopher(Cf. Guthrie, ib. p. 6. n. 3.), but custom personified. Plato repeats a part of the above-mentioned view after an introductory phrase "Cratylus is right in saying that...."(390d9). Thus, Cratylus' view appears to be approved. However, in the rest of the Cratylus, Cratylus' theory of names is refuted completely. How should this point be interpreted? I understand that Socrates pretends that Cratylus is right in the view assumed to be his(an example of Socratic irony) ; otherwise, it should be understood that the circumstantial participle λεγων is used not modally, but conditionally(cf. Crat. 387C1, Phikb. 34A10, Laws 727A2, 862A1). The rest of the Cratylus considers what the correctness of names is like and shows that it is not as Cratylus thinks. Then, what is it like? I think we can see concretely what the correctness in the second sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 433A8-B1, 533D4-5 and what the correctness in the first sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 476D5-6.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.41-53, 1984

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Many scholars treat the first part of the dialogue (384 c-391 b) as the exposition of Plato's own views about the correctness of names because of its similar phraseology to that of the Republic X and its critical remarks on the Protagorean background of Hermogenes' conventional theory of names. But this treatment not only drops the demarcation between Plato's position and Cratylus', but also prevents them from understanding the overall structure of the dialogue. For, as Bernard Williams recently revealed in his brief but excellent paper, it is Cratylus' natural theory of the correctness of names that Socrates attempts to elaborate with Hermogenes in the next part (391 b-427 d) and then he sets about to refute with Cratylus himself in the final part (427 d-439b). According to my interpretation, however, Plato's strategy is already mentioned to some extent in the first part of the dialogue. Because a name-giving role personified as νομοθετη&b.sigmav; is said not only to precede a name-using role as διδασκαλικο&b.sigmav; but also to be supervised in turn by the dialectician, διαλεκτικο&b.sigmav;, who uses names for discussion. And I suppose these three personified figures to represent the positions of Cratylus, Hermogenes and Socrates respectively. So the main theme in succeeding arguments of the dialogue as well as the dialogue itself seems to be under dialectical supervision. This is a noeud initial of the dialogue. I suggest, therefore, that the notorious etymological section in the second part displays various deviational forms of name-relation from such integral linguistic practice with names as the dialectic. For, though we find in the text somewhat confusing expressions with the same verb 'δηλουν' (to show) , e.g. 'someone shows something by a name.', 'a name shows something to us.', 'a name shows something.', etc., we can presume from them an underlying structure: A shows p with n to B (where A and B are persons, p is a thing, and n a name). This underlying 4-place relation is transformed into the various expressions found in the text without changing the meaning of 'show' in it. But the etymological explanation urges us to think the verb 'show' equivocal like this: A legislator as a name-giver showed^1 something with a name, from which descended name shows^2 it to us. Thus, etymological study turns out to be nothing less than research for original intentions or thoughts of the name-giver-they are usually expressed by a verb 'βουλεσθαι'-, for such intentional factors take advantage of the time- and semantic gap between giving names and deciphering their descendants. But, of course, research for such factors may be uncertain and arbitrary. To do without it, there must be a direct relation between names and things : 'a name shows^3 something'. Being interpreted by similarity, this binary relation though it is also transformed from the same 4-place relation above gets another meaning of 'show': 'a name is a copy of something'. It is this final position of Cratylus' natural theory that is to be refuted in the third part of the dialogue. If we demand the correctness of names for its own sake i.e. apart from our integral linguistic practice, we cannot but rely on either the correspondence between language and reality or tacit consent among people without reference to our understanding the reality whatever we acknowledge it to be. So we must try to understand the truth (that is not the same thing as the correctness anymore) with names and the other linguistic components in the dialectical integrality. This denouement seems to have been already anticipated in the noeud initial of the dialogue.

著者

田中 あや

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.39-50, 2014

著者

新島 龍美

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.36-47, 1993

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<p>This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>