著者
神保 充弘
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)
被引用文献数
1 2

The purpose of this article is to analyze how the sales organization—Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company—was established and developed in the prewar Japanese pharmaceutical industry. An analysis of this achievement is very useful for explaining the process by which the distribution “keiretsu” was formed in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry.It was during the period of high economic growth that the distribution keiretsu was introduced in the Japanese industry in earnest. However, the distribution keiretsu had already been introduced by some pioneer companies before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Some of the companies belonged to the pharmaceutical industry.We consider Taisho Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. as the pioneer companies that introduced the distribution keiretsu in the prewar Japanese pharmaceutical industry. However, it is necessary to study another key company—Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company—in addition to these two companies when we attempt to clarify the origin of the distribution keiretsu in the industry. This is because it is understood that Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company was the pioneer that first introduced the distribution keiretsu in the industry.This article analyzes the period from 1906 to around 1923-1924, because during this period, the sales organization of Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company operated to a large extent and functioned most effectively.
著者
大場 隆広
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_30-2_56, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)

The purpose of this article is to clarify roles of high school graduate workers in Japan from the 1950s to the early 1960s. In particular, I address the following questions: Did high school graduate workers play the same roles as junior high school graduate workers in factories? And, if they played different roles, how were their roles different from those of junior high school graduate workers?In post-war Japan, high school enrollment ratio substantially went up, which led to the increase of high school graduate workers. High school graduates had worked as engineers and white-collars until the 1950s, while junior high school graduates had worked as skilled blue-collar workers. As a result of the increase of high school graduates, they came to be employed as blue-collar workers. The primary goal of this article is to reveal the impact of high school graduate workers on the production and working systems.To make clear the impact, first, I examine questionnaire surveys and other documents. From these surveys and documents, I derive two hypotheses: One hypothesis is that high school graduate workers were employed as substitutions of junior high school graduate workers and thus simply took same roles as junior high school graduate workers. The other hypothesis is that high school graduates contributed to the development of production systems as workers suitable for dealing with new technology, equipment or machines and thus had different roles from junior high school graduate workers.Then, I confirm those hypotheses using the data and reports by the University of Tokyo on three major companies; Hazama-gumi, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries, and Toyo Koatsu Kogyo. All investigations and reports for this study were made in the 1950s or the early 1960s. After examining these data and reports, I statistically analyze whether high school graduate workers had a positive impact on factory's production by using quantitative data. Finally, I make a concluding statement on roles of high school graduate workers and their impact on production systems.
著者
大島 朋剛
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_57-2_88, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)
被引用文献数
1 1

This paper clarifies the structure of the management development in prewar days of a large-scale brewer in Nada, Hyogo Prefecture, observing the source of the profit in the distribution process. Tatsuuma-Honke in Nishinomiya is adopted as an example. The way that should be and the change of the complicated Japanese sake distribution process are considered by an analysis which combined its sales market, sales strategy, and individual management. As a result, the following points were solved in this paper.First, it is confirmed that in the mid-1920s Tatsuuma-Honke established even in Tokyo the relation of maker predominance which was previously being developed in a local market. Although the company did not necessarily persist in its share reservation in the Tokyo market, without being bound by the monopoly right of the brand which remained among each wholesaler, it was meaningful to enable sales with the “Hakushika” brand which it specified itself.In process of the trademark establishment, the production of self-made sake increased and the raising of the bottom level of the quality was achieved. As a result, in Tatsuuma-Honke, it became possible to use a sales strategy which was further conscious of the brand's bottling sales. However, it was more important for Tatsuuma-Honke to internalize the structure which combined a sales method — undiluted sake dealing in a tun unit— called “Oka-Uri” with the opposite character of bottling, and carries out the hedge of the unsold risk. This also meant the possibility that the purchase of the undiluted sake from a minor-scale brewer would be demoted to the 2nd buffer for a large-scale brewer. This indication adds new knowledge to a simple understanding that the former specialized in Oke-Uri and the latter was based on sales of brand sake, as shown by the conventional history of research.The high profitability in the distribution process as the above-mentioned result relatively stabilized the brewing management of Tatsuuma-Honke in the depression of the 1920s. Such a case was just a pattern of the development which preceded the large-scale management in the prewar-days term of the Nada brewing industry.

1 0 0 0 OA 書評

出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.2, pp.2_89-2_97, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)

1 0 0 0 OA Soichiro Asano

著者
Satoshi SAITO
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
Japanese Yearbook on Business History (ISSN:09102027)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, pp.55-75, 2003-03-15 (Released:2010-06-28)
参考文献数
8
著者
砂川 和範
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.4, pp.1-27, 1997
被引用文献数
1 2

The purpose of this article is to analyze the business development and entrepreuriship of Japanese computer game companies such as SEGA, Namco, and Nintendo.<BR>Until the 1970's, these firms were all once small manufactures of amusement machines or toys. How did such relatively small firms in the urban area grow up to be the profitable corporations we see today?<BR>The first step is to analyze how they have been as the leading companies in the fragmented computer game market which has been characterized by frequent changes with increasing speed since the formative years of the industry. Nintendo, the first mover, created its business system based on the strategy of outsourcing in software production and quasi-integration of distributors as "Shoshinkai". SEGA and Namco tried to attack Nintendo's system using the strategy of building internal software development capabilities, which generated software production organizations which are, in using Michael Cusumano's terminology, 'software factories'.<BR>The second step is to analyze the mechanism of the 'software factory' as in the case study of 'AM 2 ken' (the 2nd R & D division of arcade machines) of SEGA. Its origin is intrafirm venture business in the crisis era of the arcade game market in 1985. AM 2 ken has been developing and driving SEGA's innovation since then. Its software production is done by small cross functional teams, and its advantage is based on the communication 'on the shop floor', where old business resources and new technologies are combined. It enabled gestalt change from 'waterfall' model to 'revise' model in grasping the process flow of software production.<BR>The study shows that small manufacturers in the urban area pzoneeringly introduced basic hardware technology from US in 70's and created the new market by developing and concentrating on the innovation of software and contents. In this way, relatively small firms could grow by bypassing the demerit of economy of scale. Here is the logic of 'small is storong'.
著者
松本 純
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.2, pp.48-70, 2001

The main purpose of this article is to clarify the British pattern of the introduction of technical instruction, analyzing the economic influence of the activity of the City and Guilds of London Institute for the Advancement of Technical Education at the end of the 19th century. This paper also focuses upon the fact that the City and Guilds attached importance to the opinion of small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers in Britain.<BR>As a first industrial nation, Britain had preserved entrenched institutional structures since the Industrial Revolution and as regards technical instruction, the state was reluctant to create the polytechnics and the scientific facilities like Germany. In Britain, on the whole, some voluntary societies, one of which was City and Guilds, endeavored to promote technical instruction throughout the 19th century.<BR>The conclusion of this paper can be summarized as follows. City and Guilds, which consisted of members of the Corporation of London and sixteen Livery Companies, conducted a nationwide technological exam for the various types of merchants and manufacturers and built the first technical college, Finsbury Technical College, in London. This college particularly attracted small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers who worked around London and coped with industrialization by relying upon their manual technologies. City and Guilds satisfied their needs concerning higher knowledge or information to catch up with the technical standards of their rivals. Moreover, they provided an opportunity to centralize the technical instruction system in Britain.
著者
武内 達子
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, no.3, pp.48-76,iii, 1981

A principal problem in the management of an industrial enterprise is the judgement in the combination between possible technologies and goods. In iron industry, the amount of pig iron produced in Britain in the industrial revolution was almost doubled in decade, and more than half of the goods were castings for various uses.<BR>In the present paper, the goods of Newton Chambers, iron works specialized to foundry, were analysed based upon Day Books between 1793-1833 at an interval of ten years. The goods were classified into seven groups: (1) goods sold to merchants, mainly domestic uses, (2) tools and machine components, (3) rails and wheels for mines, (4) pig iron, (5) ballasts, (6) water pipes, and (7) gas pipes and components of gas works plants. The company did not produce guns and components of steam engines. The constitution of goods and its variation over the period revealed the trace of the activity of entrepreneur.<BR>The goods which characterize Newton Chambers were cast-iron pipes. Their high quality and low price stimulated new social needs. The great demands for iron pipes had started from 1807 in London for water works and for gas light companies after 1814. The percentage of pipes in the annual sale in 1813 was 20%, in 1823 30%, and 1833 49%. Newton Chambers could survive in serious depressions after Napoleonic War by the great demands for iron pipes.<BR>It is concluded that the success of Newton Chambers is the judgement of adoption and improvement of the production technology for mass production of standardized castings, which combined successfully with the newly developed public works for the improvement of city environments.