著者
矢島 桂
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_59-2_84, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

This article analyzes the basic characteristic of the investment in Korean railways, centering on a relationship between the colonial Government and the investors. We deal with the case of a merger with six railway companies in 1923 as an example.In Korea in the era of colonization, a lot of railway companies were established in 1918-20. But, after the crisis of the postwar period, they could not make profits on their business. The Government had given the railway companies protections and aids to encourage establishing a network of railways, and railway companies, given the Government grants, could keep paying dividends.Early 1920s, the railway companies had difficulties of their business, and their investors were made fluctuated. The government enacted the Private Railway Aid Act to calm down the investors. On the other hand, railway companies bargained about merger as a means of breaking difficulties of their business. Although the Government, at first, opposed it, under the curtailed budget, it became to back up the merger.The railway company which was merged with six companies in 1923, wanted the Government to take burdens to break its difficulties. Kaichi Watanabe who was the president—director of the company, urged that the Government should set up the big project including buying out the lines of the railway companies. He tried to make its difficulties broken by the nationalization of the lines.The Government needed private companies to build a part of railways network. The investors wanted colonial government to take burdens in order to break difficulties of their business. Thus, there was a relationship between colonial government and investors, which restricted each other. While the Government should secure the investments in railways, the investors could parasitize on the Government budget in this scheme.
著者
砂川 和範
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.4, pp.1-27, 1997
被引用文献数
1 1

The purpose of this article is to analyze the business development and entrepreuriship of Japanese computer game companies such as SEGA, Namco, and Nintendo.<BR>Until the 1970's, these firms were all once small manufactures of amusement machines or toys. How did such relatively small firms in the urban area grow up to be the profitable corporations we see today?<BR>The first step is to analyze how they have been as the leading companies in the fragmented computer game market which has been characterized by frequent changes with increasing speed since the formative years of the industry. Nintendo, the first mover, created its business system based on the strategy of outsourcing in software production and quasi-integration of distributors as "Shoshinkai". SEGA and Namco tried to attack Nintendo's system using the strategy of building internal software development capabilities, which generated software production organizations which are, in using Michael Cusumano's terminology, 'software factories'.<BR>The second step is to analyze the mechanism of the 'software factory' as in the case study of 'AM 2 ken' (the 2nd R & D division of arcade machines) of SEGA. Its origin is intrafirm venture business in the crisis era of the arcade game market in 1985. AM 2 ken has been developing and driving SEGA's innovation since then. Its software production is done by small cross functional teams, and its advantage is based on the communication 'on the shop floor', where old business resources and new technologies are combined. It enabled gestalt change from 'waterfall' model to 'revise' model in grasping the process flow of software production.<BR>The study shows that small manufacturers in the urban area pzoneeringly introduced basic hardware technology from US in 70's and created the new market by developing and concentrating on the innovation of software and contents. In this way, relatively small firms could grow by bypassing the demerit of economy of scale. Here is the logic of 'small is storong'.
著者
松本 純
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.2, pp.48-70, 2001

The main purpose of this article is to clarify the British pattern of the introduction of technical instruction, analyzing the economic influence of the activity of the City and Guilds of London Institute for the Advancement of Technical Education at the end of the 19th century. This paper also focuses upon the fact that the City and Guilds attached importance to the opinion of small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers in Britain.<BR>As a first industrial nation, Britain had preserved entrenched institutional structures since the Industrial Revolution and as regards technical instruction, the state was reluctant to create the polytechnics and the scientific facilities like Germany. In Britain, on the whole, some voluntary societies, one of which was City and Guilds, endeavored to promote technical instruction throughout the 19th century.<BR>The conclusion of this paper can be summarized as follows. City and Guilds, which consisted of members of the Corporation of London and sixteen Livery Companies, conducted a nationwide technological exam for the various types of merchants and manufacturers and built the first technical college, Finsbury Technical College, in London. This college particularly attracted small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers who worked around London and coped with industrialization by relying upon their manual technologies. City and Guilds satisfied their needs concerning higher knowledge or information to catch up with the technical standards of their rivals. Moreover, they provided an opportunity to centralize the technical instruction system in Britain.
著者
武内 達子
出版者
Business History Society of Japan
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, no.3, pp.48-76,iii, 1981

A principal problem in the management of an industrial enterprise is the judgement in the combination between possible technologies and goods. In iron industry, the amount of pig iron produced in Britain in the industrial revolution was almost doubled in decade, and more than half of the goods were castings for various uses.<BR>In the present paper, the goods of Newton Chambers, iron works specialized to foundry, were analysed based upon Day Books between 1793-1833 at an interval of ten years. The goods were classified into seven groups: (1) goods sold to merchants, mainly domestic uses, (2) tools and machine components, (3) rails and wheels for mines, (4) pig iron, (5) ballasts, (6) water pipes, and (7) gas pipes and components of gas works plants. The company did not produce guns and components of steam engines. The constitution of goods and its variation over the period revealed the trace of the activity of entrepreneur.<BR>The goods which characterize Newton Chambers were cast-iron pipes. Their high quality and low price stimulated new social needs. The great demands for iron pipes had started from 1807 in London for water works and for gas light companies after 1814. The percentage of pipes in the annual sale in 1813 was 20%, in 1823 30%, and 1833 49%. Newton Chambers could survive in serious depressions after Napoleonic War by the great demands for iron pipes.<BR>It is concluded that the success of Newton Chambers is the judgement of adoption and improvement of the production technology for mass production of standardized castings, which combined successfully with the newly developed public works for the improvement of city environments.