著者

関沢 俊弘

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.1_29-1_55, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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Recent studies contend that Taiwanese small- and medium-sized enterprises not only were able to survive but thrive during Japanese colonial rule. However, the scarcity of primary historical sources has not led to further research in this area. This article analyzes the factors for the business failure of a Japanese enterprise, the Taiwan Canned Pineapple Co. (TCPC), which was the first packer in Taiwan, and through this case study, indirectly highlights the reasons for the resilience of Taiwanese enterprises.TCPC prospered in the early 1920s. However, when many Taiwanese packers entered the market from the mid-1920s, TCPC faced difficulties, even though it adopted the new business policy of focusing on the quantity rather than the quality of products. The causes of TCPC' s slump can be explained as follows.First, the measures taken by TCPC, such as processing by machinery and procurement of pineapples from its own plantation, were not appropriate for the condition of the market and the technology of the pineapple industry at that time. In particular, TCPC' s investment in the pineapple plantation, unlike the situation where most Taiwanese factories did not possess their own pineapple plantations, was a crucial factor for its poor business performance. In marked contrast to TCPC, Taiwanese factories also adopted a labor-intensive method of production, which further contributed to its success in the industry.Second, after the bankruptcy of Suzuki & Co. in 1927, TCPC did not involve trading companies and wholesalers as its shareholders and did not have close connection with them. TCPC, therefore, became disadvantaged not only in sales and marketing but also in financing.Third, the assistance which the Japanese colonial government (Taiwan Sotokufu) provided to TCPC, such as the disposal of government land and lending of machinery, did not help much in facilitating TCPC' s business.In conclusion, this case study shows that Japanese small- and medium-sized enterprises could not compete with Taiwanese enterprises in such labor- intensive light industries as the canned pineapple industry.

著者

林 采成

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wartime transportation control of Japanese National Railways (JNR) and make it clear that the management of JNR reached the limit, as the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid became intense.Since the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR had to cope with the sharply increased transportation demand caused by the industrial development as well as the military operation. In addition to the demand increase, JNR was always requested to supervise and support other companies, especially colonial railways as not only a transportation enterprise but also a regulatory agency to transportation companies. However, JNR was not a passive existence but the one to secure human and physical resources aggressively to some degree in case of negotiations with other ministries as one of the government ministries. As far as the railroad operation was possible, the profit seeking was a subsidiary matter. The persistent cooperation of JNR with Japanese Government and Army was shown by maximum transportation capacity even when JNR had insufficient management resources. Especially, after the breakout of WWII, Japanese wartime economic management could be difficult without the land transportation of JNR which substituted for marine transportation. Nonetheless, JNR resisted Japanese Army's intention to seize the railroad management right, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Army until the end of war.As a result, an efficient railroad operation system was accomplished according to the evolution of wartime economy and military situation. But, it reached the limit because of the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid.

著者

矢島 桂

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_59-2_84, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

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This article analyzes the basic characteristic of the investment in Korean railways, centering on a relationship between the colonial Government and the investors. We deal with the case of a merger with six railway companies in 1923 as an example.In Korea in the era of colonization, a lot of railway companies were established in 1918-20. But, after the crisis of the postwar period, they could not make profits on their business. The Government had given the railway companies protections and aids to encourage establishing a network of railways, and railway companies, given the Government grants, could keep paying dividends.Early 1920s, the railway companies had difficulties of their business, and their investors were made fluctuated. The government enacted the Private Railway Aid Act to calm down the investors. On the other hand, railway companies bargained about merger as a means of breaking difficulties of their business. Although the Government, at first, opposed it, under the curtailed budget, it became to back up the merger.The railway company which was merged with six companies in 1923, wanted the Government to take burdens to break its difficulties. Kaichi Watanabe who was the president—director of the company, urged that the Government should set up the big project including buying out the lines of the railway companies. He tried to make its difficulties broken by the nationalization of the lines.The Government needed private companies to build a part of railways network. The investors wanted colonial government to take burdens in order to break difficulties of their business. Thus, there was a relationship between colonial government and investors, which restricted each other. While the Government should secure the investments in railways, the investors could parasitize on the Government budget in this scheme.

著者

菊池 航

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_3-3_26, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

65

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate one aspect of competition between firms in the post-war Japanese automobile industry, using the development competition surrounding the rotary engine as a case study. This paper examines the evolution of development competition, while focusing on the factors underlying Toyo Kogyo’s success in achieving practical application of the rotary engine, and the reasons why competing firms participated in the development of rotary engines.The late 1960s was a time when Toyota and Nissan increased their shares of the Japanese market, establishing an oligopolistic system dominated by two companies. Toyota increased its market share by outsourcing some assembly and development to itaku firms, and realizing a full-line strategy. Toyo Kogyo, on the other hand, successfully developed the world’s first practical rotary engine in 1967, and executed a differentiation strategy of supplying automobiles equipped with rotary engines. Toyo Kogyo believed that new expressways and road networks would increase demand for rotary engine automobiles with superior acceleration performance. Key factors which enabled Toyo Kogyo to achieve the technical innovation of a practical rotary engine were their outstanding technical capabilities, based on their high rate of in-house production, and the existence of a dealer network which learned the special maintenance techniques needed for rotary engines.For competing firms, the rotary engine was one possible technology for complying with emission regulations. Taking the new emission regulations as an opportunity, GM, Ford, Toyota, and Nissan participated in rotary engine development, which had thus far been led by Toyo Kogyo, thus resulting in broader development competition. This was a competition to find environmental technology, and involved firms from the U.S. as well as Japan. Therefore, when fuel prices rose due to the oil crisis, and practical three-way catalysts meeting emissions standards were developed, the competing companies withdrew from rotary engine development.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.28-80, 2020 (Released:2022-12-30)

著者

ドンゼ ピエール=イブ

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.4_3-4_27, 2010 (Released:2012-03-23)

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Unlike its American and Japanese rivals, the Swiss watch making industry did not adopt the form of the big enterprise in the 20th century but organized itself as an industrial district. Whereas it dominated 90% of world market around 1900, the Swiss watch making industry accounted a total of 663 firms (1901), of which only seven employed more than 500 workers. They were mainly small family firms specialized in a single part of the process of production which was characterized by a horizontal and vertical division of labor.Moreover, an original feature of this industry was the set up of a cartel during the interwar, with the aim to protect its industrial district structure, on the one hand, and to control technology transfer, on the other hand. The raise of protectionism throughout the world after 1918 led indeed to a tendency of exporting unfinished watches and to assemble them within the countries where there were sold, a practice known as chablonnage. This technology transfer sustained the expansion of rival companies, especially in the US and in Japan. In order to put an end to such a practice, the Swiss watch makers gathered in unions which adopted in 1928 some agreements which the main objectives were to ban chablonnage and to maintain in Switzerland an organization as an industrial district. These agreements were strengthened by the set up in 1931 of a holding company for controlling parts and movements makers (ASUAG) and by the intervention of the State which legalized this cartel (1934).Nevertheless, this cartelization could not prevent the appearance of newcomers after 1945, particularly in the US and in Japan. The cartel was eventually abandoned in the 1960's, in order to make it possible a modernization of the structures of the Swiss watch making industry to improve its competitiveness on the world market.

著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The main thrust of this study is to shed light on the management situation at the coastal industrial railway, which performed the function of linking factories of the coastal industrial area with the main trunk line, and also to shed light on its relationship with the companies in the coastal industrial area. This is a case study of the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway Co. that was built in the Keihin Industrial Area after the World War I.What was epoch-making about the coastal industrial area was that it functioned as an ‘industrial port’ which allowed large ships to berth at private wharves. Many companies in the Keihin Industrial Area of the 1920s required overland transport for procurement of materials and resources, and to ship their goods to Tokyo and Yokohama in the hinterlands. Initially, the coastal industrial railway was a plan which petitioned for construction of a branch link from the main trunk line by the government railway. However, in 1924, this changed to a plan where a private railway called the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway would be built after it received investment from land reclamation companies and other companies.The choice of a private railway helped to rapidly open up the Keihin Industrial Area rail system to traffic, but there were more than a few problems that arose from this. In particular, the high fares for straight-through transport with the government railway led to growing dissatisfaction from the recessionary companies along the railway line during the 1930s.Many similar problems faced by the management of the private coastal industrial railway receded into the background for a period from the war boom in 1937. However, the protracted nature and worsening course of the war, particularly with respect to freight transportation, were a crushing burden on the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway and was a factor in it being nationalized in 1943.

著者

金 明洙

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

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The present paper aims to shed light on the actual performance of corporate management by the Japanese people who resided in colonial Chosen, with the main emphasis placed on a case study regarding Chosen Agricultural Encouragement Company. JRCCs went over korea mainly in the latter part of Meiji period. Also I would like to pay attention to the Kada Family that undertook CAEC in 1917. Because CAEC continued from 1907 up until Japan was defeated, the case of CAEC helps analyzing corporate management of JRCC. The research results are as follows.First, the background for the Japanese enterprises which were established in Chosen after the Japanese Russian War consisted of three components: (1) the colonization policy for Korea, (2) the investment for Korea of the regional level, and (3) the entrepreneurs who supported those policies. The case of CAEC is that of Yamaguchi prefecture, and the whaling traders of Yamaguchi prefecture played a important role in establishing CAEC and managing it.Second, the corporate management of JRCC had a feature that JRCC reacted sensitively to various policies of the Chosen governor—general prefecture and sometimes changed business items with adjusting to policy change of CGGP.Third, the case study of CAEC shows that the entrepreneurs of a group in the colonial period were pursuing their business activities from the viewpoint of the whole Japanese empire. In case of the Kada Family, the management cooperation of Tokyo Kada group, Taiwan Kada group, and CAEC was supposed.Last, the alternation of generation of JRCC entrepreneurs brought some changes to the corporate management of them, i.e., the change to a special manager from a venturesome and police-dependent businessman.By the way, when the plans related to trust business etc. failed, CAEC came to pursue speculative real estate activities, effectively utilizing the increased demand for the factory site which accompanied “Korean industrialization” in the 1930's. In other words, CAEC put emphasis on the activities of the so-called “land broker” in 1932 onwards.

著者

山藤 竜太郎

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

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The purpose of this article is to determine how and why Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system at its Shanghai branch. We investigated the case of Mitsui & Co. because it is the oldest and biggest general trading company (GTC), and it has increased its Chinese branches in the years straddling the 1900s. We focus on Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch because it was the first Chinese branch for Mitsui & Co., and it served as the headquarters for its Chinese branches. Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch abolished the comprador system in 1899. This was a precedent for the other Chinese branches of Mitsui & Co. and other companies, for example, other Japanese and German trading companies.We illustrate three reasons for the abolishment of the comprador system at Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch. The first reason was Mitsui & Co.'s comprador himself. The comprador had a distinctive character. He drew salary as an employee, earned commission as an agent, and had a group of staffs. A typical comprador has the character of an employee and an agent and a group of staffs.The second reason was the influence of the off-the-job training (off-JT) program. The overseas off-JT program was launched in April 1898 and January 1899. Preceding studies advocate that the off-JT program undermined Mitsui & Co.'s comprador system. However, Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system in July 1899 at its Shanghai branch; thus, the trainees employed thereafter were on training and not on the job.The third reason was the human resource practices of Mitsui & Co. Employees that they cultivated during their professional practice in Mitsui & Co. and went on to become managers to deal with some goods in 1899.Mitsui & Co. cut down costs on the salary and commissions provided to the comprador, increased its trading partners, and adopted a long-term marketing strategy because of the abolishment of the comprador system.

著者

Rika Fujioka

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Research in Business History (ISSN:1349807X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, pp.11-27, 2014 (Released:2015-09-29)

被引用文献数

2

著者

坂出 健

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.1_3-1_27, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This article focuses on the decision-making process of Prime Minister Heath's administration toward the corporate failure of Rolls-Royce. I chose this process in light of the fact that modern airliner projects were too big to be managed by private corporations. I will examine not only the question, “Why did Rolls-Royce go bankrupt?”, but also “Why did the Heath administration leave Rolls-Royce to go bankrupt?”In March 1968, Rolls-Royce made a contract for producing RB211 engines for Lockheed's TriStar airliners. At that time, Lockheed and Rolls-Royce expected the TriStar/RB211 to enjoy a monopoly in the medium-range wide-bodied airliner market. However, the expected production quantity for the RB211 had been shrinking. Rolls-Royce, therefore, could not absorb the escalation of the development costs of the RB211 project and, consequently, suffered a severe liquidity crisis. At the time of the first liquidity crisis in October 1970, the Heath administration pulled out of a commitment from the City as money lenders to Rolls-Royce. At the time of the second liquidity crisis in January 1971, the Heath administration decided to leave Rolls-Royce to go into bankruptcy. If the RB211 were to be cancelled, it would certainly cause the chain bankruptcy of Lockheed. As a result, Lockheed, the United States Nixon administration, the British Heath administration, and the United States bank group started negotiations over the continuation of the TriStar/RB211 project. By June 1971, the United States bank group agreed to provide a new $250 million loan to Lockheed subject to a debt guarantee by the United States government. With this new loan, Lockheed had the room to raise the price of the RB211 engines.Faced with the crisis of this prestigious national corporation. the Heath administration did not bail out Rolls-Royce by limitless government financial commitment but rather ‘bailed in’ concerned business interests — namely, the City, Lockheed, and the United States bank group.

著者

山内 雄気

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_3-1_30, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper examines the fashion business by focusing on the entrepreneurship of a Japanese wholesales merchant Inanishi & Co. in the 1920s in order to demonstrate the dynamism of the creation of fashion. Inanishi played a central role in making season colors and designs using the silk textile “Meisen,” which was one of the first leading commodities accepted by the masses in Japan.In the late 1910s department stores in Japan enjoyed increased bargaining power in the consumer market. Against the backdrop of this power they decreased the volume of trade with wholesalers while starting to deal directly with the silk textile producers. The reason for this shift was to increase the number of sales promotions and shift their strategy to fit the mass market. For that purpose they made use of Meisen.Inanishi was deeply concerned about their weakening power as a middleman and wanted to find a place for themselves in business relations with department stores. As the Meisen market expanded from the late 1910s, Inanishi noticed that achieving both product differentiation and mass production had become the new business challenge for the textile industry in the 1920s.Inanishi designed a unique fashion creation system by utilizing both silk textile producers and department stores. Inanishi tried to survive by collecting fashion information from major department stores, and then spreading it to silk textile producers by publishing the monthly magazine “Sensyoku-no-Ryuko” and organizing a textile fair twice a year. By getting information from these two channels, producers may also have been attempting to decrease the uncertainty in the distribution process. As a result of complicated interaction between the department stores, the wholesalers and the silk textile producers, the fashion creation and diffusion system was constructed.

著者

林 采成

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_27-3_50, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

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This paper examines the constitution of JNR Workplace Committee and its administration from the prewar to the wartime periods and analyzes the process and the reality of JNR labor movement that subsumed into the Familism. The Workplace Committee attempted to internalize the labor movement by letting the laborers display their dissatisfaction as well as the demand as a part of adaptation mechanism within the internal organization, sometimes offering the opportunities for fringe benefits and promotion. This was the reality of the labormanagement relations that subsumed into the JNR’s Familism. Even though the Workplace Committee functioned as the passage to obtain better working environment during the 1920s, in the 1930s, it became to be a defensive mechanism that dealt with delayed follow-ups for the issues brought up by the pay raise and the promotion. In the background of such transformation, there was the existence of the antagonistic labor union that pressured the authorities to consider the demand of the Workplace Committee, as well as the JNR’s economic foundation that enabled its realization. The adaptation of the Workplace Committee to the JNR system deepened in the 1930s and it transformed into ‘the Service Society’ during the wartime period. The price of “service” was the improvement of labor treatment and the stability of livelihood. The postwar JNR labor-management relations began on the basis of these factors.

著者

牧 幸輝

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_49-2_73, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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This article aims to explore the business vision of Risaburo Toyoda and examine his management of Toyoda Gyoudan [Toyota Industrial Group(TIG)] with emphasis on his entrepreneurial network. Although, Kiichiro Toyoda is well known as the “founder” of Toyota Motor Corporation, in fact, he was not in a position to make final decisions. His brother-in-law, Risaburo, was the president of Toyota Motor Corporation as well as the CEO of TIG. Therefore, the study of TIG including Toyota Motor Corporation must devote special attention to Risaburo. Nevertheless, he has not been judged rightly, and has often been regarded as a hindrance to Toyota's rise in the automobile business. This article aims to reexamine his positive role and the organizational structure of TIG, regarded as a “local Zaibatsu”.One of the most important facets of Risaburo was why he decided to enter the automobile industry. This article shows that in the 1930s, he had predicted the rise of Japan's heavy industry and the decline of its textile industry, and he managed to convert TIG's basic business from textiles to heavy industries.It is well known that Zaibatsu and Emerging Corporate groups were disorganized during the wartime economy due to diversification of affiliated companies. On the other hand, TIG, which was a late-comer in the corporate group, was still primarily controlled by the Toyoda family. A lack of external capital needed to enter the automobile business along with wartime corporate controls had threatened its management structure, but Risaburo secured cooperative stakeholders and reorganized TIG, making Toyota Kinyu [Toyota Finance Company] a holding company. Consequently, TIG kept the family-controlled management structure. In this process, Risaburo made the most of his entrepreneurial network and exercised leadership as the CEO.

著者

Takao Shiba

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Yearbook on Business History (ISSN:09102027)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.100-118, 1986-03-15 (Released:2010-06-28)

参考文献数

55

著者

満薗 勇

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_31-1_57, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

3

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The purpose of this article is to examine the business model of the mail order of the department store during the prewar period in Japan. With the maintenance of postal services, the major kimono retailers which were changing to department store began the mail order business in 1890-1900s. They considered it to be central means to go into the local market. It was intended for people of the wealthy groups and continued developing until the beginning in 1920s.The business model of it was characterized by a choosing agent. That is to say, a salesclerk of the mail order section considered an appointed price and a taste of each customer and chose goods in place of the customer. This model was obliged to be started because it took too much a cost to make the catalogue which contained all items. It was a cause to raise the cost that Japanese consumption markets were various complicatedly. However, considering that people in the countryside did not have enough information about urban goods because of the undeveloped media, this model had convenience and rationality. For the purpose of choosing the suitable goods, the salesclerk sometimes went on a business trip to do sales and tried to grasp the characteristic of local markets and the taste of customers. In addition, each department store raised the brand image of the store by an advertisement and guaranteed returning or exchanging goods.After the latter half of 1920s, the sales of the mail order business did not expand because a popularization strategy did not succeed in contrast with store - based sales. The catalogue which contained all items was not made after all; consequently orders from the people of the middle groups, who got enough information from ladies' magazines and liked to choose goods by oneself, did not increase.

著者

金 花

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_3-4_28, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

参考文献数

46

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High-tech industries have played a role in the rapid development of the Chinese economy. However, few companies that had operated under the planned economy until the liberalization and reforms in 1978 could generate and lead high-tech industries. In this situation, university-industry collaboration was promoted under government backing and has contributed to the development of high-tech industries in China.This study aims to first clarify the actual state and development of university-industry collaboration from the 1990s to the 2000s, and then, to describe the mechanism of university-industry-government collaboration through case studies.Two periods are shown through this study. The first is an era of a direct type of industrial creation in the 1990s, represented by university-run enterprises. This study finds that from the late 1980s to the 1990s, university-run enterprises in China increased rapidly as universities had to acquire research funds on their own because of the government’s fiscal predicament. Moreover, companies were not recipients of technology transfer, and thus, engineers in universities had to commercialize their technologies by themselves. As a result, academia outside the market complemented industry by creating and driving the development of new industries.The second is an era of an indirect type of industrial creation from the 2000s onward. This study shows that in the early 2000s, owing to economic reforms, the direct collaboration between universities and university-run enterprises was discarded and university-run enterprises took the form of university-owned enterprises. Furthermore, this ongoing period emphasizes new technology transfer, as well as incubation facilities such as university-founded science parks. Universities now transfer technologies to outside companies, rather than form companies themselves. Thus, the universities’ role has changed from commercialization of technologies through university-run enterprises to enhancement of competitiveness among companies through technology transfers.

著者

張 楓

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.4, pp.4_48-4_73, 2012 (Released:2014-09-10)

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This paper clarifies the growth of the furniture industry during the postwar high-growth period in Bingo Fuchu, where is famous as a production center for high-class marriage furniture. With the increase in income during the postwar high-growth period, there was a growth in the bridal market as well, thereby it lead to an expansion of the high-class marriage furniture market. Against this background, it was evident that Bingo Fuchu had been also rapidly expanding as one of the most famous production centers for high-class marriage furniture in Japan. We consider the following two aspects as being of great significance in the popularizing Bingo Fuchu as a production center for high-class marriage furniture. First, the production system for Bingo Fuchu's original high-class marriage furniture and that for mass products were coexisted and led by backbone manufacturers. This aspect is different from that indicated previous studies which emphasize mechanization and mass production. Further, the creation of a new advanced system (specialized Planning Management Division, enhanced manufacturing facilities, etc.) and enhancing existing provincial cooperation among associated local enterprises made it possible for the production system to be constructed in Bingo Fuchu. Second, in order to construct a new distribution system for increasing sales, a burgeoning production center was necessary, since there were no local wholesalers in Bingo Fuchu. Thus, a new distribution system was constructed as a supplementary to establish wholesalers who played a central function in distribution, as indicated by previous studies; this system was characterized mainly by development of the trade fair business. Initially, certain backbone manufacturers enabled Bingo Fuchu to acquire the reputation of being a production centre of high-class marriage furniture from the end of the 1950's to the beginning of the 1960's. This was done by conducting nationwide exhibitions in reputed furniture stores and winning prizes for excellence on the basis of market evaluation. Further, local trade fairs in Bingo Fuchu led by the unions in the middle of the 60's also played a vital role in the establishment of Bingo Fuchu's reputation. At these trade fairs, a long-term dealing relationship was established between wholesalers and retailers through the disclosure of production information. In addition, almost simultaneously, manufacturer's sales offices were established in Bingo Fuchu as distribution points and sales bases in order to attempt strengthening ties with business partners and customers.

著者

時里 奉明

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_28-2_48, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristic of securing and the management of manpower by analyzing the housing policy of a government-owned Yahata ironworks.Yahata ironworks has constructed workman's house before operation begins. The reason was because an area cannot supply a workman with a house.After Yujirou Nakamura assumes the position of the third president, the house is explained as part of the welfare facilities. The purpose of Yahata ironworks's establishing the welfare facilities is to prevent the movement of the workman who had actually faced, and to press established. It was expected of the workman to be skilled because the uneasiness of life was canceled by the welfare facilities, and it worked for a long term. Moreover, it was planned for the workman to live according to Yahata ironworks, and to train the loyalty that even the descendant worked at Yahata ironworks. It does to the welfare policy after the model of the enterprise like an acknowledged Krupp ironworks in Germany.Yahata ironworks makes the residential area, encloses necessary manpower to the region that is, and is crowded. And, Yahata ironworks establishes other welfare facilities in the residential area, and straightens the mechanism that the workman's life is wholly managed. Yahata ironworks will do the welfare policy of the workman supporting entirely with a core of the housing policy.Thus, Yahata ironworks chose the road where the welfare policy of a German enterprise was wholly introduced. If so, it will be able to be said that Yahata ironworks had the historical significance of presenting the shape of new Japanese firm starting with the housing policy.

著者

磯村 昌彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_29-4_51, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The study analyzes a steel plate purchasing system for automobiles, which exists between steel and automobile industries, from the perspective of genetic theory, with a focus on a centralized purchasing system.The centralized purchasing system is a system in which an automaker attempts to procure steel plates not only for its in-house use but also for the use of parts and other manufacturers.The centralized purchasing system differs among automakers. The controlled self-supply method employed by Toyota is the most efficient; how has this method been developed and formulated?Toyota's centralized purchasing system for steel plate procurement began during the World War II. At that time, Toyota was using direct supply method. The company then eventually developed the current efficient controlled self-supply method after twists and turns, including the virtual abandonment of the centralized purchasing system at one point.During such process of development, Toyota's procurement policy that included long-term stability, co-existence and co-prosperity, and self-dependency had been important. The existence of the policy and that of parts manufacturers and Toyota Tsusho Corporation, which developed based on synergistic effects with the policy, has enabled the adoption of the controlled self-supply system.Also, the purpose of the centralized purchasing system has evolved from an initial response to the procurement difficulty of steel plates to the current system with the rationality of competition that excels in “Quality, Cost, and Delivery.”In other words, Toyota's centralized purchasing system has not been based on prior agreement; nor has its development been following a linear path.