出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.4_76-4_94, 2010 (Released:2012-03-23)

著者

平山 勉

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.1_28-1_51, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

---

The purpose of this article is to clarify reorganization process of production system in the metal mold industry in the first half of the high growth era. In the preceding literature has mainly focused on the positive investment in the metal mold manufacture of this period, and overlooked the shift of the production system which played on important role for the development of this industry. Therefore, this paper focused on the metal mold industry of Tokyo, and examined reorganization of production system.In the metal mold industry at the high-growth period, the shift from comprehensive controI production system to segment control production system has advanced rapidly. The expansion of the mold market caused the shortage of skilled labor. Because it took time to promote skilled labor, it was difficult in comprehensive control production system correspond to the expansion. Therefore, the system of production system that did not need the skilled labor was pursued in the metal mold industry. And, the aggressive capital investment in the latter half of the 1950's had big influence on the shift of the system. The introduction of a special machine and new and powerful equipment enabled the dismantlement of the skilled labor. As a result, the production process was divided, and the skilled labor came to be concentrated on the processes which required the high skilled labor.Thus, the metal mold manufacturing at the high-growth period had reorganized the system of production flexibly with the problem. In addition the productivity of this system was higher than the comprehensive control production system. Therefore, in this article, it is confirmed the expansion of the mold market led the reorganization of the production system which resulted in the high productivity.

著者

三鍋 太朗

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.1_52-1_78, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

---

This paper aims to illustrate recruitment, wages, and the working conditions of ship's officers with a special reference to Mitsui Line, the shipping division of Mitsui & Co. in the 1920s.There were thirteen mercantile marine schools in Japan in the 1920s. Mitsui Line hired the new graduates of these schools as officers and engineers. Every year for the first half of the 1920s, Mitsui Line employed many new graduates. Consequently, approximately 50% of the officers and engineers comprised young employees with less than five years of service.Employees' monthly income comprised three parts : base salary, extra salary, and additional salary for sea-service. In the wake of First World War, the Japanese economy experienced inflation and there was a rapid increase in wages. Mitsui Line had to take adequate measures in response to this new situation. The company introduced the component of “extra salary” after controlling the base salary. This extra salary component continued even after the war. The officers' bonus was equivalent to the total monthly income for five or six months. Additionally, the company paid a large sum as retirement allowance to its officers. In the case of employees with 25 years of service, the retirement allowance was equivalent to the base salary for 135 months, which constituted approximately 20∼30 thousand yen.However, the working conditions of officers and engineers were very arduous. They were required to have onboard experience for about 300 days per year during the interwar period. In the case of officers, the working hours per day were about twelve. Apart from being on watch daily, they had to manage rnany desk tasks such as cargo planning. In those days, cargo planning was a tedious task. The living conditions in ships were severe, especially in the engine rooms. Mitsui Line provided high salaries and retirement allowances in exchange for long-term, rigorous labor. Compared to the white-collar staff of other large Japanese enterprises, it can be said that Mitsui Line's treatment of the employees was not particularly good.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.1_79-1_93, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_85-2_93, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

著者

下川 浩一

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_31-3_43, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

著者

曳野 孝

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_60-3_70, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

参考文献数

17

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_71-3_88, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

著者

北浦 貴士

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_58-1_77, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

---

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the contents and significance of the regulations implemented by local governments prior to the enforcement of the initial commercial law in 1893, when Japanese corporations introduced the concept of limited liability, the fundamental characteristic of corporation law. Taking up the cases of Tokyo and Osaka as examples, this paper discusses how the regulations urged newly established corporations to complete their capitals.During the depression after 1882, not a few corporations went into bankruptcy and some of the promoters committed fraud. Under such circumstances, the judiciary denied the corporations' limited liability to protect creditors. This, however, had considerable adverse effects on the general stockholders who had extensively invested in the stock market.The governments of Tokyo and Osaka immediately implemented two measures to address this issue. First, they executed the inquiries into the properties of the promoters. This measure was expected to prevent the authorized initial stockholders from committing fraud, failing to pay the money for acquiring stocks, and committing embezzlement. In addition, the investigation into the promoters' properties eventually compelled them to make an initial payment to acquire the companies' stocks at the time of the formation of the companies. As a result, the companies' assets were secured. Such a practice was imperative in propagating the idea of the limited liability in general. The second measure was the instructions for the companies to amend their rules of operation. This regulation was to ensure that the rules conform to the fundamental provisions of a corporation, that is, the limited liability, the payment of stocks, and the organization of the corporation. This measure also had the effect to secure the assets of the corporations.In conclusion, the above-mentioned regulation eventually propagated the idea of the limited liability. This conclusion can be verified by the fact that the Tokyo Appellate Court, which had previously denied the limited liability of the stock companies, was forced to amend its ruling.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_78-1_92, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

著者

石井 里枝

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_30-2_58, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

---

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the management and governance of a joint-stock company in Japan in the 1910s, focusing on the case of the Tone Electric Power Company. The Tone Electric Power Company was established in 1909, whose supply area was assumed to be Gunma prefecture at first. However, through mergers and acquisitions of electricity companies in the neighborhood, it grew up to be a big business beyond a regional company, covering four prefectures as the supply area. Tone Electric Power's history is a good case for investigating the evolution of management and governance in a Japanese regional company.In the governance of the Tone Electric Power Company, the large stockholders basically played a central role, and in this sense, the corporate governance structure was close to the classic shareholders sovereignty. However, it is notable that the shareholders were not monolithic and each large shareholder acted for his own interest. And in this situation, the employed manager, Sozo Osawa, gradually got power and became relatively independent from the shareholders. This fact suggests that the governance structure of the Tone Electric Power was in transition from the classic one in the 1910s.

著者

高柳 友彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.3, pp.3_3-3_27, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)

---

This research discusses how regional societies used and managed newly discovered hot springs in the post-Meiji period, as well as the significance and limits of hot spring management by corporations, through an examination of the establishment process and management trends of Nagaoka-Kosen Co., which was set up for hot spring operation and maintenance.Nagaoka-Kosen was established as a body to replace the functions of the ward which regulated conflicts over hot spring use by private individuals. This was because a body with legal characteristics was necessary in Nagaoka ward, which lacked a property ward. Nagaoka-Kosen, which was set up by regional residents, led development and functioned as the body for the unified operation and management of newly discovered hot springs. Meanwhile, inn owners who used hot springs as well as new residents in hot spring areas were excluded from the shareholding structure. By prohibiting the operation of inns by shareholders, they succeeded in restraining private interests.However, as Nagaoka-Kosen undertook unified hot spring ownership and management, the need to develop new hot springs arose in response to the increase in users. In addition, there was a change in hot spring use, with hot springs formerly used for public baths (sotoyu) being utilized as bathing areas of inns. The change in hot spring use transformed Nagaoka-Kosen into a body to supply hot springs to inns. As a result of the need for a hot spring development company arising from the increase in users, the financial burden of shareholders also increased.Until the pre-war period, Nagaoka-Kosen supplemented the fund increase necessary for development with contributions from shareholders. However, as a result of the increase in users and change in hot spring use, they reached a limit in securing funds, and following World War II, they were prompted to reorganize the company structure.

著者

青地 正史

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.3, pp.3_28-3_46, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)

---

In 1944-1949, the “Gunjugaisha Hou (Law of Corporations for War Supplies)” and the “Kaishatourinjisochi Hou (Law on Extraordinary Measures for Corporations, etc.)”, old Japanese laws, provided exceptions to the Japanese Commercial Law revised in 1938: both laws restricted stockholders' rights in rules of procedure for meetings of stockholders. However, it remains unclear whether these rules were enforced in those days. The purpose of this paper is to clarify that question.During the war, the Gunjugaisha Hou gave priority to national interests over stockholders' interests (the principle of product first). In contrast, the Kaishatourinjisochi Hou gave priority to cost savings of opening stockholders' meeting over all other matters. Using the same reasoning, the latter law was continued during the Postwar Reconstruction Period.Were these laws actually effective? According to the minutes of the proceedings in a stockholders' meeting of the Zaibatsu companies such as Mitsubishi Jukougyou and Mitsubishi Denki, in 1944-1946, the calling of stockholders' meetings depended on a public announcement, not a notice, and important decisions, such as the amending the statutes of the company, depended on simple, not prudent processes. The stockholders' meetings of Nihon Chisso Hiryou and Nihon Sekiyu (non-Zaibatsu companies) were carried out similarly.In conclusion, the Gunjugaisha Hou and the Kaishatourinjisochi Hou were effective in those days.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.3, pp.3_47-3_85, 2008 (Released:2012-02-11)

著者

大島 久幸

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.4, pp.4_3-4_27, 2009 (Released:2012-02-11)

---

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between changes in shipping markets and trading companies' shipping businesses from the first decade of the 1900s through the 1920s. In shipping markets during the period through the First World War, in which concentrated chartering markets such as the Baltic market played a very important role, Mitsui & Co. employed centralized management of branch offices, expanding its shipping sections, which constituted internal markets. However, as the role of liners grew with expansion of the scheduled shipping network beginning in the second half of the 1920s, the transportation functions of general trading companies began to operate in an autonomous and decentralized fashion at the branch offices that managed each scheduled service. At this time, large shippers such as Mitsui & Co. maintained their competitive strengths by concluding tariff contracts with under-the-table rebates. As a result of such changes in shipping functions, trading companies' domestic shipping sections were forced to choose whether to shift to common carriers or to contract in size through external sourcing of freight space. While under the leadership of its manager Kawamura the shipping division of Mitsui & Co. chose the former option, Mitsubishi Corp. chose the latter.

著者

齊藤 直

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.4, pp.4_28-4_54, 2009 (Released:2012-02-11)

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper aims to illustrate the pressure from the capital market brought to even national policy concerns, by analyzing the relationship between Taiwan Development Company (TDC) and its shareholders.In most of previous researches, TDC's shareholders were supposed to be “stable shareholders,” which would not sell their stocks even if the investment destination shows poor business performance, because TDC is a national policy concern. In the procedure of founding TDC in 1936, “stable shareholders” were welcomed and, in fact, two thirds stocks were allocated to foundation members and institutional shareholders such as sugar manufacturing companies or zaibatsu holding companies. However, it is not empirically supported that they did not sell their stocks in the secondary market.In this paper, we investigate selling and buying by all shareholders of TDC, using the list of shareholders from 1937 to 1943, and illustrate the counterplan arranged by managers of TDC, analyzing the company documents. The main findings of this paper are as follows.1) Individual minority shareholders had continuously sold their stocks since shortly after the foundation of TDC. As a result, the number of shareholders had gradually decreased.2) Institutional shareholders began to sell the stocks of TDC from around the latter half of 1941. Even sugar manufacturing companies except for Meiji Seito sold their stocks at this time. And when TDC increased capital in 1942, considerable parts of institutional shareholders did not subscribe newly issued stocks.3) The managers of TDC seriously recognized the pressure from the capital market and attempted to raise profitability and seek new shareholders.4) It is financial institutions such as mutual loan companies or life insurance companies that purchases stocks of TDC, which were sold by institutional shareholders. They should be considered to have financially supported TDC since around 1941.

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.4, pp.4_55-4_80, 2009 (Released:2012-02-11)

---

In the early 1950s, it was pointed out by the MOF's financial inspectors that almost all small and medium sized banks lacked the modern bureaucratic management structures with scientific business analyses, formally rational procedures and rules. Thus, the banks were instructed by the inspectors on improving their management structures in the modern bureaucratization like Weberian's meanings.According to the inspectors' perceptions, the degrees of the improvements among each group of banks were differed during the 1950s. The regional Banks' improvements in their management structures weren't progressed completely until the end of 1950s. The mutual banks' improvements in their management structures weren't nearly progressed until the same era. To sum up, the direction of the instructions as to the banking managements by the inspectors was the one to change the banking managements from non-bureaucratic and non-effective ways of the managements to a bureaucratic and more effective ways.Through the process shown above, the modernization in the banking management structures was led by the MOF's financial inspectors toward the final stage in the end of the 1950s.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.4, pp.4_81-4_106, 2009 (Released:2012-02-11)

著者

平野 創

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_29-1_55, 2008 (Released:2011-10-18)

被引用文献数

2

---

The purpose of this paper is to describe how coordination of plant investment in the petrochemical industry by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not achieve its originally intended function.In 1967, MITI established a 300,000 ton standard for annual production of ethylene in order achieve economies of scale and strengthen international competitiveness. This standard sets the minimum size for new ethylene manufacturing facilities at annual production of 300,000 tons. In this way, MITI aimed to avoid overcapacity and consolidate investment. Part of the background behind establishing this standard was the ulterior motive of leading firms, who wished to block the entry of relatively weak latecomer firms.The intentions of MITI and the leading firms were realized comparatively well, based on the 300,000 ton standard, in initial coordination of plant investment. Facility construction was only approved for 5 companies, primarily leading firms. Furthermore, the scale of investment in the overall industry was restrained at a smaller scale than would have been the case had each firm invested freely.However, demand for petrochemical products subsequently increased more than expected, resulting in a situation different from that which was originally intended. In later coordination of plant investment, MITI concluded that it was necessary to construct more facilities to satisfy future demand, in response to the growth in demand at that time. Accordingly, new facility construction by 4 companies was gradually recognized. Due to growth in demand, MITI's policy of blocking the entry of latecomer firms lost its legitimacy. In the final phase, MITI recognized active construction of new facilities to match the increase in demand.

著者

宮崎 忠恒

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_56-1_86, 2008 (Released:2011-10-18)

---

This paper focuses on problem about management and collection of the loans by government financial institution. Specifically, this article examines how the Japan Development Bank (JDB, Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkou) managed and collected loans that taken over from the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB, Fukkou Kinyuu Kinko) in the first half of the 1950s.The RFB, which played an important role in reconstruction of Japanese economy after World War II by supplying industrial funds, was disbanded in January 1952. Its vast uncollected loans were taken over by the JDB. Since then, the JDB managed and collected those loans.Among those loans, loans to coal mining industry were the biggest one measured by outstanding loans and amount of collection. In addition, collection rate of loans to that industry was lowest at end of March 1956.In the first half of 1950s, for the JDB, collected money of those loans was important resource on its own activities. Therefore, the JDB selected to mitigate collection from coal mining industry on its own managerial point of view. Around the same time, the Government, whose priority was put on cutting price of coal, made several plans that included across-the-board mitigation of collection from that industry. However, those plans were not brought into effect. If political and unselective mitigation carried out along those plans, collection rate of loans to that industry was far lower.Previous studies about the JDB put importance on its independence at lending activities that is one aspect of the financial institution. However, the result of this paper shows that its subjectivity at managing and collecting activities that is another aspect also should be emphasized.