著者

田中 智晃

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_52-4_76, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper discusses issues related to the marketing strategy carried out by Nippon Gakki. In spite of numerous restrictions on sales, such as cost, size, and the need for periodical tuning and long training periods for users, the Japanese piano and organ market developed rapidly during the high economic growth period (1955-1973). What was behind the market expansion during this period? Mainly, it is attributed to three different factors: music education, credit sales, and the dealership system.Modern music education using instruments only began in the postwar period. The Japanese government officially announced the new school curriculum guidelines in 1958, which clearly stated that ‘students have to play the organ in school music class.’ This new curriculum boosted the demand for keyboard instruments, especially organs (reed organs). Around the same time, Nippon Gakki tried to further expand the market by encouraging early childhood music education, through the Yamaha music school.The second factor was the use of Yoyaku-hanbai (savings-type installment sales) which a Japanese sewing machine company created in the prewar period. This method was used by Nippon Gakki and Kawai Co. to enlarge the market to a wider income group. The third reason for the expansion was the dealership system of Nippon Gakki, which changed its system into a force that could achieve an ideal musical education, using the management resources of the dealership.Nippon Gakki grasped the trend of the times to firmly gain a competitive advantage; furthermore it constructed a stable marketing channel which was reinforced by the synergy of the three factors mentioned above, in addition to the territory system, the dealer-support system and the evolving sales force organization. This resulted in Japan becoming the largest piano and organ producer and consumer in the world.

著者

恩田 睦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The aim of this paper is to present the entrepreneurial activities of local enterprises during the pre-war period by analyzing the fund raising approach of Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. between the early 1900s and mid 1920s. The funds raised were instrumental in the railway company's success in large-scale capital investments like the electrification and electric actuation of their train carriages in a short period of time. In conclusion, it was evident that the 2nd generation manager, Sadakichi Kakihara was not only able to expand business activities in the local areas, but also actively do so in Tokyo and raised funds with highly favorable standings.For the funds raised between 1900 and 1907, it was necessary to have collaterals for small sums of money borrowed at high interest rates for a short period from small-scale local banks situated along the railway lines that were concurrently run by the board of directors. The board of directors had to use their own securities or the company's stocks as collaterals. However, by relying solely on the local banks, it was unable to provide sufficient funds for the railway construction. It was during 1907, when Kakihara became the manager that he took the initiative to approach Tokyo's Eiichi Shibusawa for loan financing and the two entered into an agreement. The debt financing terms of Shibusawa, who had connections with banks in Tokyo, were such that there was sufficient funding with low-interest rate for the construction of the railways. In addition, the loan was for the long term.Subsequently, with regards to financing for the electrification works of the railway, Kakihara then raised funds from Bushu Bank which had been inaugurated as an external board. Although Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. was able to increase profits, retained earnings for the company were reduced because of the increase in corporate dividend ratio. Due to Kakihara's business activities making inroads into Tokyo, success in large-scale capital investment with the funds raised was made possible.

著者

木下 なつき

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_57-2_74, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper explores the early history of the life insurance company owned by African-Americans in California, focusing on their marketing strategy. The company, founded in 1925 as the Golden State Guarantee Fund, struggled to survive in the tough situation for Black Business, which was different from other black life insurance companies. California's small and lower-middle black communities made a life insurance business tough. According to the prior studies, successful black insurance business had to have a large and poor black population as in the Jim Crow South, or solidarity as in the ghetto North. They covered the organizational inefficiency that most of black business had.Because of the contrary condition in California, the Golden State Life had to develop their organizational capability in sales and marketing. George A. Beavers, Jr., one of the main founders, was in charge of both public relation and directing agency divisions as young community leader. While introducing some competitive ways to the agency management, Beavers took the advantage of community capitals on which most of their marketing activities were based in its early stages.Going between two opposite elements — competitiveness and community-consciousness, they finally made up their organization — “branch=team system.” While they developed team works inside each branch, all the branches competed the company-wide production contests. The concept came from baseball and other team sports. Organized sports gained high popularity and made an enthusiasm among African-Americans in the early 20th century. They helped the agents unite with each other and learn how to make organizational efforts in business.The Golden State Life's other marketing strategy was breaking into non-black market. Black people often shared residential and commercial spaces with other racial and ethnic groups in California. The company tried to meet the demands of the local communities, which were not limited to the blacks.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_44-3_59, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

著者

道重 一郎

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2008 (Released:2011-10-18)

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In this paper, based on investigation of clothing retailers in eighteenth century London, I try to clarify the role of retailers in the consumer revolution and discern the degree of modernity of eighteenth century London retail shops.In eighteenth century England, there were splendid urban growth and development of shopping area in many towns and retailers of these areas began to display novel goods at their shop windows and tried to sell fashionable things. Especially in London, shopkeepers were strongly sensitive to fashion trends. A key to their business success was in understanding fashion trends and keeping up with the latest fashions. Active business conduct going along with fashion was decisive for shopkeepers in London and they played an important role in diffusion of new fashion trends.I have investigated trade cards of some London clothing retailers and the business records of a London milliner. They sold diverse clothes and ornaments, but focused their business on preparing and arranging fashionable dresses and hats. The main concern of Mary Holl, whose records I have investigated was to provide sales of lace or other ornaments and the service of stitching these ornaments into clothes as well as washing and mending clothes. They tried to provide customer satisfaction by offering services which adopted the latest fashions and also suited the middle class customer's identity.It is also clear from records of Mary Holl, and other documents, that the outer and inner appearance of shops were important elements to attract potential customers. Show windows displayed diverse goods and a tasteful shop façade could lure customers into the shops. Inside of many shops there was a special space for the favoured customers to rest while shopping. Shopping became a leisure activity in the late eighteenth century; it was a very important business strategy for shopkeepers to enhance customer satisfaction by preparing comfortable space, especially for female customers.In the late eighteenth century, at the onset of the consumer society, shopkeepers in London, such as Mary Holl, whose customers were mainly the middling sorts of people played a very important role in increasing the consumption and spreading fashion trends.

著者

Hisayuki Ōshima Alexandre Roy

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Research in Business History (ISSN:1349807X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.24-43, 2023 (Released:2023-12-26)

参考文献数

38

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The importance of general trading companies in Japan’s economic development is widely acknowledged, but little is known about their role in the transfer of technology and innovations. We address this issue by examining the emerging aircraft industry in Japan during the 1920s, focusing on its main foreign partner, France, and one of the largest Japanese groups, Mitsubishi. We show that while the French influence in the Japanese market remained unchallenged up to the mid-1920s, it faded away afterward due to the absence of French trading companies on the ground, despite considerable support from the French government. This contrasts with our analysis of the Japanese side. Using its worldwide network, Mitsubishi Trading Co. provided Mitsubishi Motors Co. with appropriate information and contracts with French as well as German companies. It eventually succeeded in creating joint ventures with these close partners. Their early failure in 1926 sparked a shift from importing technology via trade agreements to developing the industry through manufacturing (e.g., creation of Mitsubishi Aircraft Co. in 1928). Thus, Mitsubishi Trading proved to be an efficient early market developer for the Japanese side, whereas French business suffered from not having similar trading companies in Japan and being overdependent on state structures.

著者

Masaru UDAGAWA

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Yearbook on Business History (ISSN:09102027)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.3-29, 1991-03-15 (Released:2010-06-28)

参考文献数

39

著者

Atsuko Suzuki

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Research in Business History (ISSN:1349807X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.68-88, 2022 (Released:2022-12-28)

参考文献数

28

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This study investigates price determination methods of kimono fabric dealers in early modern Japan, conducting a case study of Naraya, a Kyoto-based merchant that had branches in the Kantō region (Edo and its neighboring areas). In order to cope with data availability limitations, the investigation utilizes historical records of other major Kyoto-based merchants with Edo branches and those of modern times as well. There were two price determination methods: namely, the “uchi-mashi” and “soto-mashi” methods.Uchi-mashi: Cost ÷ (1 - (Profit percentage ÷ 100)) = Selling priceSoto-mashi: Cost × (1 + (Profit percentage ÷ 100)) = Selling priceNaraya used the uchi-mashi method for “kudari mono [kimono fabrics purchased in Kyoto and sent down to the Kantō region].” With regard to “kantō mono [kimono fabrics purchased in the Kantō region],” the soto-mashi method was adopted. There were three pre-determined profit rates applied in the calculation, corresponding to three different categories into which commodities were classified. In the case of kudari mono, however, it was a common practice that prices were increased higher than calculated selling prices depending on the quality of fabrics and popularity of their designs. In addition, there were unique business practices concerning price tags. When commodities were sent from Kyoto, prices were doubled, and such doubled prices were written on price tags. “Cash only, price on the tag” sales were also held. In introducing these practices, Naraya followed precedents of major merchants that had branches in Edo. This is the first Japanese economic history study that gives an in-depth analysis of early modern merchants’ actual business practices concerning price determination.

著者

松原 日出人

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.3-27, 2020 (Released:2023-03-30)

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This study investigates the Misumi production area in the Kumamoto prefecture, an emerging citrus production area led by the Misumi Agricultural Cooperative Society (hereinafter referred to as the Misumi region). The primary objective of this study is to elucidate the development of the Misumi region in 1970–1990, focusing on the rise, fall, and resurgence of this region. In contrast to the existing studies that focus on traditional production areas, the secondary objective of the present study is to explain the development of the citrus industry centering on this emerging region. The historical analysis revealed the following: during the first period (up to 1975), the Misumi region was established in the citrus market as a new noteworthy producer and its success was symbolized by the production of mandarin oranges containing 13°C sugar;the Misumi region was highlighted as a new brand name producer for this product. However, the Misumi region stagnated in the second period (1976–1985) because of unstable shipments and delays in the introduction of better varieties. These problems weakened the competitiveness of the Misumi region in the market. In the third period (after 1986), the Misumi region was restructured to regain its competitiveness in the market. The focal point was the double renewal of production, namely, the introduction of superior varieties and new production techniques. These efforts raised the competitiveness of the Misumi region again as a production area.

著者

島西 智輝 梅崎 修 南雲 智映

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.3-27, 2020 (Released:2022-12-30)

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This study analyzes the growth of the largest industrial union in Japan, Zensen Domei(ZENSEN), from the postwar economic recovery era to Japan’s period of high economic growth, by using historical documents and union leaders’ oral histories. Although the number of employees in the textile industry shrank during the period of high economic growth, ZENSEN’s number of members clearly increased. This can be attributed to the collective organization of small and medium enterprise workers and workers in the downstream industry such as distribution. Three factors contributed to ZENSEN’s successful organization of workers. First, the organizational system was improved and centralized leadership was strengthened. Second, ZENSEN created an organizer department at its headquarters to centralize organizing activities. Third, a human resource development plan, an evaluation, and selection system were introduced to develop the organizers. In addition, ZENSEN used “enforcement and penalties” and “selective incentives” to maintain its expanded organization. In other words, ZENSEN severely penalized large company unions that dropped out of the united struggle and demonstrated the benefits of industrial policy, internationalization, information sharing, and human exchange to their company unions. As a result, in spite of the increase in the number of SME unions, large unions remained within ZENSEN. Although limited to the case of ZENSEN, currently known as UA ZENSEN, the findings confirm that industrial unions can mitigate the difficulty of union organization and weak labor-management bargaining power in small and medium enterprises.

著者

Akira Kudo

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

Japanese Yearbook on Business History (ISSN:09102027)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.88-116, 1989-03-15 (Released:2010-06-28)

参考文献数

70

著者

星野 高徳

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_29-4_53, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

参考文献数

80

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After 1910, urbanization and increased use of other fertilizers resulted in the loss of the value of human waste as compost. The night soil recycling networks of Osaka, formed in the early modern period, collapsed and the city was forced to provide human waste dis-posal as a municipal service.Previous studies on the transition to this municipal service have shown that improve-ments in hygiene conditions in Japan came later than in Western countries because Japa-nese cities depended on systems of human waste recycling networked with suburban farming villages.However, Takeshi Nagashima compared statistical data of Osaka with that of Tokyo and raised questions about the effect of Osaka’s modern sewage disposal system. According to this study, Osaka’s typhoid morbidity rate in the 1930s was higher than that of Tokyo, which placed an emphasis on the night soil recycling system. In short, the sewage disposal system built in Osaka did not provide a fundamental solution, and problems of infectious disease persisted for a long time. Regarding reasons for this, Nagashima pointed out the city’s financial limitations but did not examine the more concrete problems Osaka faced when creating its sewage disposal system.Thus, this paper focuses on Osaka’s night soil disposal plan and examines obstacles encountered when building a modern sewage disposal system as well as factors that pro-longed the city’s continued sanitation problems.After human waste disposal became stagnant in the city center, the government revised the Filth Cleaning Law on May 17, 1930. The revised law included human waste as part of cities’ waste disposal obligations. After this revision, Osaka considered the construction of a sewage disposal system to be a more important municipal measure than its human waste removal service. However, despite the city’s plan, Osaka’s residents were opposed to such a measure because they were reluctant to spend much money on flush toilet installation. Therefore, the measure was ineffective in solving the city’s waste disposal problems.In the end, Osaka was entrusted with the final disposal of human waste. Because the measure preserved the livelihoods of night soil peddlers and reduced the city’s waste dis-posal cost, the city cooperated with Osaka Prefecture and agricultural associations to build human waste storage tanks, thereby intervening in the process of human waste disposal. As a result, the city of Osaka supplied human waste to many surrounding farming villages in the prefecture, simultaneously relieving its human waste problems.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.4_54-4_92, 2014 (Released:2016-03-28)

著者

青木 洋

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_3-2_26, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

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Industry-government-university collaboration (IGUC) in Japan during the period from World War II to the postwar time has recently attracted the attention of some historians. However, there are only a few case studies focussing on the development of a specific technology. This paper presents a case history of high frequency (HF) heating and hardening technology from the pre-war to the post-war period in Japan, and examines the role of IGUC for the technological development.Many new technologies were developed during the War, but the most famous and important among them was electronics. It originally led to the development of radio, but thereafter, people tried to apply it in other industrial and technological fields also. The HF heating and hardening technology attracted attention as a promising manufacturing technology after the War. It is one of the reasons for which a lot of idle HF valve oscillators for military use were applicable to HF heating equipments.Consequently, this paper gives a clear picture that the network of IGUC expanded from the pre-war to the post-war period in the field of HF heating technology. In the pre-war period, there was a lack of IGUC because new technologies for Japanese firms were mainly procured from foreign firms. But, the situation changed during the War. Japanese firms needed to develop new technologies by themselves or in collaboration with other domestic institutes. Public research institutes and university professors played an important role in IGUC. As a result of this collaboration, some new enterprises got the opportunity to establish and grow as leaders in the industry.

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_27-2_52, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

63

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This paper aims to analyze the diffusion of tungsten filament lamps in Japan and the strategy of Tokyo Electric.In the United States, General Electric (GE) developed drawn-wire tungsten lamps in 1910. This electric lamp was three times more efficient (w/candlepower) and lasted twice as long as a carbon filament lamp. In Japan, Tokyo Electric, a GE subsidiary, introduced tungsten lamps in 1911.Initially, this lamp was adopted by small scale electric power companies/utilities in rural areas and new market entrants in major city. Some electric power utilities in major cities were cautious in the introduction of the tungsten lamp. The revenues of electric power utilities may have declined if there was no increase in the demand for electrical lighting service, corresponding to the improvement in the efficiency of electric lamps. Tokyo Electric promoted tungsten lamps, by introducing them in installations with more and brighter electric lights. This served the mutual interest they shared with the electric power utilities, which was building a large customer base for lamp manufacturers.During World War I, many electric power utilities decided to introduce tungsten lamps and the main channel of distribution of the tungsten lamp was through a cooperative relationship with Tokyo Electric. Electric power utilities succeeded in internalizing the effect of improved lamp efficiency by revising the advantageous rates for electric lighting service. The tungsten lamps that were launched in Japan were adjusted for lower efficiency and longer life spans, compared with their US counterparts. Electric power utilities tend to emphasize the longer life spans. Furthermore, Tokyo Electric marked down the lamp price while maintaining quality standards. Thus, Tokyo Electric, which pioneered the distribution of tungsten lamps in Japan, reaped significant profits.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.2_53-2_93, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_51-3_89, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

著者

白井 泉

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_3-1_25, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

36

被引用文献数

1

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The Takedate Cooperative is a well-known agricultural cooperative in Japan. This study examines the Takedate Cooperative’s credit activities from 1907 until the 1930s. Established in the backward agricultural areas of northeast Japan, in the Aomori prefecture, this cooperative supported members’ production activities, introduced standardization and trademarking in the apple trade, and created the “Takedate Apple” brand. Since its inception, the cooperative has included purchase, marketing, and production divisions, and in 1914, it introduced a credit division to help its members overcome difficulties in raising money from the financial market after poor rice harvests. An additional aim of Takedate Cooperative was to dominate its member behavior by providing preferential financing terms to frequent users of its production and marketing activities and to members who obeyed to its rules. Before World War I, the cooperative raised finances through individual member deposits, and lent considerable sums of money at low rates to its members for cultivation. This lending practice allowed cooperative members to grow apples as well as rice until the early 1920s. However, in the wake of poor business conditions after World War I and the consequent lower than normal performance of its marketing division, the cooperative was forced to reduce loan amounts and lent money to cover living expenses only. It even urged members to save money. Given the circumstances, the cooperative’s loan rate eventually exceeded that of the Aomori prefecture’s financial market, leading many competent members to withdraw their memberships. However, this action did not result in the stagnation of the cooperative and its surrounding areas. On the contrary, in Takedate village, the core area of the cooperative, peasants could still borrow money and purchase land without pledging security. Thus, 80% of farm households could continue to grow apples, leading to greater affluence in the 1930s.

著者

伊田 吉春

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_26-1_50, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

60

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The goal of this paper is to show the role technologies used in silk manufacturing played in the development of high quality silk production.In 1878, Kichiroji Tase and his family began producing raw silk through mechanical means in order to improve quality, but the early stages involved a great amount of trial and error, and they were unable to produce silk of very high quality at first.However, the Tase family continued working into the 1890s, aiming to increase production gradually, and eventually were able to produce high-quality raw silk. This improvement in quality was due to a number of factors which included improving the silk production equipment, carefully selecting the cocoons used as raw material, and mastering the processes involved in boiling and reeling the silk. At this stage however, the “sunk reeling” process which required separate boiling and reeling steps had not yet been brought into full use, so while quality had increased, production could not yet be expanded.The “sunk reeling” process was fully established as a part of production after the dissolution of the silk manufacturing association in the 1900s, and efficiency increased. The family had created a system enabling large-scale production of high-quality raw silk, and they were able to further tighten factory management policies in the hopes of increasing operational efficiency. It was at this point that operational differences between the Tase family’s silk company and the Suwa silk industry essentially disappeared. After developing their own raw silk production methods, the Tase family had to begin competing with the large-scale silk producers in the market for high-quality silks, and during this period the Tase family increased production of silk thread for textiles and opened a branch factory in order to expand their operations.

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1_51-1_94, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)