著者
小草 泰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.1, pp.1_17-1_33, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)
参考文献数
18

A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

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科学哲学より。「経験の透明性」は経験の現象性と志向性の関係について何を示しているのか http://t.co/feq1ZZlR
科学哲学より。「経験の透明性」は経験の現象性と志向性の関係について何を示しているのか http://t.co/feq1ZZlR

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