著者

小草 泰

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.73-83, 2007

著者

小草 泰

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.1_29-1_49, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)

参考文献数

16

被引用文献数

2

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Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.

著者

小草 泰

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_17-1_33, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)

参考文献数

18

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A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

著者

小草 泰

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1-2, pp.1-21, 2018 (Released:2018-05-07)

参考文献数

30

被引用文献数

1

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Dispositionalism of color claims that colors are dispositions to cause certain sorts of visual experiences in perceivers. Lately, this theory has been criticized as conflicting with the phenomenology of color experiences. Critics insist that our visual experiences represent colors not as dispositional properties, but as simple, monadic, intrinsic features of physical objects, and that this poses a serious threat to dispositionalism. First, I will examine four versions of this kind of objection and defend dispositionalism against them. Second, based on these considerations, I will explicate the notion of ‘certain sorts of visual experiences' that dispositionalists refer to. More specifically, I will offer a promising view of color experiences through examining the phenomenon of color constancy.

著者

小草 泰

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.85-100, 2006-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

7

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This paper deals with Evans' view on demonstrative thoughts, i.e., thoughts typically expressed using demonstratives such as 'this' or 'that.' As is well known, Evans defends against (so-called) the Direct Reference Theory the claim that singular terms have Fregean Senses, while contending that demonstrative thoughts (expressed using these terms) are object-dependent. Criticisms have been given to this two-sided contention of Evans', but they have not paid due attention to his subtle and detailed theory of demonstrative identification. In this paper I examine, through scrutinizing this theory of demonstrative identification, whether Evans' defense of his two-sided contention above is successful or not. I will conclude by arguing that it is not successful at least in establishing the object-dependency of demonstrative thoughts.

著者

小草 泰

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.73-83, 2007