著者

中西 悠喜

出版者

一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会

雑誌

オリエント (ISSN:00305219)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.1, pp.53-63, 2017-09-30 (Released:2020-10-01)

参考文献数

34

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Ṣāʾin al-Dīn ibn Turka al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1432) is among the most neglected figures in the history of Arabic-Islamic philosophy. True, his Tamhīd al-qawāʿid (“Introduction to the Principles,” TQ) has been highly evaluated within the Iranian ʿirfān circle since the late Qajar period; as the author of TQ, he is considered in this circle to be a precursor of Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1640) alleged “synthesis” of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) Akbarian mysticism, al-Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191) illumi­nationist philosophy, and al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 1274) revived Avicennian philosophy. Modern historians, however, adopt this evaluation while conducting, effectively, no detailed analysis of the contents of the work. Even Melvin-Koushki, who explores in detail the lettrist-occultist dimensions of this politically afflicted polymath’s Weltanschauung, has not gone so far as to redress their inaccurate understanding of TQ itself.In this paper, I will focus on two central issues addressed in TQ: 1) that “absolute theology” (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī al-muṭlaq) is the highest science, whose subject-matter is “existence” (wujūd) as such; and 2) that existence is the Real (al-ḥaqq). What is noteworthy is that Ibn Turka discusses both issues with (critical) reference to major philosophical texts, such as the Ilāhiyyāt of Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 1037) Shifāʾ (on his conception of metaphysics as the regina scientiarum), al-Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (on his thesis that existence is a mental construct), and the Ṭabīʿiyyāt of al-Ṭūsī’s Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (on his theory of the prerequisites for something being analogical). By analysing Ibn Turka’s arguments on the aforementioned two issues while clarifying his positions towards the theses of earlier philosophers, I aim in the present study to indicate the place of this late medieval Akbarian mystic in the post-Avicennian history of philosophy.

著者

村瀬 天出夫 伊藤 博明 小野 純一 中西 悠喜 平井 浩

出版者

聖学院大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2022-04-01

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イスラム圏および西欧圏という地中海の東西二大文化圏における双方向的な魔術思想の交流を扱う。魔術は「自然の操作」という観念のもとに、近代以前の「知の歴史」に多大な寄与をなし、実験科学の興隆や人間観・自然観の形成に影響を与えた。その背景には中世・近世にかけて両文化圏をまたぐ魔術思想の交流があった。対立的(「イスラム対キリスト教」)と捉えられがちな両者の関係を、相互依存的・相互発展的な知の往来という観点から包括的に明らかにする。そのために、分断されている現在の研究潮流の統合を試みるとともに、当時の「魔術的知」の伝統と「自然の操作」の観念が現代へ連なる「近代世界」を準備した重要な要因であることを示す。

著者

中西 悠喜

出版者

一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会

雑誌

オリエント (ISSN:00305219)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.76-92, 2010-03-31 (Released:2014-03-31)

被引用文献数

1

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In classical discussions on the waḥdat al-wujūd (“Unity of Existence”), absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), that is “existence” itself, is recognized as the one and only reality. Existence is, in this system, identified with God, i.e. the “Necessarily Existent” (wājib al-wujūd), the entire universe being conceived to be self-manifestations of it. However, in the second half of the fourteenth century, this conception of existence was subjected to strong criticism by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1389/90). According to this Timurid philosopher-theologian, identifying existence with the Necessarily Existent is impossible, because “existence” itself is merely a secondary intelligible (al-ma‘qūl al-thānī) to which nothing in the external world corresponds. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamzah al-Fanārī (d. 1431), with whom we shall deal in this paper, refuted this attack, thereby laying the ontological foundation of waḥdat al-wujūd. The aim of the present study is firstly to cast some light on this “Taftāzānī-Fanārī controversy” from the viewpoint of “Necessity of Existence,” which plays a decisive role in Fanārī’s whole refutation, and then to elucidate the Ottoman scholar’s strategy in demonstrating the identification of existence with the Necessarily Existent. Taftāzānī’s criticism revolves around the three themes: 1. classification of existence; 2. existence of the Necessarily Existent and His distance from impurities (qādhūrāt); 3. the Necessarily Existent and unity. In refuting all this criticism, Fanārī posits a concept of “relation” (nisbah). According to Taftāzānī, “existence” is a concept of “being” (mafhūn al-kawn). According to Fanārī, existence thus understood is nothing other than the relation of “existene” itself to the “beings” (kā’ināt), i.e. the created things. Fanārī salvages the identification of “existence” itself with the Necessarily Existent through this equation of what Taftāzānī calls “existence” with the relation of existence.