著者
今村 健一郎
出版者
日本イギリス哲学会
雑誌
イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.19-33, 2010-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
参考文献数
16

In his discussion of personal identity, Locke uses “consciousness” in three ways. “Consciousness” means “self-consciousness,” “memory” and “the appropriation of past thoughts and actions.” This multiple meaning of “consciousness” makes it difficult to get the clear understanding of his consciousness theory of personal identity. This paper is an attempt to show; firstly, that the principal meaning of “consciousness” is “self-consciousness” in that it does not only accompanies present perceptions but also constitutes memory; secondly, that it is the consciousness as memory that what Locke says appropriates past actions. Through this attempt, it becomes possible to distinguish the central and theoretical part from the marginal and practical part in Lockeʼs theory of personal identity.
著者
今村 健一郎
出版者
日本イギリス哲学会
雑誌
イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.31-47, 2007-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

It is widely admitted that when someone is morally responsible for an action,(1) the action must be none other than her action, i.e., the action must be ascribable to her, and (2) the action must be alternative when she did it. About the first condition Locke says someone is morally responsible for an action only if it is the effect of her volition. But it is still to be asked how her volition can be identified with herself. About the second condition Locke doesn't seem to say something explicitly. This paper is addressed to these two conditions in Locke's theory of responsibility.