著者
島内 明文
出版者
日本イギリス哲学会
雑誌
イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.35-52, 2008-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
参考文献数
37

Smith proposed an equitable maxim requiring that our moral sentiments of merit and demerit should be based on the expected consequence of the action. But in practice, these sentiments vary with the actual consequence. Smith called this ‘irregularity of moral sentiment (hereafter IS)’. In this paper I would like to suggest Smith's possible explanation and justification of IS in reference to the contemporary debates on moral luck and responsibility. Smith can explain IS in terms of epistemic value of consequence of action. Smith's justifications of IS are based on the practice of atonement and the agent's guilt feeling, which admit of both consequential and non-consequential interpretations.
著者
島内 明文
出版者
日本イギリス哲学会
雑誌
イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.47-62, 2005-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

Both utility and sympathy are the key concepts in Hume's and Smith's theory of justice. Whereas Hume and Smith hold the same view that the rules of justice have utility, their accounts differ in terms of the role of utility and sympathy. In this paper, after the careful analysis of Hume's and Smith's arguments, I would like to propose the following interpretation. Hume explains the evolution of the rules of justice and justifies them based on utility; so sympathy only plays a secondary role in explaining the moral approbation of justice as a virtue. But in Smith's theory it is sympathy that is used to explain the evolution and the enforcement of the rules of justice, and utility plays a part in justification of some kind of punishment and evaluation of laws and social policies.